برون سپاری در مقابل تولید "کار در منزل" : مقایسه قراردادهای زنجیره تامین با تقاضای وابسته
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|623||2011||11 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Omega, Volume 39, Issue 2, April 2011, Pages 168–178
We analyze the effort and pricing decisions in a two facility supply chain in which one of the parties can exert costly effort to increase demand. We consider an outsourcing model in which the supplier makes the effort decision and an in-house production model in which the manufacturer decides on the effort level and we compare these two models with each other. We analyze and compare several contracts for decentralized supply chain models and we aim to find which contracts are best to use in different cases. We find the optimal contract parameters in each case and perform extensive computational testing to compare the efficiencies of these contracts. We also analyze the effect of the powers of the parties in the system and the effect of system parameters on the performances of the contracts and on the optimal values of the model variables such as price, effort and demand.
In this study, we analyze a supply chain composed of two parties and we aim to increase the efficiency of this system through contracts. For this study, we are motivated by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that works with a contract manufacturer (CM) for the production of one of its products. The OEM (manufacturer) outsources the production to the CM and the CM invests in the technology and expends a certain amount of effort for the production of this product. A larger investment in technology or a higher level of effort improves the quality of the product and a higher quality product results in an increased market potential (demand) for the product. In this setting, the CM essentially determines the product quality. However, the OEM is worried that the CM does not exert the appropriate level of effort to produce products of the appropriate quality. Thus, the OEM is considering to use a contract in order to effect the supplier's effort and to increase the demand and his profits. However, the OEM cannot force the CM to exert the level of effort that the OEM wants. It is assumed that the companies cannot contract directly on the effort level (or the quality level) beforehand since quality is not always verifiable for a third party such as a court to decide on. In addition, the firms cannot identify every possible contingency and define effort in advance. Thus, they cannot write a complete contract that defines what to do in every possible situation. Because of these reasons, we assume that the quality and thus the efforts of the parties are non-contractible which is a standard assumption in much of the related research (see , , ,  and ).
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
In this paper, we consider a two facility supply chain in which one of the parties can exert costly effort to increase demand. We analyze the effort and pricing decisions in the supply chain to maximize the profits of the supply chain members. We consider centralized and decentralized versions of the model and for the decentralized setting, we analyze and compare several different contracts with each other. We observe that there are some contracts that can fully coordinate the supply chain and achieve the profits of the centralized model when the manufacturer makes the effort decision. Namely, a linear contract, a quantity discount contract and a simultaneous revenue and cost sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain in the manufacturer effort model. However, when the supplier is the one exerting the effort, only a simultaneous revenue and cost sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain. However, the supply chain members might not prefer to use these coordinating contracts due to their complexities, risks, implementation costs and special circumstances of the relations in the supply chain. Thus, we also focus on the other contracts and observe that, when the supplier exerts effort, a linear contract and a quantity discount contract result in very poor performances in most cases, especially for small values of price sensitivity of demand, b and cost of effort, k. We observe that, when the supplier is exerting the effort, a revenue sharing contract is preferable to a cost sharing contract in industries with powerful suppliers while a cost sharing contract would perform much better in industries with powerful manufacturers. However, when the supplier and the manufacturer have similar powers, moving to in-house production and using a linear contract or a quantity discount contract might also give the best result for the manufacturer depending on the extra cost of effort and the unit costs of production. We also observe that the market size and the unit cost of production do not have any effect on the contract performances. Of course, real world situations have many more and complex characteristics that are not captured by the model in this paper. There might be different system characteristics than we study in this paper. For example, it might be possible for the OEM to commit to the decision on the market price prior to the CM's decision on effort level to gain first mover's advantage. In such a setting, we can show that the OEM can coordinate the supply chain using a linear contract or a cost sharing contract which cannot coordinate the supply chain in our supplier effort model. However, we also observe that a wholesale price contract, a quantity discount contract and a revenue sharing contract are still not able to coordinate the supply chain even when the OEM commits to market price before the supplier's effort decision. In addition, the structure of the demand function might effect the efficiencies of the contracts and demand functions other than the linear case can be analyzed. In the future, we also suggest evaluating models where the parties have asymmetric information about each other or where the effort of the supplier cannot be observed by the manufacturer even though they have symmetric information. Also, contracts in competitive markets in which there exists multiple suppliers or manufacturers can be analyzed. In all these models, the parties need to develop good strategies and contracts to coordinate the supply chain and to increase their profits.