استراتژی های همکاری نظامی - غیرنظامی در فن آوری های جدید در حال توسعه

Dual use technology has been advocated as the solution for the twin problem of maintaining a high tech defence technology base and improving economic competitiveness. The concept of dual use technology turns out to be rather imprecise representing a multitude of different meanings. This paper focuses on one important aspect, notably the co-operation between civilian and military actors in developing a new technology, by analysing the evolution of a socio-technical network related to the development of an advanced battery in The Netherlands. The analytical framework used for interpreting the empirical case builds on theories of socio-technical networks and on two previous and complementary analyses in Research Policy on dual use technology. Our analysis of the dynamics underlying the evolution of the ‘battery network’ shows how the emerging notion of the battery’s duality became a window of opportunity for a co-operation strategy of either joint or concurrent development of the battery for both civilian and military applications. The interactions within the evolving network are steered by the search for expertise and funding. In view of the difficulties of realising civilian–military integrated joint development projects, the establishment of ‘dual capacity networks’ is suggested as part of a possible strategy towards an integrated civilian–military technology and industrial base.

During the last decade governments, and to a lesser degree, defence related companies have shown substantial interest in the issue of dual use technology: technology that has, generally speaking, both military and civilian applications. Though the concept of dual use technology is not entirely new, for some technology fields its meaning has shifted from a problematic to a desirable feature. The concept entered the discourse on weapons and technology exports that started in the years after World War II (Reppy, 1999). The acrimonious East–West relations soon resulted in the establishment of the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) in 1949. It became the major framework for the US and its allies for export controls. Under this regime, dual use was viewed as a negative feature that complicated export controls: countries might try to obtain militarily sensitive technology under the guise of buying civilian technology. The presumed dual nature of some products and technologies also created tensions between the economic and the defence perspective on technology exports, not only within the US, but also between the US and west-European countries (Bertsch, 1988).

The notion of the battery’s potential duality emerged only at a later stage of the battery’s developmental process, related to a generally increased interest in hybrid electric vehicles. Together with the involvement of the ‘dual actor’ TNO-EEP it appeared as a window of opportunity for the involved actors to pursue a co-operation strategy of joint development of a bipolar battery for both civilian and military applications. However, in the end no durable network with a civilian–military integrated project for a joint development arose. Instead, what remained was a rather loose network whose actors were dispersed over a number of concurrent development projects with mutual interactions. The dual oriented actor TNO-EEP appeared as a favourable factor for the establishment of a joint development strategy. Although initially asked merely to solve a technical problem, it subsequently became a dedicated network builder. TNO-EEP participated in both the naval project and the civilian HEV project financed by NOVEM, and, consequently, could serve as a gateway for the transfer of knowledge between the naval and the commercial HEV project, thus diminishing transaction costs. As a dual actor, TNO-EEP was interested in both a civilian and military application of the battery. TNO-EEP was eager to develop a product so that it could profit from their patent of a crucial part of the battery ( Section 3). By contrast, the RNlN, though acting as a dedicated network builder, was, in the end, primarily and mainly interested in a ‘naval battery’. Moreover when the project was to enter the phase of a prototype ready for production, the RNlN, according to its funding policy, had to terminate further financial support.