موسسات آب فرامرزی در عمل

This analysis compares three game theory scenarios of how transboundary water institutions facilitate sovereign country management of transboundary water pollution along international borders of North America through bearing pollution abatement costs, sharing water monitoring responsibility and formal decision-making for pollution control. The three scenarios include a noncooperation game from an earlier period of unilateral decision-making, a cooperation game with water monitoring and information sharing for decisions, and a Stackelberg game with formal financial channels for one country separate from decisions for wastewater pollution reduction of each country. A numerical comparison of costs, damages and pollution levels for each scenario evolves with data from the US–Mexico border. Results show total costs and damages are minimized at $13,100,000 through cooperation, with the Stackelberg game at the next highest costs and damages for the steady state at $13,300,000. The Stackelberg solution improves considerably the situation for both the US and Mexico compared to the Nash Equilibrium (NE) where total steady costs and damages are $18,700,000. Cost minimization occurs as the US can finance pollution abatement in Mexico in the Stackelberg case cheaper than domestically to reduce damages. A sensitivity analysis explores changes in abatement cost financing and size of transboundary pollution. The divergence between the noncooperative independent action game and the Stackelberg game grows, while the Stackelberg solution continues to stay close to the cooperative solution. Solution strategies with increased wastewater pollution levels show that if wastewater management efforts are delayed without particular coordination from transboundary institutions in a waterway, pollution stock can grow profusely along with abatement cost and damages.