هنجارهای جنسیتی، ساعات کار و مالیات اصلاحی

This paper deals with optimal income taxation based on a household model, where men and women allocate their time between market work and household production, and where households differ depending on which spouse has the comparative advantage in market work. The purpose is to analyze the tax policy implications of gender norms represented by a market work norm for men and household work norm for women. We show how the optimal (corrective) tax policy depends on the definition of social norms, the preferences for obeying these norms, and whether men or women have the comparative advantage in market work. Two extreme results are that (i) corrective taxation should not be used at all if the norms are based on the mean value of market work and household work, respectively, given that all households have the same preferences, and (ii) only the majority household type should be taxed at the margin if the norms are instead based on the modal value.