روانشناسی معضلات اجتماعی : بررسی

Broadly defined, social dilemmas involve a conflict between immediate self-interest and longer-term collective interests. These are challenging situations because acting in one’s immediate self-interest is tempting to everyone involved, even though everybody benefits from acting in the longer-term collective interest. As such, greater knowledge of social dilemmas should help us understand not only the theoretical puzzles of why people cooperate (or not) but also the ways in which cooperation in groups and organizations can be maintained or promoted. This article reviews different types of social dilemmas, highlights recent developments in the field (especially within psychology), and suggests some new avenues for future research. We illustrate that the field of social dilemma is growing and flourishing in terms of theory, interdisciplinary collaboration, and applicability, producing insights that are novel, replicable, and applicable to many social situations where short-term self-interest is at odds with the long-term interests of teams, organizations, or nations.

Many of the world’s most pressing problems represent social dilemmas, broadly defined as situations in which short-term self-interest is at odds with longer-term collective interests. Some of the most widely-recognized social dilemmas challenge society’s well-being in the environmental domain, including overharvesting of fish, overgrazing of common property, overpopulation, destruction of the Brazilian rainforest, and buildup of greenhouse gasses due to overreliance on cars. The lure of short-term self-interest can also discourage people from contributing time, money, or effort toward the provision of collectively beneficial goods. For example, people may listen to National Public Radio without contributing toward its operations; community members may enjoy a public fireworks display without helping to fund it; employees may elect to never go above and beyond the call of duty, choosing instead to engage solely in activities proscribed by their formally defined job description; and citizens may decide to not exert the effort to vote, leaving the functioning of their democracy to their compatriots. As the preceding examples illustrate, social dilemmas apply to a wide range of real-world problems; they exist within dyads, small groups, and society at large; and they deal with issues relevant to a large number of disciplines, including anthropology, biology, economics, mathematics, psychology, political science, and sociology. Given their scope, implications, and interdisciplinary nature, social dilemmas have motivated huge literatures in each of these disciplines. Several excellent reviews of this literature exist, but many are dated or are narrowly focused on a specific variable that influences cooperation in social dilemmas. In the present paper, we build on past reviews by outlining key principles relevant to the definition of social dilemmas, summarizing past reviews, discussing recent developments in the field, and identifying future research directions with the potential to shed additional light on this important and ever-developing field.

Looking back, researchers have made significant progress in theory development, applied and interdisciplinary research, and in understanding the impact of structural, psychological and dynamic factors on cooperation. Moreover, on the whole, we see increased attention to paradigms and issues more closely approximating real-world dilemmas (e.g., paradigms that recognize asymmetries, noise, structural solutions). In sum, the field has made significant and exciting advances over the past 15–20 years, yielding valuable insights into the dynamics of cooperation in a variety of social dilemmas. We should admit that our review has not been comprehensive, in that important literatures on social dilemmas and human cooperation have not been addressed – we are thinking of seminal papers by, anthropologists, evolutionary scientists, experimental economists, mathematicians, political scientists, and theoretical biologists. The most important reason for this is limitations in terms of space and, admittedly, time. But the important point to be made is that by focusing on the psychology of social dilemmas we are underestimating the diversity in conceptual approach, interdisciplinary research, and methodological paradigms. And all signs suggest that this diversity will continue and expand in the next decades. Looking ahead, we see several promising directions for future research. At the broadest level, we believe the field would benefit from continued attention to developing an overarching theoretical framework. Earlier we reviewed interdependence theory and evolutionary theory as relatively broad theoretical frameworks. These frameworks share a number of meaningful connections. Broadly conceived, by its focus on the analysis of situational structure, interdependence theory is an ideal position to start our conceptual analysis. The same could be argued for game theory, but interdependence theory has the advantage of providing a relatively coherent framework in which the conceptual links among situations are delineated by providing a taxonomy of dimensions, including situational “dimensions” such as degree of dependence, degree of conflicting interest, information availability, and time (horizon) as key dimensions (e.g., Kelley et al., 2003 and Van Lange and Rusbult, 2012). This taxonomy helps us understand the game (read: situation) people are facing, and the problems or opportunities that the game (again read: situation) affords. This interdependence-based analysis not only provides key insights into the structure of situation (what is the situation about?), it also suggests the broad relevance of our own interaction goals (are we cooperative or not?) and those we attribute to others in a global or concrete manner (are other people cooperative or not?). The latter attributions or beliefs are, of course, closely linked to trust. Evolutionary theory provides a broad framework for understanding the (ultimate) mechanisms relevant to trust and cooperation. And psychological theory, including the appropriateness framework, should help us understand the (proximal) mechanisms relevant to trust and cooperation. To illustrate, interdependence theory (and game theory) suggests the importance of incomplete information. In social dilemmas defined by a conflict of self-interest and collective interest, incomplete information begs trust: did the other intentionally help (or harm) the collective interest? Evolutionary, this is important because it challenges the ways in which cooperation may be evolved: for example, it may help us understand why giving strangers the benefit of doubt has functional (and survival) value. Even more, it may help us understand the roots of generosity (Nowak & Sigmund, 1992). Proximally, giving others the benefit of doubt, especially when accompanied by the communication of generosity, will enhance trust the other has in your intentions – which in turn is crucial for coping with uncertainty and incomplete information (Van Lange et al., 2002). We are truly looking forward to a fruitful and comprehensive integration of adaption to structure (the game we play), the psychological and interpersonal processes involved (what we make of the game), and the ultimate functions it serves in terms of psychological, economic, and evolutionary outcomes. Such integrative theorizing has clear potential in understanding empirical (and interdisciplinary) research on uncertainty, noise, social exclusion, and sanctions. We also believe the field would benefit by devoting increased attention to structural solutions to social dilemmas, as these solutions seem to hold the greatest potential for encouraging cooperation in the many, wide-scale dilemmas we face. Arguably, one of the most important dilemmas we face is the problem of global warming. Unfortunately, international attempts to raise support for a structural solution to this dilemma have encountered challenges. Given its complexity, solving the dilemma of global warming will inevitably require teams of scientists who bring strong theory, valid methods, and a willingness to approach the problem from an interdisciplinary perspective. From our perspective, social dilemma researchers are clearly poised to contribute to that effort. Science is about finding the truth, general knowledge, progress and innovation, and applicable knowledge (Van Lange, 2013). This is what makes science so exciting. The science of social dilemmas makes it even more exciting because it addresses the basic question of human nature – the selfish and prosocial aspects of humankind – and because we often face a reality in which we experience social dilemmas on a weekly or even daily basis. Imaginary or real, people often find themselves in situations that have much in common with social dilemmas – with strangers, with colleagues, with friends, with close partners. These social interactions can be quite challenging - and sometimes even puzzling (“why did she do that to me?”). How do we deal with strangers? Do we trust them? Does our image or reputation matter? And on a larger scale, newspapers are often addressing issues of scarcity (e.g., the risk of depleting specific fish species), greed, the excessive pursuit of self-interest (e.g., incentives for the executive officers in the financial sector), or difficulties in establishing contractual agreements among countries for maintaining a healthy levels of environmental quality. We acknowledged already the relevance of applicable knowledge. One broad lesson that one might infer from the social dilemma literature is that, often, it is the combination of measures, rather than their isolated effects, that effectively promote cooperation. For example, authorities are often associated with structural solutions such as sanctioning free-riding and rewarding cooperative action, and trust is often associated with interpersonal relations (at least in psychology). But like (horizontal) trust among people, vertical trust between people and institutes (institutional trust) is crucial for the acceptance of rewards and punishment. Above and beyond outcomes in a narrow sense, people want to be treated fairly and respectfully. For example, a (local) government who listens to the concerns that people may have, and provides accurate information in a transparent manner, might often not only enhance vertical trust, but also a stronger commitment and willingness among people to make a positive contribution to urgent social dilemmas. A case in point is Tyler and Degoey’s (1995) research on the 1991 water shortage in California, which demonstrated that people exercised more constraint on their water consumption it they felt treated more fairly by the authorities. Likewise, it is often true that relatively small groups in large societies, such as local communities, have enormous potential to organize and manage themselves in ways that promote cooperation and prevent them from depleting natural resources. In small groups people are able to develop rules that match the local circumstances, they are able to monitor one another’s behavior, and punish free-riding and reward generosity quite effectively. People care very strongly about their image or reputation in their local community, and so if the norms favouring cooperation are well-specified, then often the mere presence of others makes a big difference. These are important virtues of a local organization, formal or informal, relative to a more global authority. It is crucial that members of small communities trust each other so that monitoring and norm-enforcement can take place is a cost-effective, informal manner. There is a recent meta-analytic study involving 18 societies that provides evidence that trust and social norm enforcement may reinforce each other in securing and promoting cooperation in large-scale societies. In societies where trust is low (such as Greece or South Africa), punishment was hardly effective in promoting cooperation, but in high-trust societies (such as Denmark or China) possibilities for punishment in public goods dilemmas promoted cooperation very effectively. The broad conclusion is that the effectiveness of punishment in promoting cooperation in a public goods experiment is greater in societies with high trust, rather than low trust (Balliet & Van Lange, in press-a). Another important result of this meta-analysis is that societies with stronger democracies demonstrate a greater ability to secure and promote contributions towards public goods by the use of peer punishment. These findings paint a picture in which the ways in which individuals relate to each other in small groups and local communities is important to the overall functioning of society - and this suggests the strong positive reinforcement among structural solutions, third-party intervention, and psychological solutions. As noted earlier, many of the insights described above were already recognized by the late Elinor Ostrom, who passed away in 2012 at the age of 78. More than 20 years ago, she suggested that institutes could play a very important role in regulating the local management to preserve natural resources and avoid ecosystem collapses (Ostrom, 1990). In retrospect, her insights in many ways reinforce conclusions that are now supported by a meta-analytic study. In particular, among smaller units, such as dyads and small groups, it is trust and reciprocity that matters (and we would add, generosity and forgiveness), along with effective communication. Within a frame of sufficient vertical trust, people will adopt an accepting attitude to governmental interventions, such as the provision of rewards and punishment, and some constraint on their autonomy. These are also analyses of social dilemmas where the various scientific fields and disciplines should inform one another to effectively understand how small groups might help effectively manage and resolve ongoing social dilemmas. Looking back and ahead, we cannot help but conclude that the study of social dilemmas is “alive and kicking.” Over the years, the field has produced numerous replicable findings, advanced our theoretical understanding of human cooperation, fostered communication among scientific disciplines, and has at least made a beginning of applying such knowledge to social dilemmas as we face them in everyday life. Being dedicated social dilemmas researchers ourselves, our observations may be a bit colored. But we think that the research that has accumulated has resulted in a “sea of knowledge” that should be exceptional useful in facing the numerous challenges – theoretical, empirical, methodological, and societal – that the field will encounter in the future. Examples of some key challenges are understanding the how and why of rewards and punishment, the strength of fairness (and perhaps altruism) as social preferences, and the power of beliefs about humankind (as individuals and groups) and how these might impact our behavior. Also, the field has just started to explore the role of emotions, construal processes, facial information, intergroup issues, reputation, gossip and many more issues that are relevant to how people approach others in social dilemmas. We could go on, but simply thinking about these intriguing issues makes us look forward to the next several decades of research on social dilemmas.