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Journal of Safety Research xxx (2017) xxx-xxx



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Safety Research



journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jsr

🛛 Safety climate and firefighting: Focus group results*'**

Q3 Q2 David M. DeJoy, ^{a,*} Todd D. Smith, ^b Mari-Amanda Dyal ^c

Q4 ^a Workplace Health Group, College of Public Health, University of Georgia, United States

^b Department of Applied Health Science, School of Public Health, Indiana University, United States

5 ^c Department of Health Promotion and Physical Education, Kennesaw State University, United States

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

8 Article history Received 24 February 2016 Received in revised form 12 April 2017 10 11 Accepted 14 June 2017 Available online xxxx 1215 33 Keywords: 34 Firefighters 35 Safety climate 36 Occupational safety

37 Injury prevention

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38 Qualitative research

Background: Firefighting is a hazardous occupation and there have been numerous calls for fundamental changes 18 in how fire service organizations approach safety and balance safety with other operational priorities. These calls, 19 however, have yielded little systematic research. *Methods*: As part of a larger project to develop and test a model 20 of safety climate for the fire service, focus groups were used to identify potentially important dimensions of safety 21 climate pertinent to firefighting. *Results*: Analyses revealed nine overarching themes. Competency/professionalism, 22 physical/psychological readiness, and that positive traits sometimes produce negative consequences were themes at 23 the individual level; cohesion and supervisor leadership/support at the workgroup level; and politics/bureaucracy, 24 resources, leadership, and hiring/promotion at the organizational level. A multi-level perspective seems appropri-25 ate for examining safety climate in firefighting. *Conclusions*: Safety climate literature also seem relevant to 27 firefighting. These results also suggest that the fire service may be undergoing transitions encompassing mission, 28 personnel, and its fundamental approach to safety and risk. *Practical applications*: These results help point the way 29 to the development of safety climate measures specific to firefighting and to interventions for improving safety 30 performance. 31

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43 **1. Introduction**

Firefighting is a hazardous occupation. Firefighters are injured, suffer 44 work-related illnesses, are hospitalized, are forced into early retirement, 45or die at higher rates than most other workers in the United States (Lee, 46 Fleming, Gomez-Marin, & Leblanc, 2004; U.S. Department of Labor, 47 2006). From 2010 to 2012, about 70,000 firefighters were injured in 48 49 the line-of-duty (LOD) each year (U.S. Fire Administration, 2014). The large majority of these injuries (87%) occurred in structural fires. 50Approximately 100 firefighters die in the line-of-duty each year (Fahy, 51LeBlanc, & Molis, 2015), and this number has not improved substantially 5253during the past 25 years despite advances in technology, personal protective equipment, engineering controls, environmental management, 54medical care, and safety legislation. 55

56 1.1. Rethinking safety in the fire service

57 This lack of progress has prompted a number of firefighter organiza-58 tions and advocacy groups to call for fundamental changes in how fire

★ Contract grant sponsor: U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (EMW-2011-FP-00582).

* Corresponding author at: 341C, Wright Hall, Health Sciences Campus, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602, United States.

E-mail address: dmdejoy@uga.edu (D.M. DeJoy).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jsr.2017.06.011 0022-4375/© 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. service organizations approach safety and balance safety with other op- 59 erational priorities. In 1999, the Fire Service Needs Workshop (Walton, 60 Bryner, Madrzykowski, Lawson, & Jason, 2000) recognized the need for 61 a culture of safety instead of a culture that rewards and glamorizes un- 62 safe behaviors. The 2005 National Fire Service Research Agenda Sympo- 63 sium (NFPA, 2005) also identified culture change as a high priority 64 research area and one of the key factors in reducing firefighter injuries 65 and fatalities. Firefighter Life Safety Summits were conducted in 2004, 66 2007, and 2014 (National Fallen Fighters Foundation, 2004, 2007, 67 2014). The most fundamental issue agreed upon was the need for 68 the American fire service to change its acceptance of LOD fatalities as 69 normal and to advocate changes within the fire service related to safety, 70 leadership, management, supervision, and accountability. Studies of 71 firefighter fatalities have also called for changes or improvement in 72 the organizational aspects of fire service organizations (Hodous, 73 Pizatella, Braddee, & Castillo, 2004; Kunadharaju, Smith, & DeJoy, 74 2011; Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 2006). In 2015, the U.S. 75 Fire Administration (USFA, 2015) reinforced the call for culture change 76 in their report: National Safety Culture Change Initiative. 77

Despite these calls for action, there has been a dearth of empirical 78 research on the organizational and cultural aspects of fire service organi-79 zations and firefighting operations. Conclusions and recommendations 80 offered to date have been based largely on professional experience and 81 judgment and the examination of firefighter incident and fatality data. 82 Linkages between organizational factors and firefighter LOD injuries 83

^{☆☆} The authors report no conflicts of interest.

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and death have not been extensively explored or empirically verified 84 85 through systematic research. This is surprising, because in terms of the overall occupational safety literature, research on organizational factors 86 87 has expanded exponentially during the past three decades. The impetus for much of this work can be traced to the investigations of a number of 88 high profile events, including the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (Pidgeon & 89 O'Leary, 2000), the 2003 Columbia space shuttle disaster (Vaughan, 90 91 1996) and the 2005 BP Texas City explosion (Baker et al., 2007). These 92 investigations all highlight the critical role of organizational factors 93 and the fact that investments in more sophisticated and expensive engi-94neering solutions often yield diminishing returns in terms of safety. There is now broad recognition that system safety depends on social/ 95organizational structures as well as engineering and technological 96 97 controls (e.g., DeJoy, 2005; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Reason, 1997; Rochlin, 1999). 98

99 1.2. Safety culture and climate

Much of the research on organizational factors has focused on safety 100 culture and safety climate. The distinction between safety culture 101 and safety climate remains a source of some debate within the safety 102 field (Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; 103 104 (Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Gibbons, 2004). Definitions of safety culture (Wiegmann et al., 2004) generally highlight the shared 105 norms, values, and assumptions that impact safety-related attitudes and 106 behaviors, while safety climate focuses more on employee perceptions 107 related to safety policies and practices within their workgroup or orga-108 109nization (Zohar & Luria, 2005). Arguably, safety climate represents the observable or surface manifestations of safety culture (Schneider, 110 1975; Zohar, 1980). The majority of empirical research specific to work-111 place safety falls more within the purview of safety climate, in that, the 112 113main focus has been assessing employee perceptions through the use 114 of questionnaires and quantitative methodologies (Deloy, Schaffer, Wilson, Vandenberg, & Butts, 2004; Flin et al., 2000; Neal & Griffin, 1152004). 116

The body of evidence linking safety climate to safety performance 117 has grown considerably and now covers a wide array of different 118 occupations and work settings and a variety of different safety-related 119 outcomes (Clarke, 2006; Neal & Griffin, 2004). Results from several 120recent meta-analyses covering up to 200 published studies (Beus, 121 Payne, Bergman, & Arthur, 2010; Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 122 123 2009; Clarke, 2010; Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011) indicate that safety climate is among the strongest predictors of workplace 124 safety behaviors and injuries. Much of the interest in safety climate 125can be traced to the fact that safety climate functions as a leading 126 indicator of safety performance (i.e., predicts future injuries and other 127128adverse outcomes), whereas most traditional measures of safety performance (such as lost time injuries) are, by definition, lagging indicators 129(i.e., after-the-fact). However, studies focusing on firefighters are mostly 130absent in this literature. 131

132 1.3. Current study

The current study was conducted as part of a larger project to devel-133op and test a model of safety climate pertinent to the fire service. This 134study employed focus groups to identify important dimensions of safety 135136 climate and pertinent safety-related practices and behaviors. In addition, we were interested in determining the extent to which prominent 137 safety climate constructs from the general industry literature also apply 138 to firefighting. Focus groups were thought to be a good method for 139obtaining a more thorough understanding of the organizational and 140 operational dynamics of the fire service. Focus groups as a qualitative 141 methodology are often used for taking a detailed look inside various 142aspects of peoples' lives, including their work and occupational roles 143 (Schonfeld & Farrell, 2010). Qualitative methods are increasingly being 144 145 used in occupational safety and health research, either as independent methodologies or in conjunction with various quantitative methodologies 146 (Black, 1994; Dobson et al., 2013; Gordon et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2013; 147 Schonfeld & Farrell, 2010).

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2. Method

Two large metropolitan fire departments, one located in the eastern 150 U.S. and one located in the western portion of the country, participated 151 in this research. The selection and Eastern and Western departments 152 was partially to improve the generalizability of results. The two partici- 153 pating departments were chosen for their overall comparability and 154 their willingness to participate. Both departments serve metropolitan 155 areas with populations exceeding one million residents. Each depart- 156 ment employs upwards of 1000 personnel and operates approximately 157 30 stations with specialties including search and rescue, EMS, aircraft 158 rescue and firefighting, and hazardous materials. A stakeholder advisory 159 group (SAG) with representatives from the two departments was 160 established at the beginning of the project, the purposes of which were 161 to advise and assist the research team and to liaison with department 162 senior leadership and employee organizations. This research, including 163 the focus group portion, was reviewed and approved by Institutional Re- 164 view Boards at the University of Georgia and Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 165 University. Informed consent policies were followed. 166

2.1. Focus group participants

Focus group participants were recruited by the research team using 168 posters and email messages delivered to personnel at the various sta- 169 tions operated by the departments. The SAG facilitated the recruitment 170 in terms of making sure that the recruitment materials were widely 171 distributed and answering any questions about the focus groups or 172 the overall project. The SAG also provided input into the development 173 and structuring of the focus group protocol. They did not, however, 174 participate in or attend the actual focus group sessions. They also had 175 no access to the focus group recordings or transcripts, and did not par- 176 ticipate in organizing or analyzing the results. A total of 10 focus groups 177 were conducted; five with each department. We anticipated that 178 conducting five groups with each department would help in reaching 179 saturation; that is when no new information is forthcoming. In each de- 180 partment, four groups were conducted with station or company level 181 firefighters. Two groups were conducted with frontline personnel 182 (Level I); two with station/company level officers (Level II); and one 183 with senior department leadership (Level III). The numbers of senior 184 personnel were limited making multiple groups difficult. This structure 185 or segmentation was employed to help maximize free and open discus- 186 sion and to obtain viewpoints from different operational levels. It was 187 thought that the hierarchical or quasi-military structure of fire depart- 188 ments might potentially make some participants reluctant to disclose 189 their personal views and opinions in the presence of others holding sub-190 stantially different ranks and responsibilities within the organization 191 (Dobson et al., 2013; Krueger & Casey, 2015; Morgan, 1993). 192

2.2. Focus group protocol

Each focus group began with a brief welcome message and expression of appreciation for taking the time to participate in this portion of the project. The moderator introduced herself or himself and his or her assistant for the session. A senior member of the research team moderated each focus group and each group followed the same script. Informed consent forms were completed and an opportunity provided for questions. The consent form mentioned that the group discussions would be digitally recorded (audio) and that notes would be taken during the session. These particular aspects were also communicated verbally to the groups while they were reviewing the consent forms. Participants were also reminded that no names would be included in any written transcripts or notes. Participants were then asked to 205

Please cite this article as: DeJoy, D.M., et al., Safety climate and firefighting: Focus group results, *Journal of Safety Research* (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jsr.2017.06.011

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