پیاده سازی سیاست های تحقیق و توسعه : تجزیه و تحلیل برنامه های تحقیقاتی دارویی اسپانیا

We analyze Spain's National Pharmaceutical Research Program using detailed firm-level data. We find differences between ex ante announced evaluation criteria and ex post implementation. This suggests that judging R&D programs on their design, rather than their implementation, may be misleading. We also uncover that the apparent discrimination against non-European firms can be interpreted as a premium to having local production facilities. Overall, the program values firms on the basis of criteria, such as R&D investment and patent spending, consistent with empirically tested measures of innovative activity.

Given its importance, the design of public support programs for innovation has received much attention (Martin and Scott, 2000 and Trajtenberg, 2002). To evaluate the effectiveness of such programs, the literature has relied on both case studies and firm-level microeconometric evidence (Klette et al., 2000 and Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). However, between a program's design and its outcome there is an important intermediate step: its implementation. A well-designed program may fail if poorly implemented. To judge the success of a program, one should take into account possible differences between its ex ante design and its ex post implementation. For instance, a program's design may claim it rewards firms on the basis of both research and commercial success. However, only its implementation can tell us how and whether the design was put into practice. Focusing on Spain's National Pharmaceutical Research Program, we use a unique firm-level data set to explore these issues. Our aim is threefold: first, we highlight the gap between design and implementation; second, we analyze whether the implementation is broadly in line with the program's objectives of R&D promotion; and, third, we try to uncover any other criteria that might have been used, such as possible discrimination in favor of Spanish firms.

This paper has studied how the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology ranked pharmaceutical companies in the framework of Profarma, a government plan aimed at fostering R&D. Our focus has been on the implementation, rather than the design of the plan. By using detailed firm-level data, we have shown remarkable differences between the ex ante and the ex post criteria. Uncovering differences between design and implementation, our paper suggests that too much attention may be given to analyze the optimality of the design, or to study the achievement of the objectives, and too little to its actual implementation. Even if selection criteria are optimal, the plan may fail if its implementation falls short. In spite of this discrepancy between ex ante announced and ex post applied criteria, the plan's implementation has been shown to be broadly in line with its objectives. In particular, we found that R&D investment and patent spending played a central role in evaluating firms. From the empirical work by Griliches et al. (1991) we know that these two variables are good indicators for innovative capacity in the pharmaceutical industry.