آینده مدیریت سیاست علم و فن آوری سناریوهای جهانی مسائل-2025

This article presents four scenarios depicting science and technology (S&T) management dilemmas of the next two decades. The scenarios concern the balance between risk and promise, between the need to steer the directions of S&T, to minimize risk, and the need to maintain a free and unconstrained S&T agenda. These scenarios were constructed in the third year of the Millennium Project's study of this topic. The scenarios were formed in an interactive process with the project's international participants. The key policies that were found to be useful in all of the scenarios include (1) when considering the possibility of the misuse of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists, include the possibility of misuse by a single individual, acting alone; (2) establish mechanisms and techniques for making possible the explicit unintended consequences of scientific research and technology, including malicious uses; (3) for desirable technologies, where it may not be possible to avoid significant risks, develop mitigation strategies in parallel; (4) teach science ethics

Over the past three years, the Millennium Project has conducted a study of future issues in science and technology (S&T) management, involving a well-informed and internationally diverse panel of futurists, scientists, and policy advisors. The first year's work explored key questions about the future of S&T and sought initial answers or actions for each issue. This was accomplished through a two-round questionnaire and a series of workshops with Science Attachés in Washington, DC1 The second year's work collected a range of judgments about managing S&T risks, improving relationships between S&T and policymaking, fostering interdisciplinary S&T, and dealing with the implications of globalization for S&T management. With that background in hand, the third year's research reported in this article was designed to create a set of alternative scenarios that made S&T management policy issues explicit against a variety of plausible backdrops. A two-round questionnaire (to which 122 participants responded) was used to collect judgments about the content of the scenarios.2 The results were used to write the four scenarios included here. Some conclusions about the needed and effective S&T policy were drawn from these scenarios, and the conclusions are presented in this paper after the scenarios.

Based on the responses from futurists, scientists, research and development managers, and S&T policymakers to the two-round questionnaire used to develop these scenarios, as well as the above four scenarios and the results of prior Millennium Project research, the following conclusions were drawn: 1. Five S&T management levels exist simultaneously at any point in time, and a mix of these techniques controls the course of research. These levels are: Global organizations with the power to proscribe and encourage particular research directions, set standards, inspect, monitor, and initiate legal proceeding against people or organizations that do not follow the rules. A current example is the International Atomic Energy Agency; its functioning is codified through treaties among nations, such as the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and others that govern international nuclear affairs. It is not difficult to imagine similar organizations being established in the future in other fields, in which risks are apparent, including genetics, nanotechnology, human–machine intelligence. National advisory commissions that establish or advise on issues of acceptable and unacceptable research. Examples of these in the United States include the National Academy of Sciences (and its research arm, the National Research Council), which often reports on risks and opportunities of new science targets, and scientific commissions such as the President's Council on Bioethics, which was created in late 2001. The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was established to study and furnish information to the U.S. Congress on technology-related topics for which legislation was being considered. OTA provided what many people considered was a valuable service, but it was disbanded in 1995, 23 years after it was established. National agencies of government such as the Office for Human Research Protection within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which is charged with “developing and monitoring as well as exercising compliance oversight relative to HHS Regulations for the protection of human subjects in research conducted or supported by any component of the Department of Health and Human Services.” Of course, national agencies that fund research—from the Department of Energy and National Science Foundation to the National Institutes of Health and Department of Defense—have the power to control the directions of research through their allocation of grants, procurement contracts, and other funding mechanisms. The disciplines themselves. Through self-regulation, they control research directions. Perhaps, the most well known example is the agreement reached among early researchers in the field of recombinant DNA who met at Asilomar, CA, in 1975. The concern among organizers was that certain modified organisms that could infect humans might be created in the course of experimentation and escape from the laboratories, creating an epidemic of a new sort. The dangers were discussed at the conference, and guidelines for future research were established. Only peer pressure was used to enforce the guidelines, which were later incorporated into the funding policies of grant agencies. The individual researcher, who, more or less, has the power to choose the course of his or her research. More or less because the freedom of choice is to a degree a function of the field, the setting or laboratory in which the scientist operates, his or her seniority and reputation, and the person's ability to raise research funding. 2. In this study, all of these levels were considered, but, in addition, we conclude that other possibilities exist. There were two schools of thought about controlling S&T risks. One school believed that regulations would simply drive research underground or to other countries. Regulators would have no chance to keep up with the accelerating pace of advances. The way to manage risks is to educate global opinion about S&T and to train scientists to be more ethical and to manage risks themselves. The other school believed that the potential scale of intended and unintended impacts of S&T on the future of humanity requires that there be global systems to forecast and assess the risks from S&T and to design regulations and enforce agreements. Since the impacts can be worldwide, global systems are justified. Over the next 25 years, the potential S&T dangers are clearly global; therefore, the control must be global. Some threats to human security should be banned, while others should be controlled. A synthesis of the two orientations toward risk management has seven interdependent elements: Formulate international definitions and guidelines via eminent experts. Establish an International S&T Organization to interconnect and provide access to information about risk and opportunity. Add roles for university education. Create a global S&T fund. Produce annual Davos—like S&T forums. Engage the media to improve public S&T discussion and to engage politicians. Create international treaties as consensus evolves. 3. It will be necessary to establish an ongoing forecasting and risk assessment system. This could be done at any or all of the five levels at which S&T management occurs. Investigators should forecast plausible, unintended consequences of their research and address the means for minimizing adverse developments as a routine part of their research. 4. Funding of S&T should include priority for research directed toward the global basic needs of humanity. This could be accomplished by coordination among the funding agencies, offering substantial prizes for applications that would benefit from additional research and publicity, creating incentives for global private companies to pursue global S&T research that is both profitable and socially necessary, or establishing a world scientific committee that would recommend priorities of funding of S&T toward global basic needs. 5. Based on the views of participants, the challenges that science can pursue to help improve the human condition include: Commercial availability of a cheap, efficient, environmentally benign, nonnuclear fission and non-fossil-fuel means of generating base load electricity, competitive in price with today's fossil fuels Simple, inexpensive, effective medicines and corresponding delivery systems to treat widespread diseases and epidemics Improving the efficiency of water use in agriculture by 75% Climate change—understanding and solutions Improvements in early detection and tracking systems of pandemics 6. Based on the views of the panels that contributed to this study, the future applications of science or scientific research that have the greatest potential for danger to human survival are: Accidentally or intentionally released genetically modified organisms that have serious adverse consequences for the biosphere Use of biotechnology to build new kinds of biological weapons of mass destruction Nanotechnology to build stealthy new means of killing large numbers of people Loss of biodiversity resulting from aggressive, exclusionary marketing strategies encouraging the use of genetically altered, patented varieties Intelligent nanotechnology evolving beyond human control 7. In addition to the risks listed above, one of the scenarios created in this study described the possible advent of a single individual, acting alone, to create and deliver a weapon of mass destruction. This threat was given the name SIMAD. Respondents found this threat plausible and a major stimulant to the creation of safeguards and regulations limiting certain research and access to it. 8. There was universal agreement among the interviewees that the relationship between the S&T community and policymakers has to change. Some interviewees suggested ways to bypass government policymakers, while others suggested ways to improve communications between policymakers and the S&T community. 9. Interdisciplinary research (IR) has created convergences and synergies among S&T fields, which has led to almost all of today's exciting advances. Yet, there are still many barriers among the disciplines to be overcome. One participant said that the most pressing issue in managing and enabling IR is getting R&D managers to think more creatively. Many participants believed that IR could be enhanced by big national and international projects to improve the human condition, new funding categories and procedures, changes in educational curriculum, new communication opportunities among the disciplines, the creation of IR positions in both the public and private sectors, and the stimulation of the free market's demand for new products. 10. Globalization of science without global ethics could lead to disasters. Technology applications are accelerating so fast that the social implications should constantly be taken into account. There will be more emphasis on individual scientists and engineers making individual ethical choices. 11. The drivers of scenarios affecting S&T management of the future include: The rate of progress of S&T The severity of the risks of S&T The nature of science education of the general public The level of public concern over the risks The locus of regulation The nature of S&T regulation The degree to which the risks of S&T materialize The effect of regulation on globalization of science The responses and attitudes of media The degree to which regulations can be circumvented The penalties associated with violation of regulations The emergence of spokespersons and “stars” for science 12. In the course of this research, participants were asked a number of questions related to the future of S&T management. More than two thirds of the participants answered yes to the following questions: Are dramatic increases in collective human–machine intelligence plausible within 25 years? Is it likely that organizations designed to regulate the course of S&T will generally fail to keep pace with accelerated advances of S&T within 25 years? Is it plausible that weapons of mass destruction will be available to single individuals within 25 years? Is it plausible that international S&T treaties and regulations will have provisions for enforcement police enforcement or military intervention within 25 years? Is it plausible that international systems (like the International Atomic Energy Agency) will be established to monitor and regulate biotechnology, nanotechnology, and other areas of scientific research and development with enforcement powers? More than half of the participants answered yes when asked: Is it plausible that advances in cognitive science, information technology, and new educational systems and/or changes in older ones will be able to significantly improve tolerance for diversity within 25 years? More than 50% of the participants answered no to the following questions: Can S&T regulators and commissions be virtually free from corruption? Is it plausible that an antiscience movement will be as or more powerful than the environmental movement? When extreme unintended consequences are involved, can a cost-benefit trade-off be logically made? Within the next 25 years, might scientists unite into a global labor organization? Can science disciplines effectively self-regulate? 13. When multiple scenarios describe a broad range of future possibilities, policies found to be common to each of the scenarios in the set are “good bets” because they seem to be useful no matter which setting is considered and are, in fact, insensitive to future developments. A review of the scenarios and the policies suggested by the respondents gives rise to these possible policies that should be considered for implementation: When considering the possibility of misuse of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists, include the possibility of misuse by a single individual, acting alone. Establish mechanisms and techniques for making explicit possible the unintended consequences of scientific research and technology, including malicious uses. This should include an assessment by the researchers involved and, depending on the level of the work and the risks, by the assessment bodies. For desirable technologies, where it may not be possible to avoid significant risks, develop mitigation strategies in parallel. Recognizing that the directions of S&T will be determined by complex interacting multilevel institutions and practices, attempt to assure that each level takes responsibility for the consequences of the work it directs and accomplishes. Monitoring should be part of the responsibility. Engage high-profile organizations in risk analysis; for example, departments of defense of most countries should perform preventative analysis (not a euphemism to justify first strikes, but rather a broad-based threat assessment) concerned with “extreme tech” misuse. Promote full funding of multination research into nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cognitive science, learning processes, and global problems, with adequate attention to future uses, ethical implications, risks, and impacts. Increase visibility and public participation in setting priorities of publicly funded research and development. Anticipate the need for global institutions that will be charged with information collection and dissemination or management of some research domains (as is now the case for atomic energy). Explore alternative forms for these institutions that minimize the chances they will impede innovation, that promote sharing the benefits of their fields globally, that minimize risks, and that operate without corruption and with wisdom. Recognize that advanced S&T education is critical. Teach science ethics. Note that scientists and professional groups in many fields have already begun to examine and issue advice on the directions of research and their risks (e.g., bioengineering). One future area, however, that may require additional attention of this sort is molecular nanotechnology. If molecular manufacturing is feasible, according to one of our respondents, the consequences (including unstable arms races, extreme economic disruption, and many others) may only be averted by the timely creation of a strong, stable, progressive international authority to oversee the safe development and effective administration of molecular nanotechnology. 14. From a methodological standpoint, despite the length of the questionnaires, responses were extensive, thoughtful, and thought provoking. The method involved asking panels to suggest drivers, to criticize and comment on partial forms of the scenario, and to “fill in the blanks” of almost complete scenarios. This approach seems to have been successful but is labor-intensive for both the participants and the analysts. In the future, it would be good to include an optional online explanation of the scenario space covered and of the checklists used so that participants who wanted to probe the creation process could have access to this information. ☆ The scenarios included in this article are drawn from the 2003 State of the Future, published by the American Council for the United Nations University and funded by a grant from the Office of Science, U.S. Department of Energy Corresponding author contact information Corresponding author. 1 The results of the first year's work have been reported in Glenn and Gordon, State of the Future, American Council for the United Nations University, Washington, DC, July 2001. 2 The complete study, including the questionnaires themselves and the responses, can be found in Glenn and Gordon, State of the Future, American Council for the United Nations University, July 2003.