نظارت IMF و بازارهای مالی- تجزیه و تحلیل اقتصاد سیاسی

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is in the process of re-inventing itself with bilateral and multilateral surveillance emerging as a key function. The paper analyses how IMF surveillance announcements may be influenced by political power that member countries exert at the IMF. First, we analyze the content of Article IV Public Information Notices (PIN), and second, we use the financial market reaction to the released PINs as tools to identify the role of political economy factors for IMF surveillance. For a set of emerging market economies, the paper finds that financial markets react more favorable to PIN releases for politically influential member countries. Moreover, IMF surveillance appears to be systematically more favorable for countries with larger IMF loans outstanding, consistent with the finding in the literature that the IMF may engage in ‘defensive surveillance’.

The recent financial crisis has induced an intense search by policy makers for a fundamental change in the international financial architecture, with the objective of not only re-establishing global economic and financial stability in the short-run but also to safeguard such stability over the longer term. The G20 process, where much of this policy debate is currently taking place, envisages endowing in particular the IMF with a widened set of responsibilities in this regard. The IMF is thus standing at a crossroad in its search for a clearly defined role in the global economic and financial order. It is undergoing two fundamental changes. One concerns a re-definition of its function in the global financial system, in particular in light of the financial crisis; the other a fundamental shift in the balance of political power within the institution. A central tool for the IMF that is set to gain further in importance is surveillance, both at the bilateral level and at the multilateral level, which is emerging as a key function for the IMF

The IMF is standing at a cross-road in its search for a new role in the global economic and financial order. For quite some time now, scholars have argued for greater IMF transparency (e.g. Fischer, 1999). Surveillance, both at the bilateral level and at the multilateral level, has been emerging as a key function for the IMF. The present paper has attempted to assess the experience of the IMF's surveillance over the last decade. It has asked to what extent this IMF surveillance process has been influenced by political economy factors and through other channels.