In denial? Stock market underreaction to going-concern audit report disclosures

Richard J. Taffler*, Jeffrey Lu, Asad Kausar

Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield University, Cranfield, Bedford MK43 0AL, UK

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Abstract

We investigate the stock price reaction to UK going-concern audit report disclosures in the calendar year subsequent to publication. Over this period our firm population underperforms by between 24% and 31% depending on the benchmark adopted. This market underreaction to such an unambiguous bad news release is not a post-earnings announcement drift phenomenon; it is also robust to other potentially confounding explanations. However, whatever the reasons for such stock mispricing, we find costly arbitrage prevents rational investors forcing prices back into line with fundamental value. Our results have implications for the market’s ability to impound bad news appropriately and the incompleteness of arbitrage in such small “loser” firm situations.

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* Corresponding author. Tel.: + 44 1234 754543; fax: + 44 1234 752554.
E-mail address: r.j.taffler@cranfield.ac.uk (R.J. Taffler).

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1. Introduction

An increasing body of research suggests that the stock market takes time to assimilate bad news, in contrast to a more timely incorporation of good (positive) news. For example, Womack (1996) shows that analysts’ new buy recommendations provide only small and short-lived price increases whereas new sell recommendations appear to take up to 6 months for their implications to be fully incorporated in market prices, with average 6-month abnormal returns of $-9.1\%$. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) demonstrate that markets respond in similar ways to Moody’s bond rating changes, finding no significant abnormal returns following upgrades but negative abnormal returns of between $-10\%$ and $-14\%$ in the first year following downgrades with a further $-3\%$ to $-7\%$ in each of the second and third years following the original announcement. Likewise, Dichev (1998) shows that stocks in the highest decile of bankruptcy risk underperform those with low bankruptcy risk (lowest $70\%$ probability of bankruptcy) by around $14\%$ in the year following portfolio formation, and that this pattern continues on a rather more attenuated basis for a further 3 years.

Other areas with apparent incomplete stock price reaction to new information events include the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly (e.g. Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990), dividend cuts and omissions versus increases (Michael et al., 1995), IPOs/SEOs (e.g. Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 1997; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995) and stock splits (e.g. Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002). Both potential measurement problem issues and behavioral explanations for these apparent empirical irregularities are discussed in the literature.

This paper contributes to the “underreaction” literature by providing a sharply defined setting for testing the speed of market reaction to a very serious and unambiguous bad news event, the receipt of a first time going-concern modified (GCM) audit report by a firm. In addition, since most of the market anomalies research has been conducted in US capital markets, our UK context allows us to extend this literature by exploring related issues in an alternative trading environment. Two related studies are those of Willenborg and McKeown (2001) and Weber and Willenborg (2003) who explore the case of going-concern audit opinions in micro-cap IPOs. In particular, Willenborg and McKeown (2001) find IPOs with a GCM audit report on the private-company financial statements contained in their prospectus significantly underperform those with non-going-concern audit reports by around $25\%$ in the first year post-IPO and by three times that on a 3-year horizon. The authors attribute their results to the private information conveyed by the going-concern opinion helping uninformed investors better estimate IPO value in the secondary market. In a companion paper, Weber and Willenborg (2003) break down this analysis by type of audit firm and find that 1-year aftermarket performance is more negative for firms receiving going-concern opinions than those with clean opinions for Big 6 and national firms but not for local firms.

We explore the medium-term price reaction to going-concern audit report disclosures by London Stock Exchange (LSE) firms over the one calendar year
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