آیا شبکه مدیریت سرمایه داری دولت روسیه می تواند مزیت رقابتی را دارا باشد؟کشش نهادی در مقابل فشار نهادی

In the fall of 2005, former chairman of Yukos Oil, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was sentenced to prison, after being found guilty of fraud and tax evasion. Many viewed the trial as the government's attempt to gain control of the energy sector which Putin had declared as strategically crucial to the country. This article examines the role of the state and the type of capitalism that is evolving in Russia. We view this system as consisting of three forms of network capitalism that coexist in this transition economy – market, oligarchic, and siloviki – and the relationships among them, all existing within the pervasive environment of the Russian state. We argue that the Russian economy will continue to be based for some time on the cognitive institutional pillar rather than the regulative pillar. The article concludes with implications of government policy decisions for the various forms of capitalism, for the country's competitiveness and attractiveness for foreign investment, and for Russian managers.

Yukos, Russia's largest and most successful oil company, originated during the country's privatization program of the early and mid-1990s. In 2005, its chairman and major shareholder, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and his partner, Platon Lebedev, were found guilty of defrauding the state during the 1995 privatizations of an insecticide research institute and a fertilizer factory. The court also concluded that the company owed $28 billion in back taxes. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were given long prison sentences, and the company's major assets were broken up and sold at auction. The assets formed the basis for the newly created state-owned petroleum company, Rosneft. Some saw the Yukos trial as the government's retribution for the excesses of the 1990s privatization program that resulted in the country's major industries ending up in the hands of a small number of powerful businessmen who used highly questionable methods to accumulate these industrial gems at a fraction of their true market value. But the Putin administration also seemed to have another motive for going after Yukos and Khodorkovsky – to squelch his political ambitions. In any case, the trial created great uncertainty about the future of the Russian economy and the state's role in it.

Russia's role as a key player in global energy markets, and its potential as a burgeoning market for consumer and industrial goods and services, makes the country increasingly important to Western and domestic companies. State policies will determine whether this situation continues, as well as whether more private Russian companies will attract foreign investment and take their place among major global competitors. The country's competitiveness and investment attractiveness require a strengthening of regulative institutions rather than the current heavy dependence upon cognitive institutions. We believe this requires substantial institutional pull on the part of (mostly market-sector) companies to pressure the government to create more formal institutions. We also conclude that Russia will continue to develop its state-managed, network capitalism. The specific direction of the economy, however, will depend upon government policies that determine which types of network capitalism are strengthened and which are weakened by those decisions. Our analysis leads us to conclude that policies which strengthen the market capitalism sector will have the most positive effects on the competitiveness of Russian companies and their attractiveness for foreign and domestic investment. In any case, Western investors, international agencies, and Western governments will need to recognize that, whatever the outcome, it will not be the Western market capitalism they are familiar with, and they will need to find ways to work with Russia's state-managed, network form of capitalism.