برای بهتر شدن یا بدتر شدن ؟ اثرات محلی تمرکز زدایی از بخش جنگل اندونزی

This paper quantifies the local impacts of mechanized logging on forest-dependent communities in Indonesia, before and after decentralization. A conceptual framework incorporates financial, social, enforcement, rent-seeking, and environmental impacts. Using data from 60 communities in East Kalimantan, the empirical results suggest that significantly more households received financial and in-kind benefits after decentralization compared to before. Many communities engaged in self-enforcement activities against firms both before and after decentralization. Post-decentralization, a significantly higher proportion of households perceived community forest ownership. There were few significant differences in perceived environmental impacts. Little evidence exists of a post-decentralization trade-off between environmental and financial contractual provisions.

Until the 1997 East Asian crisis, Indonesia experienced rapid growth over a prolonged period under an autocratic political structure and highly centralized fiscal system.1 The old political structure however, did not survive the crisis, and the country is now gradually becoming accustomed to a multi-party democratic system. Beginning with the 2004 elections, the president will also be elected through a direct popular vote. The role of local level legislatures has increased as a result of decentralization; and they will therefore have much greater impact on the country than in the past. The general expectation is that democracy will lay a more solid and sustainable foundation for broad based economic development in Indonesia, and will be better able to mediate conflicts among different regions and groups. As political power becomes more diffused resulting in multi-centric power structure, an ambitious program of decentralization is being implemented, with potentially far reaching implications for the Indonesian polity and the fiscal system (Sidik and Kadjatmiko 2002; Ahmad and Mansoor 2002; Alm, Aten and Bahl 2001). The two seminal laws on decentralization, Law Number 22/1999 on RegionalGovernment (UU PD), and Law Number 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and Regions (UU PKPD) came into being in 1999. These laws and their implementing regulations envisage rapid and major correction of the anomaly that in spite of satisfying conditions of decentralization such as large population (210 million in 2001), land area (1.94 million sq kilometer spread over nearly 17,000 islands), diverse population, and regional inequalities in development, its fiscal system until 1999 was among the most centralized (Alm, Aten and Bahl 2001).2 Indonesia is witnessing transfer of a significant degree of fiscal power and responsibility from central to the lower levels of government (comprising 31 provinces, 410 districts, about 4000 Kecamantan, and nearly 70,000 villages as of early 2003). Decentralization appears to have provided fiscal and other incentives to form new units of government (Asanuma and Bambang 2003). This could complicate coordination among various local governments as the externalities, economies of scale and scope, and spillover effects tend to vary for different activities, and therefore may not coincide with political boundaries. Decentralization has also permitted experimentation with different organization structures of local governments, making comparative analysis more difficult (Matsui and Kuncoro 2003).

Indonesia has embarked on a decentralization process with far reaching implications for its fiscal system and the political economy. While the initial implementation of decentralization has been relatively smoother than anticipated, formidable challenges in reaching the goals of decentralization remain. These include addressing vertical and horizontal imbalances, building institutions, which could mediate in central- regional government as well as inter-provincial disputes, and provision of additional revenue sources from provinces and districts. Indeed, even partial reversal of ambitious decentralization can not be completely ruled out. This paper has analyzed the role, which the two components of the property tax, Land and Building Tax (PBB) and change on Transfer of Land and Building (BPTHB), can play in the decentralization process. The analysis in this paper suggests that there is a modest scope for increasing the share of own-revenues particularly by Kota and Kabupaten, if they are given greater discretion in setting the property tax rates. The centralized administration is however considered necessary, as there are substantial scale and scope economies, particularly in valuation. Making the property tax a truly local tax, including valuation, can realistically be only a very long-term goal. Continued improvements in valuation techniques and expertise and improvements in implementing urban property tax will need to be further emphasized if the property tax is to play greater role in Indonesia’s fiscal system. Recognition and capacity building in information management and high quality research concerning fiscal decentralization arrangements also need to be strengthened.