شرایط لازم برای تحویل خارج از ساعت و تاثیر قیمت گذاری حمل و نقل جاده ای شهری و سیاست های مالی جایگزین در بازارهای رقابتی

This paper discusses the economic conditions needed to move urban freight delivery traffic to the off-hours, and the effectiveness of alternative policies to foster such move in competitive markets. Such policies seem to be needed because the empirical evidence indicates that in urban freight competitive markets freight road pricing may not be the most effective way to move truck traffic out of the congested hours. This is because: the decision about delivery time is jointly made between the carrier and the receiver; the carriers have great difficulties passing toll costs to receivers; and, in the few cases where toll costs could be passed, the price signal reaching receivers is of no consequence compared to receivers’ incremental costs of off-hour deliveries. Three different policies are considered: freight road pricing combined with financial incentives to receivers willing to accept off-hour deliveries, freight road pricing, and laissez faire conditions (neither freight road pricing, nor financial incentives). The paper uses an economic formulation to estimate the impact a policy would have on the agents’ profits, which provides insight into how the agents would react, and leads to a set of necessary conditions for off-hour deliveries to be feasible. Two cases of industry structure are considered: independent operations (carrier and receivers are separate companies) and integrated operations (carrier and receiver part of the same company). The particular case of large traffic generators, with central delivery stations is also discussed. The analyses of integrated carrier–receiver operations indicate that, because of the centralized decision making process, they could transfer all or none of the delivery operations to the off-hours. This enables them to take full advantage of the carrier savings during the off-hours, that are at a maximum when all deliveries in a tour are transferred to the off-hours. The analyses of independent carrier–receiver operations conclude that the decision about delivery time is the outcome of the interaction between carriers and receivers as part of the Battle of the Sexes game, where the receivers play the dominant role. The paper highlights that, because of the competitive nature of the urban delivery industry, rates tend to be set at marginal costs. This, in turn, prevents carriers from transferring toll surcharges to customers because the tolls are, generally, a fixed cost that does not enter into the marginal cost. As a result, receivers in competitive markers are not likely to receive any price signal; that are only possible in the industry segments in which the carriers enjoy oligopoly power. Equally significant is that, even in those cases, where the carrier could pass toll surcharges to their customers (9% in New York City), the price signal is of no consequence when compared to the incremental costs to receivers associated with off-hour deliveries. To overcome this, the paper suggests the use of tax incentives to receivers willing to accept off-hour deliveries, combined with freight road pricing as a revenue generation mechanism. The analyses of large traffic generators reveal that these facilities represent an ideal target for off-hour delivery policies because they could handle off-hour deliveries at a minimal incremental cost, which is a consequence of the scale economies associated with handling deliveries for multiple businesses. The paper highlights that, because of marginal cost pricing, toll schemes based on distance and/or time spent in a tolled region will enable the carriers to pass toll costs to the receivers, as the tolls would enter in the marginal costs and therefore freight rates. This, however, would not resolve the issue pertaining to the insignificance of the price signal reaching receivers relative to the incremental costs associated to moving to the off-hours. The analyses of the necessary conditions for the policies considered in the paper indicate that the most potent stimulus is provided by freight road pricing in combination with financial incentives to receivers. The paper concludes that neither freight road pricing by itself, nor laissez faire, are likely to achieve the goal of inducing a significant switch of truck traffic to the off-hours.

The idea of reducing urban congestion by moving freight deliveries to the off-hours, i.e., outside regular business hours, is older than what most people think. The oldest implementation on record is due to Julius Caesar, who promulgated an edict banning commercial deliveries during the daytime (Dessau, 1892). This edict is part of what Dessau calls the “Lex Iuliana Municipalis” on the basis of references in Cicero’s correspondence to a comprehensive law of Caesar’s which dealt with municipal affairs. As a result of Julius Caesar’s edict, urban deliveries were allowed only during the evening hours. The law is also referred to as “Tabula Heracleensis,” because the text was found in 1732 in Heraclea, Southern Italy, inscribed on a bronze tablet dating from the year 45 BC. Some scholars suggest that the street regulations were based on the laws of Greek cities (Roth and Roth, 2000). This suggests the intriguing proposition that traffic congestion required legislation not only in Rome but even in earlier times in Greece. It is very telling that Julius Caesar’s edict generated community complaints about the noise generated during evening hours, an issue that still remains today as an obstacle for off-hour deliveries; and is considered to be the key reason why some municipalities want to curtail off-hour deliveries (Browne et al., 2006). However, the notion of using pricing as a tool to induce a socially optimal level of traffic is indeed more recent, dating back to the 1960s when a flurry of important publications took place (Walters, 1961, Nelson, 1962, Vickrey, 1963, Vickrey, 1969, Johnson, 1964 and Beckman, 1965) – notwithstanding Pigou’s mention of the concept (Pigou, 1920). Since then, road pricing has elicited great interest because of its potential as a transportation demand management, and revenue generation tool. Following successful implementations in Singapore, California, and London, there is consensus among academicians about the social benefits brought about by road pricing of passenger car traffic, a conclusion that has been corroborated by real-life implementations and analytical studies (Sullivan and Harake, 1998, Brownstone et al., 2003, Sullivan, 2003, Brownstone and Small, 2005, De Palma et al., 2005 and Olszewski and Xie, 2005). There is no such consensus, however, about the impacts and effectiveness of freight road pricing (FRP). This is because of the lack of empirical studies that provide evidence on observed behavioral impacts; and of a general behavioral theory that could explain the complex interactions underlying freight decision making. This paper discusses the economic conditions needed to move urban freight delivery traffic to the off-hours, and the effectiveness of alternative policies to foster such move in competitive markets. Such policies seem to be needed because the empirical evidence indicates that freight road pricing may not be the most effective way to move truck traffic out of the congested hours (Holguín-Veras et al., 2006b). As discussed later in the paper, this is because: the decision about delivery time is jointly made between the carrier and the receiver; the carriers have great difficulties passing toll costs to receivers; and, in the few cases where toll costs could be passed, the price signal reaching receivers is of no consequence compared to receivers’ incremental costs of off-hour deliveries. In this context, a weak or completely absent price signal reaching the receivers deprive them of the only incentive to switch operations to the off-hours. Three different policies are considered: freight road pricing combined with financial incentives to receivers willing to accept off-hour deliveries, freight road pricing, and laissez faire conditions (neither freight road pricing, nor financial incentives). The paper uses an economic formulation to assess the impact an alternative policy would have on the agents’ profits, which provides insight into how the agents would react, and leads to a set of necessary conditions for off-hour deliveries to be feasible. These conditions were modified so that they represent: freight road pricing combined with financial incentives to receivers willing to accept off-hour deliveries, freight road pricing, and laissez faire conditions (neither freight road pricing, nor financial incentives). Two cases of industry structure are considered: independent operations (carrier and receivers are separate companies trying to maximize profits) and integrated operations (carrier and receiver are part of the same company). The resulting necessary conditions are then analysed to reach conclusions about the effectiveness of the policies. The particular case of large traffic generators, i.e., facilities that cluster dozens and even hundreds of different businesses such as Grand Central Terminal in New York City, with central delivery stations is also discussed. The paper does not analyse whether or not the policies are socially optimal. In all cases, the focus is on the necessary conditions for off-hour deliveries, given that the decision has been made to foster such a change. The paper consists of four sections, including this introduction. Section 2 provides a succinct overview of previous experiences and research on related subjects. Section 3 provides a definition of the scope and limitations of the paper. Section 4 introduces the notation used in the paper. Section 5 derives the general and particular forms of the necessary conditions. At the end, Section 6 summarizes the key findings.

This paper discussed the necessary conditions required for receivers and carriers to agree to do off-hour deliveries, and the effectiveness of alternative policies to foster such change in competitive markets. Such policies seem to be needed because the empirical evidence indicates that freight road pricing may not be the most effective way to move truck traffic out of the congested hours. This is because: the decision about delivery time is jointly made between the carrier and the receiver; the carriers have great difficulties passing toll costs to receivers; and, in the few cases where toll costs could be passed, the price signal reaching receivers is of no consequence compared to receivers’ incremental costs of off-hour deliveries. Three different policies are considered: freight road pricing combined with financial incentives to receivers willing to accept off-hour deliveries, freight road pricing, and laissez faire conditions (neither freight road pricing, nor financial incentives). The paper uses an economic formulation to estimate the impact a policy would have on the agents’ profits, which provides insight into how the agents would react. These formulations, expressed as the necessary conditions for off-hours, were modified so that they represent three key policies: freight road pricing combined with financial incentives to receivers willing to accept off-hour deliveries, only freight road pricing, and laissez faire conditions (neither freight road pricing, nor financial incentives). Two major cases of industry structures have been considered: independent and integrated carrier–receiver operations, together with the particular case of large traffic generators with centralized delivery stations. It was found that integrated operations are significantly different than independent operations. This is because what really matters in this case are the impacts on the combined operation, as opposed to the impacts on each agent. This translates into a centralized decision making process that enables the decision maker to implement all-or-nothing alternatives, by which all deliveries or none at all are moved to the off-hours. As a result, integrated operations can take full advantage of the type of operation most beneficial to them and avoid the kind of cost duplications that arise in the case of independent operations. In the case of independent carrier–receiver operations, the evidence shows that the decision about delivery time is the outcome of the interaction between these agents as part of what is known as the Battle of the Sexes game, where the receivers play the dominant role. The paper shows that, because of the competitive nature of the urban delivery industry, rates tend to be set at marginal costs. This, in turn, prevents the industry from transferring toll surcharges to their customers because the tolls are, generally, a fixed cost that vanishes from the calculation of marginal cost. As a result, the receivers in competitive markers are not likely to receive any price signal; as they are only possible in the industry segments in which the carriers enjoy oligopoly power. Equally significant is that, even in those cases, where the carrier could pass toll surcharges to their customers (9% in the case of New York City), the price signal is of no consequence when compared to the incremental costs to receivers associated with off-hour deliveries. To overcome this, the paper proposes the use of tax incentives to receivers willing to the off-hour deliveries, combined with freight road pricing as a revenue generation mechanism to finance the incentives. The paper highlights that, because of marginal cost pricing, toll schemes based on distance and/or time spent in a tolled region will enable the carriers to pass toll costs to the receivers, as the tolls would enter in the marginal costs and therefore freight rates. This, however, would not resolve the issue pertaining to the insignificance of the price signal reaching receivers relative to the incremental costs associated to moving to the off-hours. The paper suggests that special attention should be paid to large traffic generators that cluster multiple businesses because these facilities tend to generate significant amount of truck traffic and handle incoming and outgoing deliveries with a central delivery station. These factors suggest both a relatively large payoff in terms of truck traffic shifted to the off-hours, and minimal implementation costs because the incremental costs associated with off-hour deliveries would be allocated among multiple businesses. Incoming deliveries would be received during the off-hours and then delivered to the corresponding receiver during the regular hours. Outgoing deliveries would follow the reverse process. This is an attractive alternative because, as discussed before, the incremental cost to receivers associated with off-hour deliveries is the key obstacle in moving trucks to the off-hours. In this context, providing incentives to these facilities in exchange for their commitment to off-hour deliveries would be a cost effective alternative that could translate into meaningful reductions in truck traffic during the regular hours. The analyses of the necessary conditions for these policies indicate that the most potent stimulus is provided by freight road pricing in combination with financial incentives. The paper concludes that neither freight road pricing by itself, nor laissez faire, are likely to achieve the desired goal of inducing a significant switch of truck traffic to the off-hours.