تفکیک در حال رشد: تقسیم کار و تفکیک نهادهای غیررسمی

In this paper, we model the co-evolution of the division of labor and informal institutions based on three assumptions. First, informal institutions lower coordination costs among specialists, which increases the equilibrium division of labor. Second, advances in the division of labor increase the size of interpersonal trading groups and thereby undermine the game theoretic basis of informal institutions. Finally, the collective nature of informal institutions implies that they are undervalued in private decision making. Together these assumptions imply that the equilibrium division of labor is too high from a social perspective. Consequently, the economy has greater than optimal complexity and grows at a higher than optimal rate of growth. Journal of Comparative Economics34 (1) (2006) 75–91.

Although growth leads to improvements in the material standard of living, psychic costs may accompany these benefits. Putnam (2000) and Tam (1998) focus on the complexity of modern life and the resulting breakdown of community. However, these conjectures have not been subject to formal analysis. Any attempt to investigate these concerns must provide a link between economic complexity and economic development and explain why the actual and optimal levels of economic complexity differ. In this paper, we consider one such link by analyzing the relationship between the division of labor and informal institutions. In growth models, the division of labor is endogenized by assuming that agents face a trade-off between gains to specialization and interpersonal coordination costs, as in Yang and Borland (1991), Tamura, 1992 and Tamura, 1996, Becker and Murphy (1992) and Davis, 2001, Davis, 2003a and Davis, 2003b. Gains to specialization may offset diminishing returns to capital, establishing the basis for a virtuous cycle of growth driven by accumulation and the evolution of the division of labor. With the division of labor dependent on a web of interpersonal exchange, this literature provides a link between economic growth and increases in the complexity of economic life. The complexity of economic organization depends on individual labor specialization decisions and the resulting degree of interpersonal economic interdependence.

In this paper, we formalize the notion that development causes a systematic deterioration of informal institutions by developing a dynamic model in which the evolution of the division of labor both drives growth and undermines the group-theoretic basis of effective informal institutions. If individuals consider the quality of informal institutions to be independent of their specialization decisions, the equilibrium division of labor is too high from a social perspective and the economy may be characterized as too complex. In addition, since the return to capital is increasing in labor specialization, over-specialization results in a greater-than-optimal growth rate. Thus, we conclude that the development process undermines traditional social structures and does not account fully for the costs involved in weakening them.