قانون تیلور و چرخه انتصاب رئیس فدرال رزرو
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|47830||2006||12 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||6140 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Economics and Business, Volume 58, Issue 1, January–February 2006, Pages 55–66
We estimate a forward-looking Taylor rule on a meeting-by-meeting basis using real-time forecasts for the Volcker and Greenspan chairmanships. We find that under Volcker the Fed responded countercyclically to inflation but had no significant response to the output gap. Under Greenspan, the Fed responded countercyclically to both inflation and the output gap. We then test the hypothesis that monetary policy varies systematically with the appointment cycle of the chairperson of the Fed. During both the Volcker and Greenspan chairmanships, we find that in the five-meeting periods prior to renomination, the Fed becomes significantly less responsive to the macroeconomy. Further, under both Volcker and Greenspan, we find evidence that the Fed raises its inflation target in the periods prior to renomination.