دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 114129
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله

توابع ارزیابی و شرایط تصمیم گیری تصمیم گیری سه بعدی با مجموعه های خشنودی بازی-نظری

عنوان انگلیسی
Evaluation functions and decision conditions of three-way decisions with game-theoretic rough sets
کد مقاله سال انتشار تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
114129 2017 37 صفحه PDF
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 261, Issue 2, 1 September 2017, Pages 704-714

ترجمه کلمات کلیدی
مجموعه های خشن بازی گرا، نظریه بازی، تصمیمات سه گانه، مجموعه های خشن، مجموعه های خشن احتمالی،
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی
Game-theoretic rough sets; Game theory; Three-way decisions; Rough sets; Probabilistic rough sets;
پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله  توابع ارزیابی و شرایط تصمیم گیری تصمیم گیری سه بعدی با مجموعه های خشنودی بازی-نظری

چکیده انگلیسی

Three-way decisions have been used over the years in many application areas. The rough sets and its extensions provide useful approaches for three-way decisions. Typically, these approaches employ a single evaluation function or criterion to induce three-way decisions. When extending the rough set based three-way decisions to multiple criteria decision making (MCDM), two issues are encountered. The first issue is related to the construction and definition of aggregation mechanisms for dealing with differences in results of evaluation functions. The second issue is related to the setting of choice structure for selecting the three types of decision choices. In this article, we consider the role and use of game-theoretic rough set (GTRS) model to resolve and address these two issues. The issue related to differences in evaluation functions is addressed with GTRS by implementing a game that considers multiple evaluation functions as game players. The game-theoretic analysis in the GTRS is employed to resolve the differences by determining a tradeoff between evaluation functions. The issue related to choice structure is addressed by considering the conditions under which different game outcomes could constitute a game solution. In particular, the equilibrium analysis within games is used to construct the rules for three-way decisions. A demonstrative example is used to explain the use of the proposed approach. The relationship between the proposed approach and the probabilistic rough sets is also discussed.