دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 92001
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله

کیفیت سیگنالینگ از طریق هدایا: تأثیرات برای بخش خیرخواهانه

عنوان انگلیسی
Signaling quality through gifts: Implications for the charitable sector
کد مقاله سال انتشار تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
92001 2017 14 صفحه PDF
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : European Economic Review, Volume 96, July 2017, Pages 48-61

پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله  کیفیت سیگنالینگ از طریق هدایا: تأثیرات برای بخش خیرخواهانه

چکیده انگلیسی

A popular belief amongst fund-raisers is that potential donors are more generous when provided gifts as part of the solicitation request and there is a growing body of experimental research supporting this belief. To date, such behavior has been modeled through the lens of gift-exchange and reciprocity. We provide an alternate rationale for gift-giving by nonprofit organizations based on the signaling model of Spence (1973). We first show that in the presence of uninformed donors there exists a separating equilibrium under which high quality charities expend scarce resources to signal quality and receive higher donations. We then explore how gift-giving and competition amongst charities impacts net public good provision. In doing so, we highlight a perverse effect – competition amongst charities can lead to lower public good provision when the likelihood a charity is of high quality is high and/or when the difference in quality across high and low type firms narrows.