اداره امور شرکت ها و کارایی های شرکت های کوچک با فن آوری بالا در سوئد
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|18028||2006||14 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Technovation, Volume 26, Issue 8, August 2006, Pages 955–968
The approach uses data from a sample of 183 small high-tech firms, new technology-based firms (small high-tech firms) in Sweden (54 variables under the headings of work experience, board and advice, financing, motivation—performance priorities, technological innovation and strategy). This study identifies some core areas of importance in corporate governance. Few managers in this study had a strong background and experience of finance and the preparation of business. Only 64 per cent of the managers have had previous work experience before starting the firm. The survey makes it clear that the small high-tech firms are likely to have a strong link with banking institutions. The consequence of these links is that most of the firm's capital supply is from banks, and that there are strong ownership links between banks and industry. The background of the founder does seem to have had an effect on the problem of financing and ownership issues. It is private sector organizations (banks) and families that are most frequently consulted by small high-tech firms (However, low means). It is also the private and public sector organizations, in connection with external board membership, regional development agencies and banks that are most frequently consulted. In the future, it is reasonable to search for factor patterns that can begin to explain and predict the direction of corporate governance in small new technology-based firms.
This research is about management, control and the ability to finance small growth and innovation-oriented high-tech firms (new technology-based firms, small high-tech firms) in Sweden. This paper will examine the relationship between corporate governance, and the process of innovation and entrepreneurship with a focus on those in the high-technology industry. Entrepreneurial firms as new start-up businesses formed individually or by a group of founding entrepreneurs will be defined. There are many problems that are common to new businesses, i.e. shortages of management of the production system, bureaucracy and recruitments. The small high-tech firms will be faced with the normal management and organizational problems associated with rapid growth. The ready availability of external advice and support can be of crucial importance to the small technology business in its formative years. There are many sources of advice and assistance available to small firms. Ownership issues are an essential part of this research. This research is about how the financial market works, corporate control and directing financial resources toward growth and innovation. Another factor that will determine a firm's governance structure is the level of technological innovation. Both Gatignon et al. (1989) and Hennart (1991) argue that firms that transfer technological competence between countries often establish subsidiaries. What is then of most importance when establishing subsidiaries than the transfer of “contemporary” management methods. Foreign investors then have to invest in the education of the management in such fields as marketing, accounting, finance and management methods ( Child and Czegledy, 1996). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show contradicting results in their research. Schleifer and Vishny argue that foreign investors often invest in less profitable firms, where the value of their control is higher. Research about corporate governance has gained a new actuality since the mid-1990's. There is a division between different financial systems in the corporate governance literature. Among other classifications are those that distinguish between a system depending on the degree of cooperation to be found in financial systems, government and industry. According to this classification, there are two primary structures—bank-oriented and market-oriented financial systems ( Berglöf, 1997; Rybczynski, 1984). The bank-oriented system is recognized as having strong links between bank and industry. A consequence of these strong links is that most of the firm's capital supply is from banks and that there are strong ownership links between banks and industry. Market-oriented financial systems are recognizable by the fact that large amounts of the capital supply are transferred via stock and bond markets as well as by other actors within the financial system. The research area is multi-dimensional and several perspectives are used. The results are expected to facilitate the understanding of the effects of management, financial issues, technological innovation and motivation on firm performance. The research is related to the efficient use of resources. Small firms are assumed, directly or indirectly, to have importance in the development of economies together with the creation and development of new industries as well as their growth potential. Small independent firms have problems in developing their innovative capabilities due to costs of market and technological development and/or incorporate knowledge within the organization ( Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1986). The innovating capability relates to technology and market development, where the limited resources of the small firms make it difficult to overcome internal and external restrictions for developing the innovation. Teece (1986) argues that to overcome these restrictions there is a need for complementing resources: resources for continuing R&D, export, marketing, sales support and management capabilities. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore the corporate governance structure for small high-tech firms in Sweden. More specifically, this will be done to illustrate how the managerial, financial and innovative resources are related in this context. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the literature, followed by a presentation of the research questions. Section 3 presents the empirical setting of the study. Then Section 4 presents some empirical evidence, and Section 5, the conclusions of the study and implications for further research.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This study identifies some core areas of corporate governance importance. This paper reports analysis of two research propositions which arise from different variables. The management literature has partially addressed the relationship of governance and innovation activities, but more research is required to explain the relationships involved. It is difficult to reach conclusions about cause and effect from the above analysis, as correlation analysis is silent on such important issues. Unfortunately, the market for corporate control has not often created the value expected, and has harmed firm's innovative capability. Although Jensen (1993) argued that the failure of the market for corporate control regarding innovation was partly due to legal restrictions on the capital market, he suggested that the major source of failure is “internal control systems”. By this term he means the overall governance systems of firms that include poor managerial incentives. Jensen's argument implies that internal control systems designed to regulate managerial behaviour may have critical effects on firm innovation. Jensen provided evidence that internal control systems have not produced effective R&D and capital expenditure allocations. Few managers in our study have a strong background and experience of finance and the preparation of business. The background of the founder does seem to have had an effect on the problem of financing and ownership issues. This suggests that either potential founders were successful in identifying a good project or that firms achieved profitability through their ability to obtain finance (new owners—supply of capital). We discussed two different financial systems in the introduction section. The survey makes it clear that the high-tech firms are likely to have a strong link with banking institutions. The consequence of these links is that most of the firm's capital supply is from banks, and that there are strong ownership links between banks and industry. Market-oriented financial systems are recognisable by the fact that large amounts of the capital supply are transferred via stock and bond markets as well as by other actors within the financial system. Only 10 per cent of the firms are on the stock market, and of the equity: stock market, 6.11 per cent. Researchers try to find answers in the corporate governance literature as to why firms with, generally well-educated staff do not perform better. Data and studies indicate that the history is still present and it is difficult to change. A first answer is the lack of a corporate governance system that can affect management and employees in changing their behaviour. A new owner can be of the influence that creates these incitements to rethink the practical work. A well-functioning corporate governance system not only performs monitoring and control to improve profitability, it should also inspire experiment, adjustment and spreading better knowledge of management. To fulfil the development ambitions, the small high-tech firms will be faced with normal management problems associated with rapid growth. The problem of management development associated with entrepreneurial growth is a well-known phenomenon. Small firms are usually associated with simple processes and organizational arrangements. Here, our point is that small new technology-based firms are not typically small firms. They have a strong scientific technology base and have been established for the purpose of exploiting an innovation. As the firms become larger, the need for managers to handle greater quantities of information increases to a point where they have to institute controls. In the future, it is reasonable to search for factor patterns that can begin to explain and predict the direction of corporate governance in small new technology-based firms. Firm growth can be defined by various measures, and should not be analysed as a separate employment element. Growth must be seen as employment growth and sales, which leads to increasing resources within the firm. Expanding sales are a central element in a business process, but it is also important to measure profitability (profit margin). Further research will be based upon different theories of corporate governance. Earlier studies of corporate governance have tested a great number of variables and the effect on firm's performance. It is possible to adopt these existing theories and integrate them to explain the effects of corporate governance variables on small high-tech firms. For small firms the individual level is important for performance, because the owner and CEO are often the same person. Therefore, in small business research, risk and strategy are often integrated due to this individual perspective. Also, the corporate governance issue of potential conflict between management and owner is non-existing in this specific case, and the role of banks (main lenders) will be more important. Through integrating different perspectives of corporate governance and small business research, the following is expected to be achieved: 1. Develop corporate governance in several different perspectives, and define different explanatory variables for small high-tech firm's performance. Thereby creating a framework to be used in empirical studies. 2. Through this framework and empirical studies, it is possible to explain how and why different aspects affect small high-tech firms’ performance. 3. Through this framework it is possible to integrate theoretical dimensions of corporate governance in one model that explains country-specific differences of small high-tech firm's performance. Barney et al. (2001) argue that linkages between resource-based theory and corporate governance open up new and interesting research. Mahoney (2001) argues that the problem with opportunism has important corporate implications, because the implementation of strategy is unlikely to follow automatically. Barney et al. (2001) argue that within the resource-based theory, corporate governance structures can be a source of sustainable competitive advantage, where government structures alone, and these skills may be a heterogeneous resource (Barney, 2002). These skills are not yet well understood (Keasey and Wright, 1993; Short et al., 1999). Government choices and the ability to control and manage firms may have a significant impact on performance (rent generation). The importance of this study is also significant when, for example Poland and the Baltic States and other countries have just recently entered the European Union. These countries are in a transition phase from communistic influenced economy towards a market economy, as are the majority of the countries in eastern and central Europe. The transition process will include political reforms and harmonization of legislation towards European Union rules and regulations. This process will cause dramatic changes for the people and the firms within these countries, and generate social and political disturbances. The integration with the European Union means an adjustment of their economies towards common practices, rules and regulations within the European Union. The ability for the recently privatised firms survival ability and growth are dependent, among other things, on the establishment of new corporate governance structures. The appearance of governance structures similar and in practice within market economy systems in the transition economies is then essential for these firms. In the market economy system well-developed financial markets are a key factor for transforming the economic flow from various actors so that a high efficiency is obtained. This is a crucial condition for the recently entered countries deciding if their economies are to generate success or failure. The financial markets within these countries as well as Sweden have undergone a significant structural change. In the transition economies, a large number of foreign banks have established themselves. The new actors not only provide a more efficient financial market but also a transition of knowledge, e.g. corporate governance.