بوجه بندی سرمایه گذاری مخاطره آمیز: حمل و همبستگی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|48189||2013||19 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||12592 کلمه|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Journal of Corporate Finance, Volume 21, June 2013, Pages 216–234
We analyze venture capital budgeting in a model with agency conflicts among entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and investors. Our three-player setting is crucial for the analysis of compensation to venture capitalists. We focus on the venture capitalist's decision to invest in correlated enterprises, and we emphasize the importance of information and the venture capitalist's role in resolving adverse selection on the entrepreneurial side. The importance of information increases the minimum carried interest offered to the venture capitalist, whereas correlated projects decrease it. The carried interest is determined by the size and level of correlation in his portfolio. Our analysis provides predictions in line with a number of empirical observations, e.g. that venture capitalists typically receive a carried interest which is “sticky” around a 20% level.