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Drawing from the theorising of Froud et al. [Froud J, Johal S, Papazian V, Williams K. The temptation of Houston: a case study of financialisation. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 2004;15(6–7):885–909] and Kripner [Krippner G. The financialisation of the American economy. Socio-Economic Review 2005;3:173–208] on financialisation, we explore the activities of New Zealand's largest listed company Telecom (NZ) Ltd. The success narrative produced by Telecom since its privatisation and listing in 1991 is centred on shareholder value. However, its financial reporting practices seem increasingly complicated and difficult to comprehend. Telecom's original off-shore investors reaped considerable returns on their investment and, until recently most investors in Telecom were domiciled outside New Zealand. Its production activities have remained concentrated in New Zealand where it holds a monopoly over an essential part of the country's communication infrastructure. This examination of Telecom's activities and financial reporting adds to the debate about financialisation by questioning the effects of the separation of production and accumulation on those where production is located. It also demonstrates the use of accounting and financial reporting practices to support a success narrative which results in resource transfers to those engaged in accumulation activities to the potential detriment of those involved in, or affected by, the company's production activities.

The aftermath of Enron's collapse has prompted various interpretations of the collapse, events prior to it, and lessons to be learned. Some regard Enron as an isolated incident reflecting the worst excesses of corporate greed (e.g., as noted by Moriceau, 2005). Those supporting this view might see improved governance arrangements as sufficient to overcome the problem, and the response to Enron in the United States has involved governance changes mainly imposed through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which focuses on individual wrong-doing (Froud et al., 2000). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not address institutional arrangements which some have argued help to shape behaviour, and which are part of a larger dysfunctional financial system (Baker, 2003, Baker and Hayes, 2004, Briloff, 2004, Froud et al., 2000, Reinstein and McMillan, 2004, Zeff, 2003a and Zeff, 2003b). That larger system continues and, with the increasing economic integration of countries through financial markets, its effects go well beyond the United States.

According to Krippner (2005) an important aspect of financialisation is the separation of the production and accumulation functions of economic activity. Further, as Froud et al. (2004) note, in these accumulation activities financial markets have become highly influential on companies’ behaviour. Institutional investors have become especially influential, tending to pursue the current conception of shareholder value, thus prompting companies to do the same. Telecom presents itself as conducting its production activities internationally and, over time has made increasing efforts to expand overseas. The geographical segment information provided in its financial reports is largely based on normalised results, but even this shows Telecom's international expansion is weak and seems to be carried by exploitation of its monopoly position in New Zealand, where Telecom has been criticised for running down the country's essential communications infrastructure (Table 4). The one significant percentage return on assets reported outside New Zealand is that categorised as “other” in 2001 and represents the dubious dividend taken from Telecom's loss-making associate Southern Cross Cables which helped to boost Telecom's reported profits in that year.