Accepted Manuscript



International environmental agreements with support

Erik Ansink, Hans-Peter Weikard, Cees Withagen

PII: S0095-0696(16)30121-8

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.02.001

Reference: YJEEM 2104

To appear in: *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*

Received Date: 18 July 2016

Revised Date: 19 January 2018

Accepted Date: 4 February 2018

Please cite this article as: Ansink, E., Weikard, H.-P., Withagen, C., International environmental agreements with support, *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* (2018), doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.02.001.

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

International environmental agreements with support*

Erik Ansink† Hans-Peter Weikard‡ Cees Withagen§

Abstract

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. We assume their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, in order to induce larger coalitions, higher levels of public good provision and higher payoffs. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (e.g. abatement of greenhouse gas emissions), there exist equilibria with support. Allowing for support increases payoffs to each of three types of agents: members, supporters and free-riders.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Public goods; Support; Transfers; International Environmental Agreements

JEL classification: C72; D02; H41; Q54

1 Introduction

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements (IEAs) (cf. Hoel, 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994), with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition. The transfer is paid in order to incentivize other agents to participate in a coalition that coordinates their members' actions to provide a public good, for example abatement of emissions. In the

*We thank the editors, two reviewers, Stefan Ambec, Lorenzo Cerda Planas, Harold Houba, and Gerard van der Meijden, as well as seminar participants at CESifo, EAERE 2015, FAERE 2015, and SURED 2016 for comments and discussion. We acknowledge financial support from FP7-IDEAS-ERC Grant No. 269788.

†Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute.

‡Wageningen University.

§IPAG Business School (Paris), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute.

دریافت فوری ← متن کامل مقاله

ISIArticles
مرجع مقالات تخصصی ایران

✓ امکان دانلود نسخه تمام متن مقالات انگلیسی
✓ امکان دانلود نسخه ترجمه شده مقالات
✓ پذیرش سفارش ترجمه تخصصی
✓ امکان جستجو در آرشیو جامعی از صدها موضوع و هزاران مقاله
✓ امکان دانلود رایگان ۲ صفحه اول هر مقاله
✓ امکان پرداخت اینترنتی با کلیه کارت های عضو شتاب
✓ دانلود فوری مقاله پس از پرداخت آنلاین
✓ پشتیبانی کامل خرید با بهره مندی از سیستم هوشمند رهگیری سفارشات