پروژه های برون سپاری سیستم های اطلاعات به عنوان یک مشکل مخاطرات اخلاقی دوگانه
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|655||2012||11 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Omega, Volume 40, Issue 3, June 2012, Pages 379–389
In the past two decades many organizations have turned to other organizations to satisfy their information systems needs. Information systems outsourcing arrangements cover the spectrum from agreements involving the delivery of all information services to those providing specific services such as systems development, communications management, desktop computing provision and maintenance, and so on. In this paper we model information systems outsourcing arrangements as a non-cooperative game with two players: a company and an outsourcing vendor. The game between the two players has an inherent double moral hazard problem as the success of the information system outsourcing project depends on the actions of both players, which are costly for them and are not directly contractible. Both parties make their decisions taking into account the effects that these decisions have on the other player's actions. In our analysis, we compare the solution obtained without a moral hazard problem (the first-best solution) to the one obtained under a double moral hazard setting (the second-best solution). We demonstrate some results based on the assumption that increases in the productivity of the vendor lead to increases in the productivity of the company. Further we establish that outsourcing contracts should provide no separate payment for failure to the outsourcing vendor although effectively many of them do. We also provide a sharing rule for providing appropriate incentives for the vendor and examine the dynamics associated with this sharing rule. Finally, we further provide for the characterization of response functions and the ensuing Nash solution including the optimal outsourcing fee. This allows for the nuanced consideration of the degree of interaction between the effort of one party and the productivity of the effort of the other party. This particular interaction has not been explored formally in the extant research literature.
Information services (systems) outsourcing occurs when an organization contracts with another organization for the provision of some or all of its information service needs. Such needs may include the provision of new applications systems, the complete overhaul of the organization’s information infrastructure, or simply running the organization’s present information systems. Since many information services are difficult to assess and are delivered over an extended period of time it is difficult to ensure that the outsourcing vendor (henceforth simply ‘vendor’) acts in the best interest of the outsourcing company (henceforth simply ‘company’). There are a variety of responses that are appropriate in this type of situation. One approach is to design incentives so that the vendor will be motivated to act in best interests of the company. Over the past two decades considerable attention has been directed towards the outsourcing phenomenon in general and the information services outsourcing phenomenon in particular (for an excellent review of the IT outsourcing literature over the last two decades see ). Michell and Fitzgerald , for example, describe the selection process of the IT outsourcing vendor. A variety of authors have discussed, in general terms, the relative advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing. Early on, Gupta and Gupta  argue that outsourcing can lead to a reduction in costs but may also lead to a loss of control and an uncertain level of service. In a similar vein Kelly  argues that, in addition to the factors identified by Gupta and Gupta, outsourcing may lead to a loss of strategic direction for the company. Fink  discusses the security and control considerations in information systems outsourcing. In a later work Aubert et al.  state that “Some argue that outsourcing IT leads to lower costs, economies of scale, access to socialized resources, and new business ventures.” (p. 4) Aubert et al.  further identify a variety of risks associated with outsourcing including hidden costs, contractual difficulties, service debasement, and loss of organizational competencies. A much more extensive review of research investigating benefits associated with outsourcing is provided by Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim, and Jayatilaka . Clearly the nature and significance of the benefits and risks associated with outsourcing are contingent on both the nature and the range of activities which are outsourced.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
This paper examines outsourcing as a non-cooperative game with two players: an outsourcing company and an outsourcing vendor. The game between the two players has an inherent double moral hazard problem since the success of the information systems outsourcing project depends on the actions of both players, and these actions are costly for the player that takes them and unobservable to the other player. Both parties make their decisions in consideration of the effect these decisions have on the other player's actions. We compare the solution obtained without a moral hazard problem (the first-best solution) to the one obtained under the double moral hazard setting (the second-best solution). Our results include the characterization of response functions and the ensuing Nash solution, including the optimal outsourcing fee. We have provided insights as to how incentive contracts may be structured in response to the double moral hazard problem. We demonstrate that optimal contracts should not include any payment for failure. We further indicate the nature of a rule for sharing the expected value of the information system being outsourced between the vendor and the company. In particular we note that the more critical the system being developed the greater the proportional share of the value added by the system is provided to the vendor. This result has not been provided in the research literature addressing information systems to date and is interesting in the context of recent statements in the literature that companies should not shy away from outsourcing their core processes and services. We also demonstrate analytically that in situations where the marginal costs of the vendor are lower than the marginal costs of the company then the second-best solution may well be superior to the first-best solution. This situation may also be considered to represent a game-theoretic equivalent modeling of the transactions costs analysis of outsourcing.