سود سهام و خرید دوباره سهم در اتحادیه اروپا

We examine cash dividends and share repurchases from 1989 to 2005 in the 15 nations that were members of the European Union before May 2004. As in the United States, the fraction of European firms paying dividends declines, while total real dividends paid increase and share repurchases surge. We also show that financial reporting frequency is associated with higher payout, and that privatized companies account for almost one-quarter of total cash dividends and share repurchases. Our regression analyses indicate that increasing fractions of retained earnings to equity do not increase the likelihood of cash payouts, whereas company age does.

Dividends are both pervasive and perplexing. They are pervasive in that companies have been paying regular cash dividends since the dawn of the modern limited liability company over three centuries ago, and publicly traded companies in all market economies have been paying out large fractions of their earnings ever since.1 Dividends are perplexing (especially to financial economists) because it is not obvious why investors should demand cash dividends. Since the seminal paper by Miller and Modigliani (1961), a vast literature has examined the payout policies of U.S. companies, and much of the recent research has studied both cash dividends and share repurchases.2 However, relatively little research has yet been published examining the payout polices of non-U.S. companies. This study examines cash dividend payments and share repurchases, over the period 1989–2005, of companies headquartered in nations that were members of the European Union before May 2004. Besides being the world's second largest economy, the EU during this era provides an ideal laboratory for studying payout policies, for four reasons. First, it is a grouping of 15 mostly sovereign and highly developed nations that over our study period is becoming increasingly unified economically and politically, but whose corporate governance systems, taxation regimes, and financial markets remain largely segmented. Second, while most of the EU countries have commercial codes based on civil law, two key nations (Britain and Ireland) have common law codes. Third, there is significant cross-sectional and time-series variation in the taxation of dividends and share repurchases over the study period, which allows us to directly examine how tax preferences influence payout probabilities and amounts. Finally, a large majority of the EU nations adopt a new common currency, the euro, after 1999, but three member countries—including the nation with the largest number of listed firms (Britain)—retain their own currencies throughout the study period. Despite the EU's global importance, very little published research has examined cash dividend payments or share repurchases on a continent-wide basis. Denis and Osobov (2008) examine the dividend policies, but not repurchases, of companies headquartered in three European countries in their sample of six large economies, while LaPorta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) include European firms in their global study of dividend policies. Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) similarly include many European companies in their examination of how cash holdings and dividend payments are valued in 35 countries with varying corporate governance regimes. The only other recent studies we find are single-country analyses. This relative dearth of continental research primarily results from difficulties in obtaining comprehensive data prior to the 1999 adoption of the euro. We ask and answer a series of basic questions about European payout policies. Are EU dividend payout ratios and likelihood to repurchase shares higher or lower than in the United States, and are these ratios the same for different European countries? Do European companies show the same declining propensity to pay dividends as Fama and French (2001) show for U.S. listed firms? Have share repurchases become as, or more, important than cash dividends among European firms, as Skinner (2008) shows has occurred in the United States, and are EU repurchases driven by the same firm-specific factors as cash dividends? Are dividends and earnings also concentrating in EU firms, as DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004) show is happening in American companies? Are cash payouts as highly correlated with the fraction of retained earnings (versus contributed equity) in the equity capital structures of European firms as DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) find for U.S. dividend-paying firms? Are total payouts becoming more responsive to earnings in companies that regularly pay cash dividends and repurchase shares, as Skinner (2008) finds for the United States? Finally, do the patterns observed in Europe support any of the competing theories explaining dividend payments—especially the agency cost model, which is the current mainstream favorite, or the catering theory proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2004a)? We find that dividend and share repurchase policies of EU companies are similar in many ways to those of American firms. For example, the fraction of European firms paying dividends has also declined in recent years, while total real dividends paid have increased. The total value of share repurchases has also surged in Europe, and now accounts for over half of the total value of cash dividends—although only one-fourth as many European companies repurchase shares as pay cash dividends. Additionally, dividends are also concentrating among European firms and, while the overall propensity of all EU firms to pay cash dividends has declined continuously with time, the propensity to repurchase shares has steadily increased. We find that company characteristics like size, market-to-book, and profitability that explain the likelihood to pay dividends or repurchase shares in the United States also influence the likelihood that EU firms will distribute cash to investors. While fewer European than American firms repurchase shares, dividend payments and repurchases are also complements in Europe and repurchases are significantly more sensitive to earnings in the most recent sub-period (2001–2005). In addition to showing how American and EU firms are similar, we also make several new contributions by either reporting differences between Europe and America or by examining factors not considered in the U.S. context. Most critically, we show that large-scale share repurchases started much later in Europe than in the United States, but have grown even more rapidly over the past decade. Additionally, this is the first academic study to examine the relationship between financial reporting frequency and corporate payout policies. We find that the average reporting frequency of EU companies has steadily increased over 1989–2005, from 1.2 to 2.4 times per year, and is associated with higher amounts of cash dividends paid and shares repurchased. We also examine the impact of privatization on the payout policies of divested firms, and find massive individual and aggregate effects; privatized companies account for almost one-quarter of the total value of EU cash dividends and share repurchases—but represent barely 2% of the number of listed firms. Our final result is surprising. We find that the fraction of retained earnings in a European firm's total equity is not significantly correlated with the likelihood to pay cash dividends, which contrasts with U.S. evidence shown in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) and international evidence presented in Denis and Osobov (2008). We also present other, equally informative, results for EU payout policies. Older EU companies are more likely to pay cash dividends than are younger companies, and older firms also pay higher cash dividends. Companies headquartered in a common law country are more likely to pay cash dividends—but are no more likely to repurchase shares—than are companies headquartered in a civil law country. Higher leverage reduces the likelihood to pay cash dividends. Larger cash holdings reduce the probability of paying cash dividends, but increase the probability to repurchase and increase the amount of dividends paid if the company is a cash dividend payer. Companies with more liquid stocks repurchase more if they do repurchase, while companies that have a majority shareholder repurchase less. Finally, we find no systematic effects of a country-specific catering variable in EU companies, which suggests that catering is not an important factor influencing European payout policies. This study is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates our research based on recent theoretical and empirical advances in corporate dividend policy, while Section 3 presents our data and sample selection criteria. Section 4 describes patterns we observe in European payout policies, and traces the evolution of these policies over time. Section 5 presents multivariate analyses of the likelihood that EU firms will pay dividends and repurchase shares, while Section 6 does the same for the amount of dividends paid and shares repurchased. Section 7 provides robustness tests using alternative (or rearranged) variables, and tests whether the major findings change if we add information on new variables that are only available for 2001–2005. This section also formally tests for the speed of adjustment to earnings for companies that regularly pay out cash through dividends and/or repurchases. Finally, Section 8 concludes.

Using a database of over 4,100 listed industrial companies, we examine the evolution of payout policy from 1989 to 2005 in the 15 nations that were members of the European Union before May 2004. We find that dividend and share repurchase policies of EU companies are similar in many ways to those of American firms. For example, the fraction of European firms paying dividends has also declined significantly in recent years, while total real dividends paid have increased. Additionally, dividends are concentrating as sharply among European as among American companies and, while the overall likelihood of all EU firms paying cash dividends has declined continuously with time, the probability of repurchasing shares has steadily increased. However, we also present several important new results showing how payout policies differ between Europe and America. Most critically, we show that large-scale share repurchases started much later in Europe than in the United States, but have grown even more rapidly over the past decade. We also find that the average reporting frequency of EU companies has steadily increased over 1989–2005, from 1.2 to 2.4 times per year, and is associated with higher amounts of cash dividends paid and shares repurchased. We examine the impact of privatization on the payout policies of divested firms, and find that privatized companies account for almost one-quarter of the total value of EU cash dividends and share repurchases—but represent barely 2% of the number of listed firms. We also find that the fraction of retained earnings in a European firm's total equity is not significantly correlated with the likelihood to pay cash dividends, but that company age (in years) is. This contradicts the U.S. findings of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) and the international evidence of Denis and Osobov (2008). Additionally, we find significantly negative effects of a lagged country-specific catering variable for cash dividends in EU companies, which suggests that the catering theory is not relevant for European dividend policies. Our panel regressions of the likelihood of distributing cash to investors through dividend payments and share repurchases, and of the amounts distributed, reveal several significant influences on EU payout policies. Companies headquartered in a common law country are more likely to pay cash dividends—but are no more likely to repurchase shares—than are companies headquartered in a civil law country. Higher leverage reduces the likelihood of paying cash dividends. Larger cash holdings reduce the probability of paying cash dividends, but increase the probability of repurchasing and increase the amount of cash dividends paid if the company is a cash dividend payer. Companies with more liquid stocks repurchase more if they do repurchase, while companies that have a majority shareholder repurchase less.