وقتی که کمترین هزینه کافی نیست : ایجاد مدل کسب و کار موفق هواپیمایی ارزان قیمت در آسیا

Following the success of budget airlines in Australia, regulatory barriers were eased elsewhere in Asia Pacific to allow the proliferation of low-fare airlines (LFAs). The aim of this paper is to assess whether the profit and growth potential of Asian LFAs are hampered not just by remaining regulatory barriers but also by the embedded revenue and cost advantages of their full fare rivals. The LFAs business model can survive and succeed in Asia so long as these companies can ensure an even lower operating cost than their already cost-efficient full-service rivals. LFAs based in low-income countries with a relative lack of viable land transport infrastructure (e.g. Malaysia) are likely to achieve the greatest market stimulation.

Following late on the global trend, low-fare airlines (LFAs) rapidly emerged across Asia.1 After deregulation in 2000, Skymark appeared in Japan, explicitly modeled on Southwest Airlines, and a second carrier, Air Do soon followed. Carriers claiming to be modeled on leading American and European budget airlines also emerged in Thailand (PBAir and Air Andaman) and in Cambodia (Siem Reap Air). In late 2001, AirAsia was re-launched in Malaysia as a no frills operation. In the Philippines, Cebu Pacific Airways, also modeled on Southwest, kept costs down by selling online and operating out of secondary airports. India's first budget airline, Air Deccan, launched in late August 2003 and Valuair and Tiger Airways commenced operations in 2004, both based in Singapore. As industry shakeouts in the US and Europe illustrated, most of these new entrants were unlikely to survive. In addition to having robust business models and adequate financing—as well as avoiding predatory behavior and regulatory hurdles—the long-term survival of these carriers depended on their ability to compete with Asia's full service legacy airlines. The prevailing sentiment among the Asian majors, expressed by the Asia Pacific Airlines Association in early 2003, was that no-frill fliers are not a threat to Asian airlines. This optimism from full-service Asian carriers is examined to see if it is based on facts or if these companies are ‘misjudging’ the strengths and adaptability of the LFA business model. Revenue and costs aspects of the potential for LFA growth in Asia are addressed. The revenue side is important as some industry experts argue that the average domestic and intra-Asian fares are already very price competitive as compared to the historical situation in Western Europe or North America prior to the emergence of LFAs. Another focus is an examination of which Asian countries provide the most favorable market environment for low-fare entrants with the least regulatory barriers together with a mobile and open-minded consumer population. On the cost side, the fundamental difference between the Asian and the North American or Western European aviation markets are examined from the perspective that Asian majors already possess lower operating cost structures; their network and fleet structures allowing them to achieve a lower cost per seat than their European or North American full-service counterparts. Most Asian majors operate in high-volume markets with wide-body aircraft that mean lower costs per seat and ensure their market dominance between major population centers. As Ergas and Findlay (2003) found in their work on Virgin Blue's entry into the Australian market, the network structures, range of differentiated services and yield management systems of the full fare carriers constitute important market advantages. Any emerging LFA will find it more challenging to compete with majors that possess such inherent cost advantages, combined with Asia's more flexible hiring practices and labor laws. The common prediction is that any LFA would have a more difficult time surviving in Asia, where a cost gap between a traditional full-service airline and a potential low-cost entrant would be much narrower than in the North American or Western European markets. The paper draws on primary and secondary documentation from Asian, North American and European airlines and associated organizations. In addition, interviews were conducted with a sample of expert witnesses, comprising a representative group of high-level managers from both full service and budget airlines in Asia.

Views vary on whether low-cost airlines will flourish in Asia. Three factors—regulation, market demand and demographics—drive this calculus. Although the target consumer base for AirAsia is enormous—500 million people live within 3 hours of AirAsia's hubs in Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, more than Western Europe's population—the failure of Asia's regulatory environment to keep pace, and the uncertain demand for low-cost services raise uncertainties. There are too few bilateral agreements that allow low-cost carriers to fly between countries and too few satellite airports that the airlines need to keep costs low. Moreover, in a region where most people still earn less than $7 a day, incomes are low to support a budget airline industry; “The demographics don’t support the low-cost carrier model in Asia,” said Chin Y. Lim of Morgan Stanley in Singapore (cited in Arnold, 2004). Other commentators see a large and growing market. They predict low-cost carriers will tap pent-up demand among less affluent Asians who typically travel by bus and hardly expect attentive service. According to a survey by Axess Asia, low fares are the deciding factor in decisions to go or stay home for budget-conscious travelers in Southeast Asia. ‘We’re talking about a transformational shift in the way people travel in Asia,’ (Reinnoldt, cited in Neuman, 2004). Although incomes are lower in Asia than Europe, Timothy Ross, of UBS, says that the region's lower average incomes should boost rather than constrain demand for cheap fares (The Economist, 2004). Moreover, the pattern in other regions suggests that regulations are relaxed growth takes place. In the US budget carriers saw passenger numbers rise nearly 50% in the five years following deregulation, compared with 4% for traditional airlines. Low-cost carriers now have roughly a third of the market. In Australia, Virgin Blue took only three years to win a 30% market share. Based on the success of Air Asia in Malaysia and Thailand, there is at least one strong business case indicating that LFAs could be as profitable in Asia as they are in Australia and other parts of the world.