به حداقل رساندن اثرات فرهنگ ناکارآمد شرکت های بزرگ در برآورد و ارزیابی فرآیندها: یک رویکرد ساده سازنده

This paper explores connections between subjective judgements about uncertainty and corporate culture which are relevant to everyone interested in estimating project parameters or interpreting estimates prepared by others. The basis of the discussion is a simple example, drawn from an actual case. It involves estimating the uncertain duration of a project activity in an organisation with two common cultural conditions: a ‘conspiracy of optimism’, and ‘irrational objectivity’. After considering some conventional approaches, the paper goes on to suggest a ‘constructively simple’ approach to estimation which is responsive to the emerging analysis and which also incorporates end-user adjustments to counter culturally driven uncertainties and bias.

The estimation and evaluation of uncertain parameters is a core aspect of most project management processes. It is therefore important to understand the factors that influence parameter estimation and in particular, the extent to which bias may be involved. These factors are framed by the ideologies, beliefs and deep-set values within an organisation [1] and they will impact on how the shared attitudes to risk and uncertainty affect the estimation process.

Uncertainty and probability are seen as incompatible concepts by many who are uncomfortable with subjective probabilities, a line of thinking often associated with Knight [31]. The approach to estimation and evaluation outlined here is built upon a generalisation of Raiffa’s view [9] that probabilities can embrace uncertainty; they are necessarily subjective, and they are models which involve successive levels of complexity to approach ‘the truth’ in terms of a complete understanding of the situation being addressed. For example, Raiffa discusses ‘second order probability models’ which address uncertainty about probabilities, although he does not exploit this notion directly. The constructively simple approach, which is summarised in Fig. 4, dismisses the classical objective view of probabilities as necessarily data based in relation to a single model which is assumed to be ‘true’. Both the classical approach and the constructively simple approach accept that ‘the truth’ is unknowable, but the classical approach looks to more data for more understanding, while the constructively simple approach looks to a deeper modelling structure and the input of more people who understand some aspects of what is going on, plus more data at an appropriate level of structure if it is available, with a view to a richer internally consistent synthesis of subjective and objective information.