پیامدهای توسعه پایدار مشارکت اتحادیه اروپا در شیلات دریایی سنگال

The article evaluates the impact of EU fishing activities for the sustainable development of Senegal's maritime fishery. An evaluation of Senegalese fisheries’ policy discourse introduces the idea that Senegalese fisheries’ policies have not been fully compatible with the sustainable development of the country's fishery sector. A comparative analysis of the sustainable development impacts associated with the activities of different fishery user groups shows that managed activities of heterogeneous user groups can benefit the sustainable development of the sector. Conclusions suggest that the heterogeneity of the user groups frequenting Senegal's marine fishery system can be capitalised upon through allocating fishery access in accord with each group's ability to generate sustainable development benefits. On the basis of these findings the article suggests that the presence of an EU fleet in Senegalese waters could play a meaningful role in ensuring the sustainable development of Senegal's marine fishery.

The most recent protocol of the fisheries’ agreement between Senegal and the EU expired at the end of June 2006, and has not been renewed for the first time since 1979. Fieldwork observations in Dakar suggested strong sentiment among Senegalese fisheries’ stake holders that the non-renewal of the four year agreement was a victory for local fishing groups. Authors such as Oli Brown [1] and Beatrice Goréz [2] have supported this view, arguing that EU fishing agreements have a negative impact upon the livelihoods of local fisheries’ groups, and by implication those of the populations affected by fisheries’ activities. The extent to which the non-renewal of the fisheries’ agreement with the EU can be viewed as a victory for local Senegalese fisheries’ groups is however, questionable. This article evaluates the validity of claims that bilateral fisheries’ agreements between Senegal and the EU do more harm than good for the sustainable development of the West African maritime fishery. The evaluation takes a two pronged approach. First a description of Senegalese fisheries’ discourse is provided, which is followed by an examination of Senegalese fisheries’ policy dynamics and their impact on fisheries’ policy outcomes. The evaluation is underpinned by an assumption that fisheries’ stake holders have a common long-term interest in ensuring the sustainable development of the fishery. This common interest provides a policy community perspective which is juxtaposed with the conflicting private interests motivating stake holders to maximise immediate social and economic returns from their fishing effort. From an institutional perspective, the extent to which the Senegalese fisheries’ administration authorities balance the conflicting micro and macro interests within the policy community is evaluated. A comparative analysis of the sustainable development implications arising from the activities of Senegalese fishing groups provides empirical meaning to the evaluation. The three main fishing groups evaluated are the local artisanal sector, the local industrial sector, and the foreign EU industrial sector.1 A simple methodology is used to describe the impact of each group on the economic capital, natural capital, human capital and public institutional capital underpinning the sustainable development of the fishery system. The evaluation finds that EU activities make a positive contribution towards the sustainable development of the fishery. The local artisanal sector holds potential to make a positive contribution to the sustainable development of the fishery, but this would require more effective management of fishing effort expended by the sector. It is suggested that the local industrial sector has a negative impact on the sustainable development of the fishery, not least because of the prominence of joint venture agreements with third country enterprises and the strong tendency towards exporting fisheries’ rents gained through joint venture activities. From a political perspective it is noted that the rationale behind making EU activities accountable for diminishing returns to fishing effort of local fishing groups is motivated by the political need for a scapegoat rather than by empirical evidence. This paper shows that Senegal's fisheries’ policy community is characterised by individual policy forces placing conflicting pressures on the policy process. The observed outcome is that fisheries’ policy does not accord with the sustainable development of the fishery sector. The evaluation ends with a recommendation that the heterogeneous impacts associated with the activities of local artisanal and foreign EU user groups can be capitalised upon for the benefit of the sustainable development of the fishery. Examples are given of micro rationality leading to macro irrationality, where the simultaneous political relevance of micro rational objectives leads policy makers to pursue macro-irrational objectives through simultaneously aiming to please all stake holders.

This study has shown that for Senegal, fisheries’ agreements with the EU have been a valuable source of public revenue, which has also been useful in responding to the needs of local fisheries’ groups and supporting the institutional capital required for the sustainable management of the resource. More recently increased pressure on the country's fish stocks, declining fisheries’ rents, and the threat of higher fish prices has resulted in political pressure to arrest fisheries’ agreements with the EU as a means of providing local user groups with a larger share of the resource. The political rationality behind a decision to stop fisheries’ agreements with the EU as a means of tempering public demands for more favourable terms for local groups can be clearly understood. However, the extent to which the realisation of these political interests can be relied upon to enable the sustainable development of the Senegalese marine fishery, and therefore the long term welfare of the country's fisheries’ policy community, remains questionable. Financially, the EU has provided an important contribution to the public institutional capital for research and direct financing for initiatives ensuring effective management of the activities of all user groups participating in the Senegalese fishery. Although the sector produces comparatively few benefits in terms of employment and catch for local consumption, the sector is reported as taking only a small part of the fishery resource relative to other groups. This article notes that EU activities have not significantly inhibited the ability of local groups to provide employment and realise catches for local consumption and/or export. The absence of this supposed trade-off implies that the EU fisheries’ access agreements with Senegal can play an important role in ensuring the sustainable development of the fishery. Accordingly the heterogeneity of the impacts associated with the activities of local artisanal and foreign EU fishing groups is an asset to be capitalised upon for the benefit of the sustainable development of the fishery system. Senegalese fisheries’ policy discourse is not alone in succumbing to policy forces favouring the short term interests of politically powerful constituencies at the expense of the long term welfare of the policy community. Similar dynamics have led the European Union into subsidising over-capitalised and financially unprofitable fishing fleet activities in third country waters. Ironically Senegalese fisheries’ stakeholders’ policy priorities currently prevent the West African state from enjoying the sustainable development opportunities presented by the grace of their equivalents north of the Mediterranean.