Going private transactions, bondholder returns, and wealth transfer effects

Lindsay C. Baran, Tao-Hsien Dolly King

Department of Finance, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 9201 University City Blvd., Charlotte, NC 28223, United States

Abstract

We examine how buyout activity and deal characteristics drive bondholder returns and the wealth transfer effects between bondholders and stockholders in going private transactions from 1981 to 2006. We find that various deal characteristics are major determinants of the cross-sectional variation in bondholder returns. In particular, a single private equity acquirer mitigates bondholder losses. On the other hand, bondholders have larger losses when a reputable buyout firm is involved in the deal. Bondholders experience losses in the 1980s and 2000s, but enjoy gains in the 1990s. Our findings remain robust to consideration of deal financing, relative cost of credit, and level of market overheating. We find a negative and significant relationship between stockholder and bondholder wealth effects, which supports the wealth transfer hypothesis.

1. Introduction

Despite the recent slowdown in buyout activity due to the credit crunch, going private transactions in the 2000s steadily increased in both the number and size of buyouts from a relatively calm buyout market in the 1990s. This crest of activity marks the second wave of buyout activity in recent decades, with the other occurring in the late 1980s. These buyouts, often by private equity funds, act as a significant force in restructuring the corporate landscape. Much of the previous academic research focuses on the wealth effects to pre-buyout stockholders and finds positive abnormal returns. Substantially less research documents the abnormal returns to pre-buyout bondholders and finds positive abnormal returns. Substantially less research documents the abnormal returns to pre-buyout bondholders. Exceptions are Marias et al. (1989), Asquith and Wizman (1990), Cook et al. (1992), Warga and Welch (1993) and Billett et al. (2010). Aside from Marias et al. (1989), who find insignificant abnormal returns in a two-day announcement window, the remaining studies find significant losses to bondholders surrounding going private transactions and relate the magnitude of these returns to bond characteristics, such as maturity and covenant protection.

Interestingly, buyout periods and deal characteristics such as the type of acquirer, deal financing, and target firm characteristics have not yet been explored in terms of their links to bondholder wealth effects. In terms of buyout periods, extant literature highlights differences between periods of high and low activity in the buyout market that may influence bondholder returns. First, Kaplan and Strömbäck (2009), Axelson et al. (2009a,b) and Ljungqvist et al. (2007) show that buyout activity increases in periods of relatively cheap credit. The presence of relatively inexpensive credit generally encourages higher leverage that can have a damaging effect on target bondholder returns. Second, several researchers (Kaplan and Strömbäck, 2009; Engel et al., 2007; Oxman and Yildirim, 2007) point to differences in the buyout wave of the 1980s and that of the 2000s. Deal financing, including the amount, seniority, and covenant protection of additional debt undertaken by target firms, impacts pre-buyout bondholders. In the 1980s banks held the senior and secured portion of deal financing; whereas in the current buyout wave, institutional investors often buy collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) comprised of these collateralized loans (Kaplan and Strömbäck, 2009). If banks serve a monitoring role that is lacking from CLO investors, bondholders lose this level of protection, indicating greater bondholder losses in the recent buyout wave. Demiroglu and James (2009) report increasing use of covenant-lite loans (beginning in 2006) and loans funded by institutional investors rather than traditional commercial banks in the buyout wave in the 2000s. On the other hand, Kaplan and Strömbäck (2009) report that the typical equity portion of deal financing rose from between 10 and 15% in the 1980s buyout wave to around 30% in the current surge, and that interest coverage ratios have also risen. This motivation should protect bondholders because becoming private would be cheaper for the firm. Finally, Oxman and Yildirim

*Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 704 687 7652; fax: +1 704 687 4014.
E-mail addresses: lcbaran@uncc.edu (L.C. Baran), tking3@uncc.edu (T-H.D. King).

1 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.
confirm prior results on bond attributes that can explain this variance, such as covenant protection, maturity, seniority, and bond risk. Finally, we provide a deeper focus compared to prior literature on wealth transfer effects from bondholders to stockholders during going private transactions. We find strong evidence supporting wealth expropriation and show that bondholder losses account for a portion of stockholder gains during buyouts. This finding adds to the understanding of the sources of gains to stockholders during going private events. The recent paper by Billett et al. (2010) explores the role of bondholder wealth expropriation in LBOs. Similar to our findings, they use bond pricing data from the 2000s and find significantly negative bondholder returns for bonds without a change of control covenant and positive returns for bonds with such covenant. While both studies investigate bondholder returns during the recent buyout wave, our study differs from Billett et al. (2010). We examine the effects of acquirer and deal characteristics on bondholder wealth effects and the wealth transfer hypothesis, whereas they concentrate on the role of the change of control covenant (after controlling for target firm characteristics on bondholder wealth) and likelihood for a firm to be a LBO target.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and develops hypotheses about bondholder wealth effects in going private transactions. Section 3 discusses sample data. In Section 4, we discuss the empirical findings of bondholder returns and wealth transfer effects around going private events. Section 5 concludes.

2. Literature review and hypotheses about bondholder wealth effects

The literature on going private and LBO events extends back to the surge in buyout activity in the mid 1980s and covers various aspects of the buyouts. Numerous studies examine gains to pre-buyout stakeholders and investigate the sources of these gains. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) provide an overview of these sources of stockholder gains. The literature most relevant to our study explores the wealth effects to pre-buyout bondholders. While researchers agree on the positive wealth effects to stockholders, the difficulty in obtaining bond pricing data limits the extent of research in this area. Marias et al. (1989) use the buyout bids from 1975 to 1984 to study the wealth effects to senior nonconvertible debt. They find no abnormal returns to bondholders in the 33 deals in their sample. Other studies show negative abnormal returns to pre-buyout bondholders. In particular, Asquith and Wizman (1990) find an overall loss of −2.2% in the 4-month announcement window and attribute cross-sectional differences in bondholder returns to covenants. Warga and Welch (1993) report significant risk-adjusted losses to bondholders. Using Lehman Brothers monthly trader quotes for 36 bonds and 13 companies, they report an abnormal return of −7.33% over a 4-month announcement window.2 Billett et al. (2010) examine the role of the change of control covenant in the probability of becoming a buyout target. Using the bond prices in the 2000s collected from the Moody’s/Mergent’s Bond Record and TRACE, for a sample of 18 LBO deals and 49 bonds they document positive returns to bondholders with the change of control covenant protection and losses to bondholders without this protection. They examine the determinants of the likelihood of a firm becoming a buyout target. They find

2 The benchmark returns used by the previous two studies are different. Asquith and Wizman (1990) employ index returns matched on the time to maturity, whereas Warga and Welch’s (1993) benchmark returns match the bond characteristics by rating and maturity. Maturity-based indices capture differences in maturity risk but cannot account for differences in credit risk. In this study, we follow Warga and Welch (1993) to calculate abnormal returns. The −7.33% loss to bondholders is based on a sample that includes the RJR Nabisco deal.
دریافت فوری متن کامل مقاله

امکان دانلود نسخه تمام متن مقالات انگلیسی
امکان دانلود نسخه ترجمه شده مقالات
پذیرش سفارش ترجمه تخصصی
امکان جستجو در آرشیو جامعی از صدها موضوع و هزاران مقاله
امکان دانلود رایگان ۲ صفحه اول هر مقاله
امکان پرداخت اینترنتی با کلیه کارت های عضو شتاب
دانلود فوری مقاله پس از پرداخت آنلاین
پشتیبانی کامل خرید با بهره مندی از سیستم هوشمند رهگیری سفارشات