نظارت بر کیفیت و هماهنگی زنجیره تامین خدمات لجستیک تحت شرایط چند دوره ای

Quality supervision and coordination are critical in realising successful cooperation in the logistics service supply chain (LSSC). To build a closer partnership in the supply chain, collaboration in the LSSC presents multi-period features. Therefore, the study on the quality of decision-making problems under multi-period conditions in the LSSC is practical. Logistic service quality is not easy to measure. Hence, this paper proposes a multi-period quality coordination model based on the single-period quality coordination model in a two-echelon LSSC, and establishes a new model in a three-echelon LSSC when the logistics service integrator (LSI) is punished. Simulation results indicate that under multi-period cooperation conditions, the LSI tends to make rapid decisions when punishment intensity is below the critical value. Moreover, for the three-echelon LSSC, the final equilibrium between sub-LSI and ultimate FLSP is not associated with punishment intensity that the LSI sets against the sub-LSI.

The logistics service supply chain (LSSC) is a new type of service supply chain with the basic structure: functional logistic service provider (FLSP)→logistics service integrator (LSI)→manufacturers or retailers (Liu et al., 2011). The LSSC provides flexible logistic service to the manufacturing supply chain. FLSPs refer to traditional third party logistics firms such as transportation enterprises, storage enterprises among others. The LSI classifies them as suppliers when a domestic or an international service network is established because of singularity, normality and regionality. Baogong Logistics Company of China, for example, integrates more than 500 storage companies, 1200 highway transportation companies, and 500 manual loading and unloading companies as its FLSPs. With these FLSPs, Baogong provides comprehensive logistics services to several famous manufacturers such as Procter & Gamble, Unilever, etc. Service quality coordination plays a great role in LSSC management. To meet the quality requirement of customers, LSI supervises FLSP after the LSI outsources the logistics business to FLSP. Normally, the LSI tends to establish a partnership with the FLSP to achieve long-term cooperation. The partnership reduces the hesitancy of the FLSP to do business. Moreover, the cost and risk of the LSI to search for a new FLSP diminishes. The LSI should then schedule multi-period quality supervisions on the FLSP. Therefore, research on quality cooperation under a multi-period term is more significant than that under a single-period. However, current research on quality cooperation focuses on the manufacturing industry and on a single-period perspective. As a result, the problem of multi-period quality supervision in the LSSC has not been studied. This problem will be discussed in this paper. This paper aims to answer the following important questions: 1. It is difficult to measure logistics service quality because logistics services are invisible (Nie and Kellogg, 1999). Hence, how can this feature be considered in the LSSC quality game model? 2. In a two-echelon LSSC consisting of one LSI and one FLSP, LSI supervises after outsourcing the logistics business to the FLSP. FLSPs may be penalized when they cannot complete the logistics business with the required quality (i.e. FLSP takes a fraudulent strategy). Compared with the single-period, how does the LSI design the quality control and punishment strategy in the case of multi-period relationship? 3. The LSSC is often characterized by multi-echelons. What is the difference for the quality control strategy of the LSI between the two-echelon and the three-echelon LSSC? Will the number of cooperation periods affect the quality of the decision of the LSI?

This research examined the quality game between LSI and FLSP in the presence of multi-period-oriented cooperation. Sensitivity analyses were conducted under two conditions: the LSI was not punished and the LSI was punished. The analyses of this paper indicate the following insights: (1) For multi-period circumstances, punishment intensity is required to ensure quality service of the FLSP especially in the initial cooperation period. Certainly, the LSI can gradually lower the punishment intensity as cooperation periods increase. If the LSI prefers lower punishment intensity in the initial cooperation period, the rapid punishing strategy reduces the possibility of the FLSP deceiving LSI. Both policies favor the smoothness of cooperation with high quality service. (2) As to the three-echelon LSSC, the ultimate quality decision of the FLSP changes with respect to the punishment intensity that the primary LSI takes against the ultimate FLSP. Higher punishment intensity contributes to better logistics services. (3) The multi-period cooperation achieves a game equilibrium characterized by less information asymmetry between the LSI and the FLSP, which may bring about strategic partner relationships. Both the LSI and the FLSP benefit from accelerating to achieve equilibrium. Information sharing is an effective strategy. Rapid punishment strategy demonstrated in this research can be a useful method. (4) Whether in the two- or the three-echelon LSSC, the methods, like reducing information asymmetry, making logistics more visible, and reviewing periodically potential service quality problems, can improve logistics service quality and provide profit for the LSSC. This research is potentially effective in helping quality decision-makers under multi-period-oriented conditions. However, the study has limitations. For example, in actual operations, the revenue function is related not only to the effort of the FLSP, but also to the effort of the LSI, actual business volume, and other risk factors. Furthermore, in light of the competition between providers under multi-period cooperation conditions, how the sub-integrator and ultimate suppliers make quality decision has not been discussed, which is an issue worth studying in the future.