امنیت بالاتر زنجیره تامین با هزینه پائین تر: درسهایی از مدیریت کیفیت جامع

Supply chain security has become a major concern to the private and public sector, after the disastrous event of September 11, 2001. Prior to September 11, 2001, supply chain security concerns were related to controlling theft and reducing contraband such as illegal drugs, illegal immigrants, and export of stolen goods. But after September 11, 2001, the threat of terrorist attacks has heightened the need to assure supply chain security. The public is of course concerned with the potential of having weapons of mass destruction embedded in the shipments through the supply chain. In addition, the private sector is concerned with the costs of assuring security, and the potential disruptions associated with real or potential terrorist acts. Governments and industry have all responded with proposals to create more confidence in supply chain security, while maintaining smooth flows of goods and services in a global supply chain. One of the most effective strategies may be to apply the lessons of successful quality improvement programs. In this paper, we describe how the principles of total quality management can actually be used to design and operate processes to assure supply chain security. The central theme of the quality movement––that higher quality can be attained at lower cost by proper management and operational design––is also applicable in supply chain security. By using the right management approach, new technology, and re-engineered operational processes, we can also achieve higher supply chain security at lower cost. We will demonstrate how this can be done with a quantitative model of a specific case example.

After September 11, 2001, the security of a supply chain has become a major concern to the public and private sectors. In particular, the ocean segment of a supply chain is most vulnerable to security threats. More than 90% of world trade involves containers aboard ships, amounting to about 20 million containers trips annually (Cuneo, 2003). For the US, 17,000 containers arrive at US ports each day. Both the government and industries have begun to examine ways to address the threat of terrorism and the potential of having weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in materials flowing through a supply chain. “Every container destined to enter or pass through the US should be treated as a potential weapon of mass destruction”, Rob Quartel, chairman and CEO of Freightdesk Technologies, told the Senate Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information on February 26, 2002 (Mottley, 2002). WMD can result in significant loss in human lives, destruction of infrastructure, and erosion of public and business confidence. Ultimately, global trade and prosperity are threatened. The public sector is of course concerned about the potential of having WMD embedded in the shipments through the supply chain. In addition, the private sector is concerned about the costs of assuring security, and the potential disruptions associated with real or potential terrorist acts. Governments and industry have both responded with proposals to create more confidence in supply chain security, while maintaining smooth flows of goods and services in a global supply chain. Some of these proposals call for increased information exchange among trading partners, ports, shipping companies, and the governments. Some call for heightened inspection and scrutiny of the goods flowing through a supply chain. These measures can add cost, delays, and uncertainties in the supply chain. At the same time, supply chain disruptions resulting from security breaches, can be disastrous. For example, if ports and border crossings were closed for a meaningful time after a major terrorist attack, the economic impact would be devastating. It is not possible to quantify the full direct costs of damages and casualties, recovery measures, congestion, and disruption to business and daily life.

The quality movement has offered us sound lessons that can be very powerful to address supply chain security concerns. Instead of final, end-product inspection, the quality movement emphasizes prevention, TQM total quality management, source inspection, process control, and a continuous improvement cycle. These are all ingredients for successful and effective ways to manage and mitigate the risks of supply chain security. We applaud the efforts that are underway to instill quality processes, to inspect products and containers at the points of origin, to use technology to automate the chain of custody, to monitor the process closely during the transportation journey, and to create transparency and visibility across the supply chain. Informational, rather then physical, activities form the core of security measures. The SST initiative has shown great promise to assure supply chain security. The initiative has now migrated into its second phase with the objectives of adding 20 additional tradelanes, developing fully sensor-equipped “smart containers.” SST is also extending the development of smart containers, ranging from the placement of intrusion–detection systems on existing containers to embedding sensors into the containers at the time they are manufactured. In addition, Phase 2 will build onto the platform more layers of security, including a grid of sensor technologies for detecting environmental changes inside containers, automated surveillance cameras, biometric identification, and satellite tracking for in-transit visibility. These developments could enable even tighter process control of the supply chain from end to end. The emphasis on process control, rather than output control, has another advantage of capitalizing on the emerging advancements of new RFID technologies. As more products come out of the production line embedded with RFID tags, the cost of tighter process control is lowered. Needless to say, technologies do not offer security free, and may even be double-edged, potentially also serving terrorists to violate public security. Only continuous improvement and constant alerts on technologies would assure supply chain security. In the end, having the right strategies and preparedness in place, we can make great strides toward supply chain security at lower costs. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the inputs from Steve Lambright and Larry Trebesch of Savi Technology in writing this article. The government initiatives are drawn from Lee and Wolfe (2003) and we are grateful to Michael Wolf of North River Consulting Group for sharing his knowledge.