مقررات برای فن آوری های نسل آینده و بازار

Intense technological dynamics is perturbing the classical liberalisation course of fixed telephony markets followed in most national policies. Major shifts in the distribution of production costs of regulated firms are induced by modern microelectronics, photonics, and fixed and mobile internet platforms, creating new networked service markets adjacent to the regulated telephone activities. The confluence of regulated and unregulated markets poses dilemmas in deciding on issues of open access to the new opportunities for competitive providers and/or consumers. This contribution briefly discusses the general regulatory issues and two specific cases, namely, fixed-mobile service integration and licensing of third-generation mobile networks.

After the opening of the telecommunications market in the European Union (EU) on January 1, 1998 and in many countries around the world, a number of fundamental questions still have to be answered about the most appropriate way(s) to ensure rapid replacement of regulated monopoly providers by a su$cient number of competitive "rms. For decades, diametrically opposite virtues, issues and legal foundations of the initial monopoly and the ultimate ideal of a competitive telecommunications market were studied and debated by academics. Nowmore practical problems posed by dynamic, but uncertain markets in transition are upon us. It seems apparent that the technological dynamics and economic characteristics of the liberalised communication sector(s) must be better observed and analysed in a more e!ective manner. Digital information and communications technologies (ICT) o!er a unique combination of innovative features and options with substantial economic signi"cance: 1. transport with the speed of light (unlike pipelines, rails, roads, etc.); 2. transport without loss of quality and value (unlike electric power); 3. instant copying/broadcasting, bundling and re-routing/re"ling of information (unlike the mail, printing and publishing sectors); 4. complementary customer-access options*choice between wired access (with strong economies of scale, scope and/or density) and wireless networks (with area-coverage abilities, e.g. cellular mobile networks, broadcasting with or without conditional access); 5. lightweight/portable terminal devices (unlike sea, air and rail networks). In competition terms, such factors determine relevant geographical markets (which can be much larger than a national or even European jurisdiction) and novel product markets (with, for instance, the ability to bundle products or services on converging markets). Accordingly, this sector di!ers fundamentally from other networked economic sectors, such as power distribution or airline transport. This short article attempts to open a discussion of some related regulatory dilemmas more widely than they generally take place.

Increased dynamics and global importance of a key business sector does not, per se, provide a logical justi"cation for regulating it less, but only for regulating it di!erently. The challenge is to determine how telecommunication services should be monitored and regulated in the future, given their rapidly growing dynamics and global economic impact. In order to address this question, it will be necessary to study and weigh the likely consequences of di!erent options for regulatory intervention to correct market imperfections, at each of the four levels in Fig. 2. As for economic dilemmas, it must be decided how the increasingly complicated bottleneck issues in the future will be resolved in a timely manner. What are the transaction costs of relying on commercial negotiations with dominant gatekeepers or between peer (IP) competitors, without recourse to validated cost information from the dominant players? Alternatively, should such players be forced a priori to certain (behavioural) terms of trade, or even to (structural) divestiture of horizontal ownership of communication networks? These dilemmas relate to the elimination of negative externalities. It is equally necessary to address the positive externalities of networks. Can global communications and information services develop satisfactorily without some ex ante safeguards for consistent numbering/domain names, standardised roaming parameters, directories and other matters determining the ability to identify and address a growing number of users in the general public? There is pressure for extending ONP rules in the direction of competition law, for at least two related reasons: (a) the compelling cost trends of modern information and communication technologies (ICT), which will erode the economic principles of classical networks by &the death of distance' and by the increasing processing power of terminals and switching (Fig. 1) in liberalised markets, and * as a consequence * will enhance the relative signi"cance of the cost of network access; (b) as recognised by the recent WTO agreements, the increasingly global nature and impact of basic telecommunications services, which*much like the international "nancial system in the latter half of the 1990s * will reveal any anomalies and shortcomings of national monitoring and regulation, with potentially harmful e!ects on regional economies. This conjugate pair of observations indicates the need for, on the one hand, internationally agreed and enforced principles of liberalisation, and, on the other hand, closer monitoring of the local gatekeepers controlling bottleneck facilities for access to networks and/or customers. A paradox would appear to emerge; even if market disciplines can now be relied upon for core/longdistance networks, the bene"ts of a direct choice between such networks are hardly enjoyed by the majority of individual users or new entrants. How should such market imperfections be addressed? The following items might be considered as part of an agenda of inquiry into potential network-market failures or signi"cant imperfections: 1. Where are the future bottlenecks in the Open Space for Communications (Fig. 3), other than conditional access systems and local loops/radio interfaces of individual network subscribers? 2. Should speci"c vertical and/or horizontal business-line restrictions or demands for complete divestiture of activities be imposed on players with signi"cant market power in the Open Space for Competition? 3. Should network operators with signi"cant market power on the telephony market in the Open Space for Communication (Fig. 3) be allowed to engage in Internet activities? 4. How should interconnection between Internet providers be ensured in the future? 5. How should &reasonable' prices (or pro"ts) of suppliers with signi"cant market power be determined in future regulations, if at all? The challenge for the future is to develop models of regulation that can e!ectively answer those questions in very dynamic market environments.