تعادل نرخ بیکاری با برون سپاری و همبستگی دستمزد تحت کاستی های بازار نیروی کار

We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high- and low-skilled workers. When the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy, it will dampen this tendency. Further, higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it will reduce it among the low-skilled workers. Overall, outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low.

On a global scale differences in labour costs are enormous across countries ranging from, for example, 1.10€ per hour in China to above 27€ per hour in Denmark, West Germany or Norway in year 2004 (see, e.g. Sinn, 2007). These wage differences constitute a central explanation for the increasingly significant business practice of international outsourcing.1 In countries with strong labour market imperfections large-scale outsourcing is often considered to pose a significant threat for employment, in particular for the low-skilled labour force segment. These concerns are often expressed by labour unions, and unions often accommodate the particular concern for the low-skilled labour force segment by advocating solidaristic wage policies.2 In this study, we analyze the effects of international outsourcing to low-wage countries on equilibrium unemployment in high-wage countries characterized by strong labour market imperfections. More precisely, we focus on a heterogeneous labour market where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union endowed with solidaristic objectives with a particular relative emphasis on the wages for low-skilled workers at the expense of high-skilled workers. We address the following questions: How does outsourcing affect wage formation, and in particular wage dispersion, in a heterogeneous labour market, where the labour union operates with some degree of wage solidarity? What are the effects of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment among high- and low-skilled workers? How are these effects related to the degree of wage solidarity? How can we characterize the aggregate effects of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment in the presence of solidaristic wage policies? And finally, what is the optimal production mode when firms commit to the outsourcing activity under imperfectly competitive and segmented labour markets?

We have studied the consequences of outsourcing and wage solidarity on labour demand, wage dispersion, equilibrium unemployment as well as the incentives associated with the introduction of outsourcing. We have shown that both the own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity as well as the outsourcing elasticity of the low-skilled labour demand depend positively on the amount of outsourcing, while both the own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity as well as the outsourcing elasticity of the high-skilled labour demand are independent of the amount of outsourcing. As for wages formed by the monopoly labour union we found that a higher share of outsourced production will decrease the wage rate applied to the low-skilled labour, and increase the wage rate for the high-skilled labour so that the wage dispersion is increased. Increased outsourcing increases equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it reduces it among the low-skilled workers. Thus, outsourcing will reduce equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low. The threshold below which this conclusion holds true is strictly decreasing as a function of the degree of wage solidarity. In this respect the effect of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment depends monotonically on the degree of wage solidarity. We have analyzed the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment. Likewise we have briefly characterized the optimal committed production mode with heterogeneous workers in the presence of labour market imperfections. An important topic for future research is to ask: What are the incentives of heterogeneous labour force segments to merge and negotiate the wage agreement as a unified labour union rather than as separate unions if the firms have access to production though international outsourcing? Horn and Wolinsky (1988) have earlier studied this issue in a different model without outsourcing.