رونمایی از ساختار شبکه های برق: مطالعات موردی در هوندا، آزاد، و دایملر کرایسلر

Three complete supply networks have been mapped in this study. These supply networks pertain to the center console assembly and come from three different product lines—Honda Accord, Acura CL/TL, and DaimlerChrysler (DCX) Grand Cherokee. Based on these three cases of supply networks, propositions are built concerning how the structure of supply networks operates. Based on the extant literature, we frame structure in three dimensions—formalization, centralization, and complexity. As an underlying methodology, we first conduct the within-case analysis and then expand the analysis to cross-case context. The three structural dimensions affect one another progressively, and the cost consideration appears to be the overarching force that shapes the supply-network structure.

A supply network refers to a network of firms engaged in manufacturing and assembly of parts to create a finished product. The membership in a network and its organization vary for a given product and over time. For instance, a product with a large bill of materials (BOM) tends to show a large membership in the network, and the efforts to consolidate suppliers affect the pattern of the network. The operation of a supply network can vary tremendously depending on policies, practices, and shared history. In spite of growing interest in the management of supply chains or, more appropriately, supply networks (Choi et al., 2001, Lamming et al., 2000 and Stuart et al., 1998), researchers are still in an early stage of investigating what a supply network looks like or how it behaves. This study will investigate the structure of supply networks and the principles involved in the operation of supply networks. Since it entails doing research in an emerging field, a case study approach has been adopted. Three case studies of supply networks are offered here. They focus on the center console assembly for the Honda Accord, Acura CL/TL, and DaimlerChrysler (DCX) Grand Cherokee. The study maps the complete supply networks of the three cases. We will first introduce a literature review of organizational structure and show how it applies to our study of supply-network structure. We will then discuss how we collected the case data, made our analysis, and ultimately extracted key propositions from the data. The analysis will entail two steps—we will first conduct a within-case analysis and capture the essence of each network case, and then we will undertake a cross-case analysis comparing and contrasting the essence of supply-network structures captured in each case to compile overarching behavioral patterns. We will conclude with a discussion and implications for future research.

Clearly, the structure of a supply network emerges over time. Once its formation is initiated by the final assembler (e.g. the final assembler selects the top-tier supplier), the structure takes on a shape of its own. As evidence, we observed that the information from the final assembler regarding what lies beyond the top-tier supplier (e.g. who the second- and third-tier suppliers are) was often inaccurate. At the same time, however, we also saw that the policies of the final assembler (e.g. formalized cost-cutting policy) have had a tremendous impact on the structure of the network (e.g. the degree of centralization as well as complexity of the network that emerges). The challenge is then to know what are the salient policies that shape the structure of the supply network and how the shaping emerges and its consequences. We also observed that overly formalized rules regarding the cost-cutting requirements lead to rigidity and a sense of inequity. We noted that this type of cost-cutting pressure imposed on the top-tier suppliers has now trickled down to the tertiary-level suppliers. Many suppliers stated that they have picked “all the low hanging fruits” for cost improvement, and now they are resorting to cutting down their profit margin “just to stay in the game”. Several managers at the final assembler and the top-tier suppliers mentioned that they could not see how small “Mom-and-Pop suppliers” can withstand this relentless pressure to cut cost. Often, the cost-reduction target (e.g. 3%) will match their entire profit margin. In addition, many design and development activities were viewed by the final assembler as a “free service” for allowing the top-tier supplier to participate in the new program. Consequently, the top-tier suppliers have now acted and begun to transfer some of the burdens of design and development onto the second-tier suppliers. Again, it does not look good for the small suppliers.