تولید و مدیریت زنجیره تامین در چین : بررسی شرکت های دولتی،جمعی و خصوصی

Because of the booming economy, interest in China has soared in recent years. The government has decided to privatize many State-owned enterprises (SOEs), so foreigners can much more easily invest in existing firms than ever before. Is it wise to consider investing in these SOEs? Certainly, many have major problems. How sophisticated are Chinese manufacturing firms? Do they understand modern principles of manufacturing strategy and supply chain management? What is the level of installed technology, from traditional production planning systems, like MRP, to robotics? This paper attempts to answer these questions based on a survey of 100 firms in the Shanghai area. We surveyed State-owned enterprises, collective-owned enterprises and privately held firms, and we discovered some fascinating insights about their differences and their similarities. We discovered that the differences among the ownership types are generally insignificant, suggesting that our results are quite general. We find that these firms are far more advanced using explicit manufacturing strategies than we had expected. However, they are not as advanced in supply chain management as many Western firms. They report significant communication with customers and suppliers — more with customers than suppliers — but the nature of the communication is often limited to one dimension, particularly on the downstream side. Firms that communicate with customers tend to do so with suppliers as well.

Interest in China has soared in recent years. The Chinese economy has been booming, and multinational firms have been investing in China at a furious pace. Dong and Hu (1995)note that foreign direct investments (FDI) increased in China at an average annual rate of 40.7 per cent between 1983 and 1993, reaching a high of 175 per cent in 1993. Managers clearly see the immense opportunity of investing in a country with a population that exceeds 1.3 billion and an economy among the fastest growing in the world. Amway, for instance, invested more than $100 million in China to pursue its strategy of direct, multi-level selling. Amway obtained a license to sell this way in 1995, and by 1997, Amway's sales exceeded $180 million. However, not all stories have a happy ending, as arrangements are not necessarily stable. For example, Amway faced a remarkable turnabout in 1998 when the government determined that Chinese consumers do not have a `mature and healthy consumption mentality,' and that China does not have the necessary legal system to effectively regulate the direct, multilevel marketing business. Therefore, they removed Amway's license. Sales in 1998 fell to $8.4 million after the license was removed. It appears that 1999 will be the first year in two decades that FDI will actually fall, perhaps by more than 20 per cent (The Economist, 1999). Many companies have made millions in China, but many others have lost millions. Bureaucracy and uncertainty about how to manage in China combine to create huge problems. The Economist notes that what is needed is not more investment, but better investment. Some foreign firms have not understood the competition, not only from foreign firms, but from domestic Chinese firms as well. Whirlpool, for instance, discovered that the Chinese appliance makers, Haier and Guangdong Kelon, had comparable technology, lower prices, and a much better sense of how to design products for the Chinese market (The Economist, 1999). Having a partner can help smooth the process, and there are many Chinese firms currently available for sale. Because the government has decided to privatize many State-owned enterprises (SOEs), foreigners can invest much more easily in existing firms than ever before. In the fall of 1998, at the Ninth Annual Trade Fair in Harbin, 1078 small and medium-sized State-owned enterprises were offered for sale. The provincial government even tried to give away some of the more distressed firms! (Broadman, 1999). A $50 billion program of debt-for-equity swaps likewise is moving very slowly (Eckert, 2000). Is it wise to consider investing in these SOEs? Certainly, many have major problems. Steinfeld (1998)notes that SOEs suffer from overstaffing, low (or no) profitability, and low productivity. This is a commonly held position. In fact, we ourselves have argued thus (Pyke, 1998a). This information raises the question of what the real story is. How sophisticated are Chinese manufacturing firms? Do they understand modern principles of manufacturing strategy and supply chain management? What is the level of installed technology, from traditional production planning systems (like MRP) to robotics? This paper attempts to answer these questions based on a survey of 100 firms in the Shanghai area. The study included State-owned enterprises, collective-owned enterprises and privately held firms. We developed a set of summary scales composed of multiple items which are described in the third section. Each element in each scale was measured on a 7-point scale. The reliability as measured by the Chronbach α was above the minimum level of 0.6 for every case but one. The survey employed three self reports of performance which have been shown to be reliable in a wide variety of settings and which produced a reliability measure of 0.81. In the next section, we present some general material about Chinese firms in the context of reviewing the relevant literature. Then in the third section, we discuss the methodology we used, and in the 4th–6th sections present our results on manufacturing strategy and supply chain management, beginning in the fourth section with some general results and comments. We conclude in the final section.

The Chinese economy has been booming with private investment, joint ventures, contract manufacturing, and even the sale of State-owned enterprises. How should Western firms proceed with their China strategy? Are State-owned enterprises a good investment? What is the status of manufacturing strategy and supply chain management in Chinese firms? This paper has attempted to give some insight into these questions by reporting the results of a survey of 100 State-owned, collective-owned, and privately-owned enterprises in the Shanghai region. We discovered that the differences among these three ownership types are generally insignificant. We also learned that these firms are more advanced with explicit manufacturing strategies than we had expected, but they are not as advanced in supply chain management as many Western firms. For example, they report significant communication with customers and suppliers — more with customers than suppliers — but the nature of the communication is often limited to one dimension, particularly on the downstream side. There are other results in our survey that we plan to report later. This includes more in-depth analysis of the supply chain itself. We are also surveying a number of joint venture firms and wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries, using the identical instrument, to see if we can further understand differences between wholly owned Chinese firms and firms with some foreign ownership interest. One useful avenue for further research would also be case studies that give readers deep insight into the operations, management and challenges of these various types of firms in China.