در کاهش روز افزون ارزش مزیت . تجزیه و تحلیل اقتصادی قانون اجرت اسپانیا
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|29011||2012||7 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||3031 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Procedia Economics and Finance, Volume 1, 2012, Pages 34–40
This paper studies the Spanish Premial Law applying an economic viewpoint. We reach the conclusion, that during the period studied (1995-2009) there has been a sharp increase in the number of civil order awarded, thus showing a phenomenon of “inflation”. This would imply a devaluation of the supposed merits underlying the awarding, meaning a corruption of the Premial system.
Generally speaking, incentives have received a broad attention, not only by economists, but also from related fields like sociology and law. This notwithstanding, interest has mainly centred on monetary incentives (for example Stiglitz, 2006), as this sort of compensation allows the receptor to maximise its utility (Becker, 1974), or on non-monetary incentives (like business cars, better offices, etc.) summarised under the term “fringe benefits”. Alternatively, economic analysis of law has studied mostly negative incentives, suchas fines and punishment. i Nevertheless, one major category —if not the main category— of positive incentives used by States have so far been nearly neglected both by economists and jurists: the awarding of orders, medals, decorations and other honours that constitute the so called Premial Law, referring to which already Beccaria lamented that: “Upon this subject [Premial Law] the laws of all nations are silent. If the rewards proposed by academies for the discovery of useful truths have increased our knowledge, and multiplied good books, is it not probable that rewards, distributed by the beneficent hand of a sovereign, would also multiply virtuous actions.” [Beccaria  (1991), p. 83]. There are serious evidences that Beccaria intended to write a complete Tract on Premial Law, although he finally did not achieve this purpose (Jiménez, 1915:27). It was Dragonetti (1836) who published a Treatise on virtues and rewards. Nevertheless it is Jeremy Bentham, who might be considered the father of Premial Law with his work entitled Théorie des peines et des recompenses. Later, Le Grasserie (1900) published an important article in La Scuola positive dealing with this topic and in which he (erroneously) stated that he was the first to introduce the concept of Premial Law. Finally, it might be stressed that the probably most important monograph on this matter was published by a Spaniard, Luis Jiménez de Asúa (1915), entitled La recompensa como prevención general. El Derecho Premial.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
The main aim of this study has been to analyze the Spanish Laudative System from an economic viewpoint. For this purpose, we start with a brief overview of the evolution and current situation of the Spanish Premial System. We then analyze the concepts of “merit” and “meritorious” as they constitute the base upon which to decide which actions should be worth a social distinction. After a brief presentation of the current system of civil orders in Spain, we enter the nucleus of our study: the question whether an uncontrolled awarding of orders and medals could derive in inflation, thus conducing to a devaluation of the underlying merits and, as a consequence, a distortion (or, worst, a corruption) of the whole Premial Law. Our study is completed with an empirical analysis of the highest classes of the Spanish civil awards, which confirms the previous hypothesis. This question, which has so far been ignored by Spanish politicians, has nevertheless attracted the attention of several other European governments (see for examples Philips, 2004), which have substantially reformedtheir Premial Law in recent times. As we have already pointed out, Spain presents an opposite trend regarding the awarding of others in comparison to France, Germany or Great Britain. In addition to this, Spain also presents a heavy bias towards man in the number of awards, while France and Germany have a much more equilibrated distribution by gender. Finally, Spanish Laudative Law suffers from a proliferation regional of orders that complement the already complex system on national awards, without any instance coordinating them. In this sense, Germany´s decision to limit the number of awards per year (e.g. restricting to 30 the maximum of awards to be bestowed to Members of the Parliament), and favoring awards to women, might show the path to be followed.