ربط استانداردهای بین المللی گزارشگری مالی به کشورهای در حال توسعه: شواهد از قزاقستان

The tendency for countries to adopt IFRS1 has been accelerating in recent years (Deloitte, 2004 and Shneidman, 2003). The benefits of this standardizing trend seem widely accepted among practitioners (PwC, 2000; Tweedie, Chairman of the IASB, as quoted in Tricks & Hargreaves, 2004), governments (Bolkestein, European Commissioner, as quoted in Walton, 2004, Commission of the European Communities, 2001, United Nations Secretary General, 1993 and USAID, 2004), and academics (Jaruga, 1993 and Thorell and Whittington, 1994), including Kazakh sources (Serebrennikova, 2004). However, there are both advantages and disadvantages to harmonization (Thorell & Whittington, 1994) and these may affect developed and developing countries differently. The International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation has recognized the “need to have an understanding of the impact of IFRS as they are adopted in particular regions” (IASB, 2004, para. 93) as a result of the criticism that the IASB tends to display an “ivory tower” mentality (Parker, 2004), hence paying insufficient regard to the practical impacts of its standards. The present case study evaluates these very issues in relation to the transition from Soviet accounting methods to IFRS in Kazakhstan. Accounting reform in former USSR countries has been extensively investigated, particularly among the more westerly of the ex-Soviet nations (Bailey, 1995, Bailey, 1998, Daniel et al., 2001, Jaruga, 1993, Jaruga and Szychta, 1997, Seal et al., 1995, Solodchenko and Sucher, 2005 and Young, 1999. See Nobes & Parker, 2006, 228ff for overview), perhaps because their geographic proximity to Western Europe and historical backgrounds meant that accounting reforms came more rapidly to these countries. Hence a case study of accounting development in Kazakhstan may form a useful addition to the literature, especially since it is likely that Kazakhstan will have “a critical role to play in global energy security” (U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman quoted in Kazakhstan Embassy, 2006a), given her vast natural resources of hydrocarbons which are projected to supply 2–3% of the world's demand for oil within the next decade (Kazakhstan Embassy, 2006b). The case study proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the advantages and disadvantages of IFRS adoption by developing countries. It explicates a four-factor framework for assessing the relevance of IFRS to a particular country, and presents a categorization of pathways that governments may take in selecting and implementing a national accounting system.2 The methodology and data sources are presented in Section 3. Section 4 applies the four-factor framework to assess the potential relevance of IFRS to Kazakhstan. Section 5 assesses the progress and problems on the pathway to IFRS implementation. Section 6 discusses the limitations and conclusions in relation to both Kazakhstan and the theoretical framework.

Whilst the dangers of applying the results of a single case study to a larger population are readily recognized, similarities between the Kazakh case study and experience in other developing and former Soviet countries suggest that Kazakhstan is not unique, so that the results may have wider significance. The conclusions of the four-factor model of IFRS relevance to the Kazakh case are summarized under the appropriate headings below. 6.1. Similar-environments factor Culturally dominated Soviet Kazakhstan was very different from the culturally self-sufficient Anglo-Saxon nations that developed IFRS, producing two quite different accounting systems with different underlying assumptions. The effect of these differences continues 15 years after Kazakhstan's independence, providing little or no justification for the relevance of IFRS on the basis of a similar environment. In the transition to IFRS, these differences have manifested themselves as difficulties with language and terminology, inhibitions in the use of judgment in applying accounting principles, and a demand for government-provided accounting procedures and codes. Accounting change is likely to proceed slowly, which is perhaps unsurprising given the widely accepted persistence of culture. 6.2. Private-sector and capital-market factors The private sector is developing in Kazakhstan, especially in the case of SMEs and foreign-owned firms, but there is still substantial governmental, bank, and familial interest in private firms. Equity investors are the raison d'etre for IFRS, but the equity market is weak, creating little demand for and supply of high quality audited financial statements. Enforcement of high quality IFRS might promote equity market development, but while the market is insufficiently developed, enforcement must come from the government. 6.3. Accounting-needs factor The first three factors provide little support for the current relevance and only weak support for the future relevance of IFRS to Kazakhstan. The needs of foreign-owned or foreign-listed firms and international aid agencies could be met by permitting them to use IFRS, without any obvious need to impose IFRS on other firms, for which IFRS are less relevant. However, international agencies have been promoting the widespread use of IFRS within Kazakhstan, and the government is implementing it. On the basis of the Nobes (1998) model this seems a curious result — given a weak equity market, and a non-Anglo-Saxon culture, the model would appear to predict the choice of a nationally specific Kazakh accounting system, rather than IFRS, and yet Kazakhstan, like many other ex-Soviet nations has “chosen” IFRS. One solution to the conundrum is to interpret the outcome as evidence of accounting colonialism imposed by the coercive power of international capital (Briston, 1978, Bailey, 1998, Chandler, 1992 and Hove, 1986). The accounting system was enforced by investment need, not accounting need, and the Belkaoui (2004) evolutionary pathway, whereby Kazakhstan developed its standards without reference to outside influence, was not an option. An alternative interpretation is that the newly independent Kazakhstan, like other emerging economies, took a political decision to reject the evolutionary path and follow Western models of economic management. IFRS were not imposed via accounting colonialism, but were merely the price of integration, or a by-product of other decisions, or even a desirable part of an overall change package. Whatever the interpretation of this outcome, it seems that the Nobes (1998) model is no longer sufficiently parsimonious. Now “All Roads Lead to IFRS.” Thus the scope for political choice identified by Xiao et al. (2004) does not lie among competing accounting systems, and so does not add to the choices in the Nobes (1998) model, but is rather a choice of pathway to IFRS. In Kazakhstan, the Belkaoui (2004) adoption (quick fix) pathway to IFRS was rejected as impossible. Given its history and environment, Kazakhstan could not and did not shift to IFRS directly. Only the transfer of technology or situationist pathways were realistic options. The government decision to develop KAS and a Chart of Accounts under the Ministry of Finance looks like a situationist pathway, while the use of consultants from PwC lends a transfer of technology “flavour.” The MNEs took a transfer of technology pathway, introducing a variety of Western accountants and accounting standards, e.g., IFRS or other Anglo-Saxon GAAP, to Kazakhstan. Now Kazakhstan is shifting to IFRS plus an accounting code (compare China in Xiao et al., 2004). This result suggests that the transfer of technology and situationist pathways may not be readily distinguishable, and taken together simply constitute a “slow road to IFRS.” This makes it possible that Krzywda et al. (1995) are correct to suggest that the dangers of inappropriate accounting models are exaggerated, because the transition process is likely to be a long one and governments will perforce seek nationally specific pathways of transition. Future research could investigate the extent to which the adoption and evolutionary strategies are possible or chosen, and the extent to which the situationist and transfer of technology pathways may be differentiated with a view to reworking the Belkaoui (2004) categorization. If the slow road to IFRS was the only option, what of the disadvantages and advantages of IFRS? FDI is the most obvious gain. The reduction in the set-up costs for accounting standards suggested by the interviewees may be illusory. Kazakhstan had to develop KAS, but this was not done ex nihilo, and has alleviated the problem of standards overload, although the process of moving to full IFRS will be a long one. International audit firms have certainly benefited more than local firms from the complexity of IFRS. Financial markets have yet to benefit from more understandable, reliable and comparable reports. To caricature the situation: if original accounting data, including governmental arrears and revaluations derived from illiquid markets, have been processed under KAS through a code-based system with missing codes, transformed by consultants using a matrix based upon an unofficial language translation of IFRS, and finally copy-pasted into a set of ready-made documents which even include the audit report, then it is somewhat unclear what economic meaning or sensible decisions may be drawn from the “information” provided. More seriously, it would be reasonable to suggest that investors approach these reports with at least some caution. Thus, although there may be apparent de jure harmonization of Kazakhstan with other countries adopting IFRS, real differences in the de facto application of IFRS and hence in the interpretation of the resulting financial statements may remain for long periods due to differing stages of transition to IFRS. Such differences might linger for long periods if differing procedures are used for IFRS accounting (e.g., whether charts of accounts are controlled at company level or handed down as UAS by governments), thus opening new avenues for classificatory research.