دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی شماره 142110
ترجمه فارسی عنوان مقاله

سهامداران کنترل و زمان بندی بازار: شواهد از رویدادهای لیست متقابل

عنوان انگلیسی
Controlling shareholders and market timing: Evidence from cross-listing events
کد مقاله سال انتشار تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی
142110 2017 12 صفحه PDF
منبع

Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)

Journal : International Review of Financial Analysis, Volume 49, January 2017, Pages 12-23

پیش نمایش مقاله
پیش نمایش مقاله  سهامداران کنترل و زمان بندی بازار: شواهد از رویدادهای لیست متقابل

چکیده انگلیسی

We find partial support for a permanent increase in firm value following U.S. cross-listings. Cross-listed firms with capital-raising intentions on U.S. exchanges and firms cross-listing after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act exhibit an increase in firm value. Yet, investors are worse off in the long run when owning insider-controlled cross-listings. Compared to non-insider-owned cross-listings, insider-owned firms have a greater rise in value around the cross-listing year but also a larger decline in the post-cross-listing years. In fact, insider-owned firms lose value by the fifth year, compared with their value before cross-listing. Lastly, we show that liquidity and visibility enhance the value of cross-listings.