سودآوری و فقرا: استراتژی، نوآوری و پایداری شرکت

Based on empirical evidence, the article looks at the implications of private sector participation (PSP) for the delivery of water supply and sanitation to the urban and peri-urban poor in developing countries, with particular reference to Africa and Latin America. More precisely, the article addresses the impact produced by multinational companies’ (MNCs) strategies, in light of the pursuit of profitability, on the extension of connections to the pipeline network. It does so by questioning the assumptions that greater private sector efficiency and innovation, together with contract design, will enable the sustainable extension of service coverage to low income dwellers. The strategies of the major water MNCs are considered both in relation to the global expansion of their operations and the adjustment of local strategies to commercial considerations. The latter might result in identifying profitable markets, modifying contractual provisions, attempting to reduce costs and increase income, reducing risks and exiting from non-performing contracts. The evidence reviewed allows for re-assessing the relative roles of the public and private sectors in extending and delivering water services to the poor. First, the most far reaching innovative approaches to extending connections are more likely to come from communities, public authorities and political activity than from MNCs. Secondly, whenever MNCs are liable to exit from non-profitable contracts, the public sector has no other option than to deal with external risks affecting continuity of provision. Finally, market limitations affecting MNCs’ ability to serve marginal populations and access cheap capital do not apply to well-organised, politically led public sector undertakings.

In the 1990s arguments have been advanced for expecting the international private sector, that is to say multinational companies, to provide a better solution to extending water supply to the poor in developing countries. They refer to the three private sector virtues of efficiency, financial capacity, and proactive management which operates by matching the service supplied with the effective demand of the poor, as concisely summarised by Franceys (1997): “Private sector participation is seen to increase efficiency and introduce new sources of finance but above all to require a new emphasis on proactive, performance oriented, commercial management that aims to match the demand of its customers with their willingness to pay realistic charges and tariffs”.1 The leading private companies, notably Suez, have themselves supported this argument by publishing statements of their ability to extend services to the poor in developing countries: see for example Lyonnaise des Eaux, 1998 and Suez, 2001. A number of private water operations in developing countries are claimed as successful examples of the private sector delivering water to the urban poor. This paper discusses these arguments and tests the claim that the private sector will deliver better results for the poor by considering the general strategies and practice of the private water companies in relation to the poor in cities in developing countries. It concludes that Expectations of the private sector were flawed by failing to anticipate the impact of commercial strategies on determining the boundaries of expansion, the economics of service, and exit strategies the community-based techniques used by the private companies in extending water services to the poor are not innovations but borrowed from public sector and community initiatives the requirements of profit-maximisation and risk reduction strategies of the private companies define the scope of private expansion at a narrower and less sustainable boundary than the public sector.

In business terms, contrary to the predictions of supporters of PSP, the private sector is not a major innovator of these techniques. As shown by the cases observed, the most far reaching innovative approaches to extending connections are more likely to come from communities, public authorities and political activity – the public domain, in the broadest sense. Moreover, some of these techniques can only be applied by the public sector. Subsidies in the form of means-tested benefits financed by taxation, or cross-subsidies financed by a solidarity charge, have to be validated through the state; rising block tariffs are also political creations, as market logic implies the opposite type of tariff structure, with discounts for larger consumption. The same is true of voluntary labour: private companies can hope to encourage communities to donate their labour, but cannot systematically require free community labour, as a condition of connection. This seems clearly ruled out by the ILO convention on forced labour54, which specifies (Article 5) that No concession granted to private individuals, companies or associations shall involve any form of forced or compulsory labour for the production or the collection of products which such private individuals, companies or associations utilise or in which they trade. By contrast, the convention explicitly recognises that the public sector can require such work as a civic – not commercial – duty, by exempting: (article 2): …any work or service which forms part of the normal civic obligations of the citizens of a fully self-governing country…[or] minor communal services of a kind which, being performed by the members of the community in the direct interest of the said community, can therefore be considered as normal civic obligations incumbent upon the members of the community…. Most generally of all, the element of democratic political activity, and the initiative to build community organisations, is also characteristic of the public domain. Private companies can and do participate in this process, and it is a notable that in France the water companies have been very active in funding and supporting political parties.