دیدگاه فروشندگان درباره اعتماد و کنترل در برون سپاری خارجی سیستم های اطلاعاتی

Whereas most discussion of outsourcing has concentrated on the clients’ perspective, we investigated the formation of offshore IS vendors’ trust in their client and the client's control over the vendor; these were assumed to affect the vendor's performance. Focusing on the Japan–China offshoring context, we conducted a survey of 110 project managers in nine Chinese IS outsourcers. Our findings indicated that trust had a significant effect on project quality but little on cost adherence; the relationship between control and the two vendor performance measures were the opposite of this. Furthermore, information sharing, communication quality, and inter-firm adaptation emerged as three significant contributors to the vendor's trust in the client; goal setting and cultural blending turned out to be significant in influencing the client's control over the vendor. One of the key contributions and implications of our research was that certain offshore client behaviors could shape vendor performance by influencing the vendor's trust in the client and client's control over the vendor, beyond formal contracts. These findings may be useful for both offshore vendors and clients in developing successful IS outsourcing.

Offshore IS outsourcing is an important topic today (e.g., [28]). According to an IDG report, the global IT outsourcing market will soon grow to US $17 billion [29]. The clients are concentrated in North America, Western Europe, and Japan, with the U.S. accounting for about 40% of the market, followed by Japan with 10%. Whereas India has been the leading destination, China represents a huge potential vendor that has been mainly ignored. Outsourcing involves the migration of all or part of an organization's IS assets, people, and/or activities to vendors located in a different country from that of the client organization. Outsourcing arrangements range from transferring work to the vendor country with lower labor costs and access to specialized personnel to negotiating partnerships in the form of joint ventures or accessing foreign subsidiaries, etc. Relationship management is a key factor for successful outsourcing. According to the transaction cost theory, tightening control through a well-designed contract is assumed to reduce production and transaction costs, but control via an outsourcing contract is inherently complicated: offshore outsourcing is much riskier than traditional outsourcing. On the other hand, interactions between offshore partners often go beyond the rules, agreements, and exceptions specified in the contract. There is an element of trust, commitment, and mutual interest that is intangible and not easily captured in a contract. The vendor–client relationship rooted in mutual trust gives rise to a strong bond between the participants.

Our exploratory research has filled some void in the literature on offshore outsourcing and trust and control impact from the vendors’ perspective. A model of trust-control in offshore outsourcing relationship was proposed; it received some empirical support: Several trust building mechanisms were identified, including the client's effort in information sharing, communication quality, and inter-firm adaptation. The client should also focus on goal setting and cultural blending with vendors in order to influence and control the project. Furthermore, the vendor's trust of the client stood out as a key factor affecting project quality, and vendor control, helping prevent cost overrun.