خدمات بانک انگلستان برای کسب و کارهای کوچک:بازار رقابتی چگونه است؟

This study is the first to employ an econometric model to examine the pricing behaviour of British financial institutions with respect to key bank products/services offered to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) including current accounts, investment accounts, business loans, and mortgages. A mean group approach is used on a panel of monthly data to gauge individual banks’ reactions to identify factors influencing the setting of deposit and loan rates, and to assess the competitive structure that best describes the UKs SME banking market. Though the results should be interpreted with caution, the empirical evidence is suggestive of a complex oligopoly. Policies directed at improving information and making it easier for small businesses to change banks/accounts would reduce inertia and improve competition among financial institutions.

The issue of whether there is adequate provision of competitive banking services for small and medium sized enterprises (SME) has long been a contentious one, as reflected in the 1980 Wilson1 report and more recently, investigations by Cruickshank (2000) and the Competition Commission (2002). This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by being the first to employ an econometric model to gauge the degree of competition in the UKs SME banking market. The mean group (MG) approach is applied to bank specific time-series data on interest rates and non-price features, to assess the pricing behaviour of British financial institutions (FIs) for a selection of key SME banking products. The results shed light on the competitive behaviour of UK banks and other FIs that supply intermediary services to small business, including how SME deposit or loan rates are adjusted to changes in LIBOR (the London Interbank Offer Rate), and the extent to which bargain and rip-offs exist among SME banking products. The econometric findings are used to comment on recent policy recommendations made by the Competition Commission (2002) and subsequent rules the banks agreed to implement. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources and methodology. Section 3 reviews the econometric results. Section 4 assesses policy, with a special focus on the Commission’s recommendations in light of the econometric findings. Section 5 concludes.

This paper undertook an econometric analysis of pricing behaviour by UK financial institutions in their provision of SME bank services. The objectives were twofold: to provide, for the first time, a rigorous assessment of the state of competition in these markets, and, in light of the results, to review various policy options. The database consisted of monthly observations (1996–2001) on interest rates for four SME banking products – current accounts, investment (savings) accounts, business loans, and commercial mortgages. In general, the findings from this study suggest the SME banking market is best described as a “complex oligopoly”. Though two important non-price features (branches and bank charges) were included in the study, this verdict might be altered had it been possible to account for every significant non-price characteristic. “Shadow” deposit rates showed that the FIs (including the big four) which paid no interest on current accounts were at odds with a fair value benchmark, though the partial equilibrium nature of the exercise could mean these shadow rates are biased downward. They also illustrate that the “2.5% rule” adopted by the big four banks is somewhat arbitrary. At one deposit level, banks should be paying more than 2.5% but at another, lower amount, the shadow rate was less than 2.5%. Moreover, banks could attempt to offset lost revenues by increasing their (complex) service charges, raising loan rates, or cutting deposit rates on investment accounts. The marked disparity in the margins earned by banks for both deposits and loans is consistent with the presence of relative bargain and rip-off products. Although some of the price dispersion can be attributed to omitted non-price features, it would be surprising if profit maximising banks did not take advantage of the well known inertia that exists among SMEs, along with switching costs and imperfect information. Problems associated with inertia could be addressed by making bank charges more transparent and comparable, and improving the ease with which business customers can switch banks. Introducing sweep accounts and more sophisticated ATMs will reduce the SMEs’ dependence on the major banks’ extensive branch networks. These measures should go some way to increase competition, thereby improving the value and quality of banking services available to small business.