شناخت و بهبود پاسخگویی در آموزش و پرورش : چارچوب مفهومی و راهنمایانی از سه تجربه ی اصلاحات تمرکز زدایی در امریکای لاتین

Many countries have emphasized hierarchical control or different exit and voice mechanisms to increase accountability of educational systems. We build a framework for understanding accountability reforms and develop three illustrative Latin American cases representing distinct approaches (Chile, Nicaragua, and Bogotá, Colombia). We highlight the complexity of institutional change and the value of flexible reform models. Using an institutional perspective we examine the components of accountability; their complex interrelationships; and the importance of design details, implementation, and monitoring. We argue for balancing clear and efficient top-down monitoring and enforcement with other, less punitive accountability mechanisms including strong local quality support systems.

This paper develops and applies a framework outlining actors and relationships that are important to understanding how accountability functions in education service provision, highlighting the challenges associated with accountability as a policy lever for school improvement. We adapt the World Bank’s (2003) well-known and influential accountability framework for service provision that distinguishes the accountability relationships embedded in the political, bureaucratic, and institutional arrangements that govern the provision of educational services. Following Hirschman (1970) we pay attention to exit and voice: Exit alternatives attempt to introduce competition between different providers, while voice alternatives allow parents to express preferences and opinions around education service delivery. Using this framework, we examine three case study reforms that attempted to strengthen quality incentives through a combination of voice, exit, and other institutional mechanisms. We describe the characteristics of the reforms and explore their potential effects on practice and outcomes, focusing on aspects of voice- and exit-related mechanisms and other accountability factors. We take an institutional perspective in our analysis, paying careful attention to implementation challenges in each of our cases.

Table 1 summarizes key findings from the three case studies. The table presents the primary reform components, the reforms’ intended effects on incentives, evidence of the reforms’ impact on practices and outcomes, and the challenges associated with implementation. In all three of the reforms there is some evidence that the manner in which accountability and incentives operated were different in the nontraditional models, most notable in the way teachers were monitored and supervised. There is limited evidence that those changes translated into improvements in either instruction or achievement and they do not appear to have affected classroom practices, even if they do appear to have improved accountability. The finding aligns with Levin’s (1974) assertion that improved accountability should not be expected to be associated with corresponding system-wide improvements. No big or discontinuous jump in outcomes was observed nor should be expected in all three cases: the benchmark is necessarily a national standard, selection of students was an easier route to improve results than improving efficiency and many key areas were untouched, such as the quality of institutions in charge of teacher formation and training.