چارچوبی برای ارزیابی اقدام جمعی و پویایی سازمانی رسمی تحت سیاست مدیریت منابع تمرکز زدایی

The decentralization of resource property rights has become an increasingly popular policy in many natural resource-dependent communities of the developing world. However, the success of this policy approach depends on both collective action and institutionalization. It is therefore important to evaluate collective action and institutionalization where the process of property rights decentralization is in progress. This paper presents a modified version of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework designed to analyze the decentralization of property rights and the collective action of community members to obtain these rights. It describes a three-phased framework for analyzing: i) the government property right decentralization policy, ii) the stock of capital assets in the community required to achieve property rights by initiating collective action, and iii) the development of an informal institution for effective property right distribution in the community. Finally, to demonstrate its utility to collective action research, we present a case study application of our modified framework to the fisheries property right decentralization policy of the Bangladesh government and the subsequent collective action of a wetland-dependent community.

Since the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987, community participation in natural resource management has been given more attention by researchers and policy makers (Atkinson et al., 2007, p-2). Moreover, the intellectual movement towards community ownership of resources rather than government or private ownership has driven greater community participation in resource management (Ostrom, 1997). At the same time, deep-rooted relationships between decentralization, collective action and property rights have caused many governments to recognize the important role of communities in natural resource management for achieving sustainable development and conservationrelated goals (Agrawal, 2001 and Ostrom et al., 1992). In the context of decentralization, two regulatory regimes can be found to affect natural resource management: informal institutions and formal institutions. During the process of decentralization, formal institutions play the role of patron, regulating the decentralization of property rights to resource-dependent communities. On the other hand, informal institutions define the local regulatory regime, including the roles and responsibilities of resource users. Blaikie (2006) and Ribot (2004, pp. 12–13) observed that decentralization is successful only when accountability, transparency, participation and equity are established in both formal and informal institutions. Further, Kahkanon (1998) noted that the establishment of accountability, transparency, participation and equity in informal institutions enhances the collective action of a community. Ostrom, 2000a and Ostrom, 2000b summarized that collective action drives the community to formulate the rules in use or de facto rules to sustain the resource use under a decentralized property rights regime.

Understanding the complex interaction among actors and their collective actions over natural resources can provide substantial knowledge for policy makers seeking more efficient and effective frameworks to support sustainable rural livelihoods. We have presented a modified version of the IAD framework designed to analyze the decentralization of property rights and the collective action of community members to obtain these rights. This three-phased framework involves analyzing: i) the government property right decentralization policy, ii) the stock of capital assets in the community required to achieve property rights by initiating collective action, and iii) the development of an informal institution for effective property right distribution in the community. To demonstrate the utility of our modified framework to collective action research, we presented a case study application to understand the impacts of the fisheries property right decentralization policy of the Bangladesh government on the collective action of a wetland-dependent community. Our analysis revealed that the collective action in our study area had three important attributes: (i) community participation in decentralized fisheries management was being manipulated for private gain by local leaders (power asymmetry); (ii) access to information was difficult for community members leading to information asymmetry; and (iii) fish productivity, equipment or technology use and property rights depended on financial capital investment, allowing external financing sources to play a central role. Based on our analysis, two aspects of the formal policy framework can be seen as driving these outcomes: (i) the tax-based non-permanent property right decentralization mechanism; and (ii) inefficient and ineffective information transfer and monitoring mechanisms. More broadly, the lack of a learning mechanism in the implementation of the existing policy combined with no provision for environmental conservation have led to a failure of the government's community-based natural resource policy.