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
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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

Superseding Dublin: the European asylum system as a non-cooperative game

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Highlights

• We represent the European Common Asylum System as a non-cooperative game

• A trade-off between control and respect of rights determines the outcome of the game

• Increasing respect of rights can favour a quota system vs. the Dublin system

• This would represent a basic form of cooperation

Abstract

The European asylum system operates according to the 'Dublin system' rules, where the responsible

Member State will be the state through which the asylum seeker first entered the EU. This has been

immediately a source of controversy between states. A fairer system would be based on quotas,

where host countries share the burden according to appropriate criteria, but member states never

reached a common agreement. In this paper we offer a vision of the European asylum system as a

non-cooperative game where states compete to reduce their asylum burden. As the two different

systems (Dublin-like or quotas) lead to different equilibriums, according to the Pareto criterion the

preferred system is the one where all states are better able to achieve their national objectives. We

examine the conditions under which a relocation system based on quotas may be preferable to the

Dublin rules, and why greater consideration of the humanitarian aspects of asylum can favour its

adoption and reinforce cohesion of the system.

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