تاثیر نشخوار در مقابل حواس پرتی بر اضطراب و ناسازگاری اعتقادات خود در افراد با اضطراب اجتماعی

Abstract A large body of experimental evidence has demonstrated the adverse effects of rumination on depressive mood and cognitions. In contrast, while prominent models of social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) have proposed rumination as a key maintaining factor, the effects of rumination in social anxiety have not been extensively explored. In a sample of (N = 93) undergraduates, this study investigated the impact of rumination versus distraction following a social-evaluative task on anxiety and another key component of social phobia: maladaptive self-beliefs. Relative to distraction, rumination maintained anxiety in both high and low socially anxious individuals, and maintained unconditional beliefs in high socially anxious individuals. The results support models of social phobia and also suggest important theoretical extensions. Implications for the treatment of social anxiety are discussed.

Results An alpha level of .05 was used for all tests.4 Pre-induction variables Table 2 displays means and standard deviations for baseline, pre- and post-induction variables (see also Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). A 2 (Group: high FNE vs. low FNE) × 2 (Condition: rumination vs. distraction) multivariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for baseline and pre-induction measures.5 Compared to the low FNE group, the high FNE group scored higher on the FNE, DASS depression, DASS anxiety, DASS stress, VAS sadness, VAS anxiety (both baseline and pre-induction ratings), VAS self-focus, high standard beliefs, conditional beliefs and unconditional beliefs (all p's < .01). There were no other significant effects at baseline or pre-induction, indicating experimental conditions were matched on variables of interest at these time-points. Table 2. Means and standard deviations for FNE, DASS, mood and rumination measures across group and condition. Variable Time High FNE Low FNE Rumination Distraction Rumination Distraction M SD M SD M SD M SD FNE Baseline 23.19 2.66 23.40 2.65 4.90 3.09 5.93 3.21 DASS: Depression Baseline 9.43 9.19 10.16 6.73 6.20 7.94 5.04 3.98 DASS: Anxiety Baseline 9.14 7.28 9.28 8.62 4.50 5.15 4.30 6.04 DASS: Stress Baseline 12.86 8.68 16.16 9.81 8.60 8.80 9.48 7.93 VAS: Sadness Pre-induction 3.05 2.13 3.24 2.37 .90 1.52 1.33 1.88 Post-induction 3.57 2.64 2.40 2.33 1.45 2.19 1.37 2.08 VAS: Self-focus Pre-induction 6.90 2.47 5.64 2.38 4.65 2.56 4.15 2.87 Post-induction 8.33 1.91 4.64 3.17 8.60 1.63 3.04 2.93 VAS: Abstract thinking Pre-induction 4.95 2.72 5.00 2.48 5.40 3.03 5.00 2.39 Post-induction 6.10 2.32 4.64 2.63 6.45 2.91 5.15 2.73 Note. Baseline refers to time-point before speech task. Pre-induction refers to time-point after speech task but before induction task. Post-induction refers to time-point after induction task. FNE scores range from 0 to 30, with higher scores reflecting higher social anxiety. DASS depression, DASS anxiety, and DASS stress scores each range from 0 to 7, with higher scores indicating higher levels of depression, anxiety and stress, respectively. VAS sadness, VAS self-focus and VAS abstract thinking ratings each range from 0 to 10, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of sadness, self-focus and abstract thinking, respectively. FNE = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales; VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. Table options Mean ratings of anxiety (+SE) at baseline, pre-induction and post-induction for ... Fig. 1. Mean ratings of anxiety (+SE) at baseline, pre-induction and post-induction for groups/conditions. Note. VAS anxiety ranges from 0 to 10 with higher scores reflecting higher levels of anxiety. Rum = Rumination, Dist = Distraction. Figure options Mean ratings of high standard belief strength (+SE) at pre-induction and ... Fig. 2. Mean ratings of high standard belief strength (+SE) at pre-induction and post-induction for groups/conditions. Note. High standard belief scores range from 0 to 40 with higher scores indicating stronger beliefs. Rum = Rumination, Dist = Distraction. Figure options Mean ratings of conditional belief strength (+SE) at pre-induction and ... Fig. 3. Mean ratings of conditional belief strength (+SE) at pre-induction and post-induction for groups/conditions. Note. Conditional belief scores range from 0 to 70 with higher scores indicating stronger beliefs. Rum = Rumination, Dist = Distraction. Figure options Mean ratings of unconditional belief strength (+SE) at pre-induction and ... Fig. 4. Mean ratings of unconditional belief strength (+SE) at pre-induction and post-induction for groups/conditions. Note. Unconditional belief scores range from 0 to 40 with higher scores indicating stronger beliefs. Rum = Rumination, Dist = Distraction. Figure options Manipulation checks: anxiety induction To test whether the speech task had the intended effect of increasing participants' anxiety levels, a 2 (Group: high FNE vs. low FNE) × 2 (Condition: rumination vs. distraction) × 2 (Time: baseline vs. pre-induction) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for VAS anxiety ratings (see Fig. 1). There was a main effect of time, F(1, 89) = 20.94, p < .01, partial η2 = .19, with an increase in anxiety from baseline (i.e, pre-speech) to pre-induction (i.e., post-speech). There was also a main effect of group, F(1, 89) = 40.60, p < .01, partial η2 = .31, such that the high FNE group reported higher levels of anxiety than the low FNE group. These main effects were secondary to a Time × Group interaction, F(1, 89) = 7.02, p = .01, partial η2 = .07, which reflected a significant increase in anxiety for the high FNE group, t(45) = −4.90, p < .01, but only a trend towards anxiety increase for the low FNE group, t(46) = −1.65, p = .11. Thus, the social-evaluative speech task had its intended effect of increasing participants' anxiety. Manipulation checks: Self-focus and abstract thinking A series of 2 (Group: high FNE vs. low FNE) × 2 (Condition: rumination vs. distraction) × 2 (Time: pre-induction vs. post-induction) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the manipulations had the intended effects. For VAS self-focus ratings, there was a main effect of group, F(1, 88) = 10.14, p < .01, partial η2 = .10, with the high FNE group reporting higher levels of self-focus than the low FNE group. There was also a main effect of condition, F(1, 88) = 47.09, p < .01, partial η2 = .35, indicating that participants in the rumination condition had greater self-focus than those in the distraction condition. There was a main effect of time, F(1, 88) = 5.25, p = .02, partial η2 = .06, due to an increase in self-focus from pre- to post-induction. These main effects were secondary to an expected significant Time × Condition interaction, F(1, 88) = 26.95, p < .01, partial η2 = .23, which reflected an increase in self-focus from pre- to post-induction in the rumination condition, t(39) = −5.54, p < .01, and a decrease in self-focus in the distraction condition, t(51) = 2.01, p = .05. For VAS abstract thinking ratings, there was an expected Time × Condition interaction, F(1, 88) = 4.43, p = .04, partial η2 = .05. This reflected a significant increase in abstract thinking from pre- to post-induction in the rumination condition, t(39) = −2.54, p = .02, but no change in the distraction condition, t(51) = .26, p = .80. Effects of rumination and distraction on anxiety levels and maladaptive self-beliefs A series of 2 (Group: high FNE vs. low FNE) × 2 (Condition: rumination vs. distraction) × 2 (Time: pre-induction vs. post-induction) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted. With the VAS anxiety ratings as the dependent variable (see Fig. 1), there was a main effect of time, F(1, 89) = 54.29, p < .01, partial η2 = .38, with a decrease in anxiety from pre- to post-induction. There was also a main effect of group, F(1, 89) = 31.03, p < .01, partial η2 = .26, such that the high FNE group reported more anxiety than the low FNE group. These main effects were secondary to a Time × Group interaction, F(1, 89) = 19.01, p < .01, partial η2 = .18, reflecting decreased anxiety from pre-induction to post-induction in both the low, t(46) = 2.57, p = .01, and the high FNE groups, t(45) = 7.10, p < .01. Importantly, there was also a significant Time × Condition interaction, F(1, 89) = 30.26, p < .01, partial η2 = .25. This reflected a significant decrease in anxiety from pre- to post-induction for participants in the distraction condition, t(51) = 8.02, p < .01, but no change in the rumination condition, t(40) = 1.40, p = .17. With high standard beliefs as the dependent variable (see Fig. 2), there was a main effect of time, F(1, 89) = 25.39, p < .01, partial η2 = .22, that reflected a decrease in the strength of beliefs from pre- to post-induction. There was also a main effect of group, F(1, 89) = 67.53, p < .01, partial η2 = .43, such that the high FNE group endorsed stronger high standard beliefs than the low FNE group. Furthermore, there was a condition main effect, F(1, 89) = 4.15, p = .05, partial η2 = .05, with individuals in the rumination condition showing stronger high standard beliefs than individuals in the distraction condition. These analyses were repeated with conditional beliefs as the dependent variable (see Fig. 3). There was a main effect of time, F(1, 89) = 12.31, p < .01, partial η2 = .12, that indicated a decrease in strength of conditional beliefs from pre- to post-induction. There was also a main effect of group, F(1, 89) = 60.16, p < .05, partial η2 = .40, indicating the high FNE group reported a greater strength of conditional beliefs than the low FNE group. For unconditional beliefs (see Fig. 4), there was a main effect of time, F(1, 89) = 11.23, p < .01, partial η2 = .11, indicating a decrease in the strength of unconditional beliefs from pre- to post-induction. There was also a group main effect, F(1, 89) = 37.92, p < .01, partial η2 = .30, with the high FNE group reporting stronger unconditional beliefs than the low FNE group. These effects were secondary to a Time × Condition interaction, F(1, 89) = 13.27, p < .01, partial η2 = .13, which was in turn secondary to a significant Time × Group × Condition interaction, F(1, 89) = 5.55, p = .02, partial η2 = .06. This reflected a significant interaction of Time × Condition in the high, F(1, 44) = 11.91, p < .05, partial η2 = .21, but not the low, F(1, 45) = 1.65, p = .21, partial η2 = .04, FNE group. That is, in the high FNE group, there was a significant decrease in endorsement of unconditional beliefs for the distraction condition, t(24) = 4.88, p < .01, but no change in the rumination condition, t(20) = −.50, p = .62.