الگوبرداری نامتقارن پرداخت در شرکت ها
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|44329||2013||15 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||11676 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Corporate Finance, Volume 23, December 2013, Pages 39–53
This paper examines whether asymmetric benchmarking of pay exists for vice presidents (VPs). Using ExecuComp data for 1992–2007, we find that companies reward VPs for good luck but do not penalize them for bad luck. However, asymmetric benchmarking of VP pay is mitigated by governance, CEO power, gender, and industry factors. The presence of asymmetric benchmarking of pay could suggest that managers are involved in skimming, or it could mean that firms insulate managers from poor firm performance to prevent them from accessing outside opportunities. We find that unlike CEOs, asymmetric benchmarking of pay for VPs is not consistent with the skimming hypothesis.