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Sequential commitment games

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Highlights

- We consider extensive-form games where players have the option to commit to actions.
- Commitments are sequential, voluntary, and irreversible.
- Committing according to DFS orders lead to Pareto efficiency in two-player games.
- No order of commitments guarantees Pareto efficiency in four-player games.

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