قابلیتهای دینامیکی بهره برداری از بازار و اداره سلسله مراتب ساختار: مقایسه تجربی از تایوان و کره جنوبی

This empirical investigation reports on the role of drivers of dynamic learning mechanisms (DLMs) in exploiting dynamic capabilities (DCs) of market and hierarchy governance structures. Using a sample of 367 Taiwanese market and 210 South Korean hierarchy organizations, this study differentiates the role of drivers of DLMs in these organizations to provide more robust insights into DCs exploitation in polar governance structures. This study posits that learning intent and embedded learning are important primary antecedent drivers of DCs exploitation. The findings reveal that manager integration power, external linkages, codification of experience, and ambiguity are key drivers of DCs exploitation in market governance structures. External linkages, repeated practice, codification of experience, and ambiguity are key drivers of DCs exploitation in hierarchy governance structures. These results show that DCs exist in specialized learning routines and that DCs exploitation is based on organizational DLMs. This study highlights an influential innovation routine view of DCs exploitation and proposes a clear theoretical model of DCs exploitation via the exploitation of various drivers of DLMs.

The resource-based view posits that firms are creators of value and competence, and their resources are knowledge based, unable to be imitated, and non-substitutable (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). A firm's resources consist of all properties, both tangible and intangible (i.e., equipment, human resources, know-how, operational skills, learning systems), that are costly to duplicate and that provide a specific return. Williamson, 1975 and Williamson, 1985 argues that market mechanisms will fail if transactional information is asymmetric, and high switching costs always exist for market transactions. Market transactions always involve opportunism and uncertainty, and they frequently lead to inefficiency. Furthermore, because contracts are inadequate for resolving all problems associated with market transactions, firms frequently adopt certain governance structures to handle transaction problems. Hennart and Park (1993) report that transactions exists adverse selection of ex ante and moral hazard of ex post; consequently, only internalized market transactions into governance structure then just can sew up a problem of adverse selection and moral hazard. In line with internalization theory, Hennart and Park (1993) argue that governance structure can internalize various transactions that efficiently integrate specific properties and tacit knowledge components. When firms face pressure from competitors and they lack internal competitive resources or capabilities, they can rapidly gain such resources or capabilities through governance structure cooperation. Entering into a market or hierarchy to rapidly acquire specific resources or capabilities is a natural competitive response. Governance structure cooperation can efficiently combine complementary resources and exploit unique capabilities to dodge high market uncertainty and minimize transaction costs to rapidly capture market power. Therefore, governance structure cooperation is a main gateway for promoting competition among firms. Certain firm capabilities and assets, including tacit know-how, knowledge articulation, specialized production facilities, distinctive routines, and so on, cannot be purchased or acquired from the transaction market (Teece, 1976, Teece, 1980 and Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Moreover, even if they could be purchased, these capabilities and assets generally have a relatively short shelf life; hence, any advantage gained must be through the organization's distinctive routines or evolutionary process (Barney, 1986). Nelson and Winter (1982) recommend that distinctive competence be continually refined in specific organizational routines, particularly when such routines involve repetitive patterns of activities. Dynamic capabilities (DCs) exploitation results primarily from organizational routines that store knowledge via complicated, detailed processes (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Through these organizational routines, a firm achieves new resource configurations and can re-exploit its resources or capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000 and Kogut and Zander, 1992). Therefore, DCs exploitation is an important part of the creation, evolution, and recombination of resources and can assist an organization in renewing its knowledge base and increasing its competitive strength (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994 and Teece et al., 1997). Winter (2003) states that DCs typically involve long-term organizational commitments to a specified routine. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) stress that DCs can be generated via organizational processes involving the integration, reconfiguration, gain, and release of resources. They claim that DCs must be created via specific organizational learning routines. DCs exploitation thus is embedded within an organization's distinctive routines and learning processes. The concept of DCs has attracted a lot of interest, primarily in the field of strategic management. According to Schreyogg and Kliesch-Eberl (2007), three different theories of DCs exist. The radical dynamization approach treats DCs as functionally equivalent in dynamic environments. This approach makes a clear DCs distinction between moderately dynamic and high-velocity markets ( Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000, Helfat and Peteraf, 2003 and Winter, 2003). The integrative approach, which is not actually conceptually based, views DCs as amending capabilities through the addition of a dynamic process ( Adner and Helfat, 2003, Kor and Mahoney, 2005 and Teece et al., 1997). Finally, the innovation routine approach draws on the theory of innovation routine to define DCs as problem-solving patterns and organizational procedures that entail a stable pattern of activity and learning through organizational governance cooperation ( Doving and Gooderham, 2008 and Zollo and Winter, 2002). Luo (2000) and Weerawardena, Mort, Liesch, and Knight (2007) both propose that DCs in international expansion indicate dynamic learning. Dynamic learning determines a company's ability to upgrade its resources capabilities. Klievink and Janssen (2009) state that organizational integration is key to DCs exploitation. An empirical investigation by Zhou and Li (2010) shows that strategic orientation positively impacts DCs Malik (2008) argues that forming alliances with multinational enterprises can create DCs. Empirical research by Hung,Yang, Lien, Mclean, and Kuo (2009) shows that process alignment and learning culture positively impact DCs exploitation and organizational performance. Therefore, although the literature suggests that a firm's organizational system and its learning are key DCs exploiting groundwork, little attention has been paid to DCs exploitation in market and hierarchy governance structures with a focus on DLMs. Therefore, this study follows the innovation routine approach to address gaps in the study of DCs exploitation via drivers of DLMs and to offer a more robust understanding of DCs exploitation in market and hierarchy governance structures. In today's high-velocity environment, economic institutions frequently adopt market or hierarchy governance structures to achieve a sustainable competitive position, reduce transaction costs, overcome resource limitations, and enhance DCs exploitation. A 2008 economic report issued by the Taiwanese government shows that medium- and small-size enterprises account for 97.63% of all Taiwanese enterprises and employ 77.12% of all laborers; this represents a type of market expansion. In contrast, large enterprises account for 64% of South Korea's gross domestic product; this represents a type of hierarchy expansion. Therefore, most Taiwanese and South Korean firms represent two different competitive growth strategies and two different DCs exploitation systems: market and hierarchy governance structures. Therefore, it is important to understand how governance structure (i.e., market or hierarchy) exploits DCs via different drivers of dynamic learning mechanisms (DLMs). This study follows Williamson (1991) by showing that markets are based on autonomous incentive- and contract-based cooperation, and hierarchies involve high administrative control, dependency, and more formal, orchestrated organizations. This paper offers two contributions to the research on DCs. First, it highlights an influential innovation routine view of DCs exploitation and proposes a clear theoretical model of DCs exploitation. Second, it reveals the role of drivers of DLMs in DCs exploitation, differentiates the roles of drivers of DLMs in market and hierarchy governance structures, and addresses gaps in the research on DCs exploitation via DLMs to offer a more robust understanding of DCs exploitation in polar governance structures.