چارچوب نهادی برای طراحی و نظارت شیلات مبتنی بر آزمایش سیاست های مدیریت اکوسیستم

Indicator systems are seen as central tools for ecosystem-based fisheries management, helping to steer fisheries towards sustainability by providing timely and useful information to decision-makers. Without testing hypotheses about the links between policies and outcomes, however, indicator systems may do little more than promote ad hoc policies, possibly even prolonging the transition to sustainable fisheries. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework is a robust framework that has been used extensively to design policy experiments and empirically test theories and models linking ecological–economic systems, institutions and the sustainability of common pool resource systems. A modified IAD framework is developed that transparently encompasses both process-oriented pressure-state-response (PSR) and structurally oriented sustainable livelihood indicator frameworks, thus providing a platform for ecosystem-based fisheries management policy experiment design and monitoring. An institutional approach to fisheries management facilitates critical examination of important cross-cutting issues, including assumptions regarding what comprises sustainability and how market, government and civil society organizations use strategic investments in capital assets and institutions to achieve sustainability objectives. The emphasis on capital assets keeps attention on the relative merits of alternative investment options in policy experiments.

According to the American Fisheries Society, “sustainability of fisheries and other aquatic resources is a state in which these resources, and the ecosystems that support them, are managed in such a way that their long-term viability and productivity are maintained for the benefit of future generations” (Knuth et al., 1999). Achieving sustainability has proven elusive to date, but it is internationally recognized as a primary goal of fisheries management FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), 1995, NMFS (National Marine Fisheries Service), 1999, NRC (National Research Council), 1999, Garcia, 2000 and Garcia and Staples, 2000. There is a growing consensus that an ecosystem-based fisheries management paradigm is needed for achieving fisheries sustainability Costanza et al., 1998, NRC (National Research Council), 1999 and Gislason et al., 2000. Under ecosystem-based fisheries management, experiments are needed to build further understanding about complex fishery system processes (Walters, 1997). This goes beyond just implementing ad hoc ‘adaptive’ responses to unexpected ecological or economic crises, replacing trial and error learning with a directed process of active policy selection. Policy selection is driven by societal objectives that are ultimately a reflection of the values, preferences and behaviors of individuals and organizations within that society. Institutions, the human-crafted rules and norms that infuse social order, shape human incentives and behavior Ostrom, 1990 and Ostrom, 1999 and a variety of institutions (means) can be crafted to achieve any particular objectives (ends) envisioned under ecosystem-based fisheries management. Even small-scale, self-governing fisheries use a plethora of rules to govern when and how resources are harvested and used by particular users (Ostrom et al., 1994) and, in more complicated fisheries, the rule set may become very complex (Sinclair et al., 1999). Furthermore, the array of options may vary greatly in costs, making it necessary to design and monitor policy experiments that strategically test the cost-effectiveness of policy bundles that can help achieve diverse societal objectives under ecosystem-based fisheries management (Rudd et al., 2003). A variety of indicator frameworks have been proposed to monitor fisheries sustainability Garcia and Staples, 2000, Garcia et al., 2000, Sutinen, 2000, Charles, 2001 and Olsen, 2003, the sustainability of other common pool resources Prabhu et al., 1999 and Campbell et al., 2001 and for broader assessment purposes Hammond et al., 1994, Ashley and Carney, 1999, Bossel, 1999, OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), 2000, UN (United Nations), 2001, World Bank, 2001, Segnestam, 2002 and NRTREE (National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy), 2003. The OECD pressure-state-response (PSR) framework (OECD, 2000) and variants are process-oriented frameworks that are gaining exposure in the fisheries field Garcia and Staples, 2000 and Bowen and Riley, 2003. Exogenous driving forces and endogenous anthropogenic impacts exert pressure on the state of the environment; societies respond by attempting to mitigate the pressures. An alternative structurally oriented framework, the sustainable livelihoods model Ashley and Carney, 1999 and Bebbington, 1999, is popular in the forestry and agricultural development fields Prabhu et al., 1999 and Campbell et al., 2001. An emphasis in the sustainable livelihoods framework is on the role of capital assets (natural, produced or physical, human, social and financial) on sustainability and human welfare. The emphasis in both PSR and sustainable livelihoods frameworks has been largely on using indicator systems to communicate useful information to decision-makers Ashley and Carney, 1999, Garcia and Staples, 2000, Garcia et al., 2000 and Segnestam, 2002; relatively little explicit emphasis has been placed on the role of frameworks in developing policy experiments. Without testing hypotheses about the links between policies and outcomes, however, indicator systems may do little more than promote ad hoc policy responses, possibly even prolonging the transition to fisheries sustainability. There is, therefore, a need to use a framework that can be used for both the design and monitoring of fisheries policy experiments. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework Ostrom, 1990 and Ostrom, 1999 is a robust framework that has been used extensively to design policy experiments and empirically test theories and models linking institutions and the sustainability of common pool resource systems (Ostrom et al., 1994). The strength of the IAD framework is derived from its systematic theoretical focus on the impact of rules and norms on individual incentives in complex ecological–economic systems, its empirically oriented focus on outcomes (including the transaction costs of management) and by its accounting for dynamic system interactions at multiple tiers of analysis (Ostrom, 1999). To date, however, the IAD framework has not been used to organize indicators of sustainability. In this paper, I present a modified IAD framework that transparently encompasses both the PSR and sustainable livelihoods frameworks, thus providing a platform for designing, monitoring and communicating the results of ecosystem-based fisheries management policy experiments. The framework encourages analysts to organize indicators to take full account of the ecological, social and institutional variables that influence and shape the incentives and behavior of individuals and organizations. Further, there is a clear differentiation between aggregate patterns of behavior (e.g., fishing effort), the impacts those behaviors have on capital assets (e.g., species depletion, rent capture) and the threats that those impacts pose to capital assets (based on societal goals and fishery management objectives). Finally, societal responses to threats to capital assets are clearly differentiated through the investment choices that various sectors of society (private, public and civil society organizations) make in response to those threats. Investments can be made in the capital assets themselves or in institutions that influence that shape human behavior. While this paper focuses on fisheries management, the modified IAD framework can be applied to other renewable resource systems.

Successful implementation of ecosystem-based fisheries management policies requires that managers consider multiple ecological and socioeconomic objectives in transdisciplinary policy experiments. A modified IAD framework encompasses both the structurally oriented sustainable livelihoods framework and the process-oriented PSR framework and is thus well-suited for designing and monitoring policy experiments because of its multilevel causal linkages and flexibility. Causality is a key consideration in ecosystem-based fisheries management policy experiments. There is clearly a need for directed policy selection in ecosystem-based fisheries management (Walters, 1997) and this implies that analysts and decision-makers must have some understanding of how potential control variables relate to anticipated policy impacts. In complex ecological–economic systems, our understanding will always be incomplete but directed policy experiments will help increase this understanding of fishery systems. The IAD framework is flexible in that it permits policy makers to not only test specific policy hypotheses, but to also more broadly test competing theories and underlying assumptions (Ostrom, 1999). It can also help frame studies that seek to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for multicriteria sustainability (e.g., Heikkila, 2001). Indicator systems that present only a snapshot of system status without fully considering causal connections are not nearly so useful. The data requirements for a full monitoring system will be extensive although the amount and type of data collected will vary greatly from site to site and according to monitoring objectives. In many cases, secondary sources of data—including indicators developed for PSR and sustainable livelihood indicator systems—can be used directly in an IAD-based monitoring system and the framework can be used to identify any key information gaps. It should be noted that resources devoted to monitoring ecosystem, socioeconomic and institutional aspects of fisheries sustainability are often only a fraction of those allocated for monitoring ecological aspects of commercial fisheries and that increased resources could have a large impact on the quality and quantity of data available for monitoring purposes. Communication of concise information that is based on large amounts of underlying data is a challenge for monitoring systems in general. Decision-makers often have very little time to consider key implications of their decisions and they are often called on to make decisions in fields in which they have limited expertise. Indicator systems must convey critical information simply and compactly as a result; lengthy narratives or series of tables are unlikely to be closely scrutinized and of limited value. A variety of communication methods have been proposed that can be implemented within an IAD-based monitoring system, including ‘orientor stars’ (Bossel, 1999), the ‘dashboard of sustainability’ (Hanson, 2003) and ‘traffic light’ systems (e.g., Jamieson et al., 2001). Financial resources are always scarce (i.e., individuals, corporations, non-governmental organizations and public managers all face budget constraints) and a variety of investment options may be available to help achieve sustainability objectives. An advantage of using the modified IAD framework is that all societal responses to pressures on capital assets can be viewed in terms of the investments that different segments of society make in those capital assets directly or in the development of institutions designed to protect or enhance them. For example, financial capital might be invested in habitat rehabilitation (natural capital) that increases the sustainable flow of fish from the ecosystem, in skills development programs for young fishers (human capital), in research that improves fishing technology (physical capital), in meetings that allows fishers to share ideas and build networks (social capital), in enforcement (an operational level institutional investment), in the development of a new marine protected area (a collective action level institutional investment) or in the development of participatory democratic processes needed to effectively govern coastal ecosystems (a constitutional level institutional investment). The benefit–cost ratio of the different investments may, however, vary greatly. One important role for policy experiments is to generate information about the relative returns from different types of investments. With this type of information, a more informed ‘business case’ can be made for those investments that contribute most to achieving management objectives and societal goals. Investments based on a ‘marginal benefit equals marginal cost’ principle should be a goal for all fisheries management systems so that those initiatives that contribute most to meeting objectives are identified and funded in a cost-effective manner. Using the IAD framework helps analysts to systematically consider a broader range of investment options than is typically considered in most fisheries management systems (e.g., investments in social capital, local knowledge, processes to devolve fisheries management). In conclusion, the IAD framework is a useful tool for designing and monitoring an entire array of policy experiments that are defined in terms of societal investments in capital assets or institutions designed to alleviate pressure on capital assets in fishery systems. It is flexible, pragmatic and has a history as a base for rigorous empirical applications. These features will be crucial if ecosystem-based fisheries management policies are to be successfully developed, tested, implemented and monitored in support of sustainable fisheries governance.