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On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm

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

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Highlights

- We analyze a preference revelation game for students in the student-optimal DA algorithm.
- We show the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium through a simple algorithm.
- The equilibrium outcome from our algorithm is the same matching as in the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm.
- In a one-to-one matching market, it is the student-optimal vNM stable matching.

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