مدیریت عمومی در نیوزیلند و تاثیر آن بر ترتیبات نهادی برای مدیریت شیلات
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||تعداد کلمات|
|8658||2012||9 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||محاسبه نشده|
Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Marine Policy, Volume 36, Issue 2, March 2012, Pages 550–558
In the last few decades Western democracies, predominately those of British origin, have debated vigorously about how to improve public management performance. These debates have created an influx of new ideas and initiatives regarding the concept and practise of public management. New Zealand implemented public management reform further and faster than most other nations. At the same time, New Zealand implemented sweeping reforms to the management of fisheries, which led to the quota management system based on the allocation of individual transferable quota. This article briefly outlines the history of changes in New Zealand's public management system and the effect these changes have had on institutional arrangements for managing fisheries. Each institutional arrangement has been devised to accommodate the priorities and policies of the government of the day, spanning the Marine Department established in 1866 to recent structural changes made to the Ministry of Fisheries. The recent structural changes have placed greater emphasis on governance to improve performance, but have also led to substantial losses of in-house experience and institutional knowledge. This article contributes to the broader discussion about whether structural changes provide measureable benefits or the most cost effective way to deliver improvements in performance.
In the last few decades Western democracies, predominately those of British origin, have implemented contemporaneous public management reforms aimed at modelling political and administrative relationships based on assumptions in economic theory. While the reforms have varied in depth, scope and success across nations, they are said to have been implemented in response to unproductive and inefficient government departments, or bureau-pathology . Departments were characterised as centralised, rule-based systems within self-contained hierarchical bureaucracies with administrative rules and procedures that severely constrained managerial discretion. This situation led to inefficiencies in government activities and processes and unresponsiveness to changes in social conditions . According to Scott , the focus of any reform should be to ease the tradeoffs between policies that promote economic growth and those that promote equitable distribution of the fruits of the economy. Scott maintains that these tradeoffs may require a government to undertake incremental and continual reform of the public management system to avoid making changes under pressure after ‘things have drifted.’ A reform movement uses the machinery of government to remove administrative obstacles; new departments are created as old ones are scattered or reconfigured . Public management is, therefore, about where power arises and how it is used . Changes to the New Zealand public management system are analogous to pendulum swings from one set of extremes to another . The radical reforms that began in the mid-1980s went further and faster than in any other nation . During this period, New Zealand implemented sweeping reforms to the management of fisheries with the new and largely untested quota management system (QMS) based on the allocation of individual transferable quota (ITQ). The QMS was a radical departure from the previous fisheries management system, which was its attraction during a period of radical economic and social reforms . This article explores changes in New Zealand's public management system and the effect these changes have had on institutional arrangements for managing fisheries.1 The first section of this article briefly outlines the history of New Zealand's public management system, highlighting the radical reforms that began in the mid-1980s. It then outlines the period from 1999 to 2008 when the perceived downsides to the radical reforms were addressed by increasing public service expenditure, taking steps to improve inter-departmental coordination and placing greater emphasis on public engagement in the development of certain policy initiatives, which had a corresponding influence on the way fisheries were managed. This section also depicts the system since the 2008 change in government that coincided with the global economic downturn. The second section outlines the institutional arrangements for managing fisheries in New Zealand, spanning the Marine Department established in 1866 to the Ministry of Fisheries' structural changes in 2009/10. The purpose of the structural changes was to meet the government's expectations for more focused public engagement and greater economic value generated from fisheries. It then outlines how the Ministry's structural changes were implemented and the resulting loss of in-house experience and institutional knowledge. This section also discusses possible future structural changes to the Ministry. This article contributes to the broader discussion about whether structural changes provide measureable benefits or the most cost effective way to deliver improvements in performance.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In the last few decades there has been vigorous debate about how to improve public service performance . Inevitably, this debate has been highly complicated and emotional . Fundamental questions have been asked about what constitutes public goods and services, how far public intervention should go, how public goods and services should be provided and delivered and by whom, and how providers should be held accountable . At the same time, the public has demanded smaller, less costly and more effective government while desiring more and better goods and services . The radical reforms in New Zealand from 1984 to 1999 were principally about bringing a runaway fiscal deficit into balance and were based predominately on the National Party principles of self-reliance and private enterprise, irrespective of the Labour Party having begun the reforms. Some took up the reforms as if they were a moral mission, and with a sense of conviction that sometimes lost sight of the fact that the electorate knows what is best for the nation . The frenetic search for departmental efficiencies also lost sight of the role of moral or ethical considerations in the practise of public management. By the late 1990s there was increasing concern that the radical reforms had led to fragmented services and lacked consistency in ethics across the wider public sector, causing the pendulum to swing back towards more centralised coordination of services . Effort was made to implement a whole-of-government approach to improve departmental coordination and create synergies by building public sector capability and including more public engagement in certain policy initiatives . However, this approach proved problematic, given the political nature of negotiation and compromise, which leads to inherently vague outcomes that are difficult to measure . Currently, the government is rethinking the core function of the public service within increasing fiscal constraints. At the same time, the government is turning to the private sector and academia for innovative policy and strategic advice and reconsidering the role that departments can play in sustaining national prosperity. The government must also be cognisant of public demands that the concept of prosperity reflects new ways of measuring wealth that account for individual and social wellbeing and limits on available ecological services . The changes made over time to New Zealand's public management system have been reflected in the institutional arrangements for managing fisheries. Each institutional arrangement has been devised to accommodate the priorities and policies of the government of the day. More recently, the Ministry of Fisheries has undergone a structural overhaul that was reminiscent of the radical reforms’ strong emphasis on managerial control and the hard edge of accountability. Some changes were needed because ‘some things had drifted’, but the need for change had little to do with the previous structure being ineffective. Although the known problems related more to aspects of the culture, values, routines and professional beliefs and preferences, ongoing structural change was used as an instrument to bring about changes in behaviour and assert control. The restructuring had a consequential effect on morale and productivity and led to substantial losses of in-house experience and institutional knowledge, particularly within the fisheries management function, and the inclusion of ‘new blood’ in senior management positions that place greater emphasis on governance arrangements. While significant progress has subsequently been made on fisheries plan development, aquaculture legislative reform and other priority work, it is too soon to tell if the structural changes have improved the way fisheries are managed.