دستیابی به هدف با مشارکت قابل اعتماد در سطح تاکتیکی
|کد مقاله||سال انتشار||تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی|
|3490||2010||7 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید|
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Publisher : Elsevier - Science Direct (الزویر - ساینس دایرکت)
Journal : Research in Transportation Economics, Volume 29, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 99–105
Recent Thredbo Conferences have begun to explore the importance of the relationship between public transport service purchaser and provider in the development of successful public transport services. However, practical examples to test the trusting partnership model are rare. Bus service planning and delivery in Melbourne, Australia, has pioneered the trusting partnership approach, from agreement about desirable service standards and requisite operator qualifications (at the Tactical level) to detailed service delivery contracts. New negotiated performance-based metropolitan bus contracts commenced in January 2009, embodying principles discussed in previous Thredbo Conferences. This paper reports on the Tactical planning process that agreed service standards and the subsequent contract negotiation process, reflecting a trusting partnership between purchaser and provider, while remaining transparent and accountable and maintaining performance pressure on the provider. It shows how patronage growth rates have increased dramatically and identifies areas where further enhancements should be explored in the contracting area.
An emerging focus of the Thredbo Conference series has been the way theory and practice evolve and inform each other in the contracting of public transport service provision. An important development over the past four Conferences has been the focus on the theory and practice of negotiated performance-based contracts (NPBCs), particularly as an alternative to competitive tendering, as a means to award the right to provide service (see, for example, Hensher & Houghton, 2005, Hensher & Stanley, 2003, Hensher & Stanley 2009, Stanley et al., 2007, Yvrande-Billon, 2007). A common rationale for NPBCs is to deal with the inevitable uncertainty that creates difficulty for ex ante contract specification and tender bidding, by adopting an awarding mechanism that can be adaptive and sustain performance pressure during the course of the contract. To this extent, NPBCs reflect alliance contracting as used in such areas as building and construction and infrastructure Public Private Partnerships more broadly. The evidence that savings from competitive tendering (CT) diminish beyond first round tenders has further encouraged this search for alternative awarding mechanisms that can sustain performance pressure (Wallis & Hensher, 2005). Hensher and Houghton (2005) and Hensher and Stanley (2008) outline many of the merits of NPBCs as compared to contracts that are let by CT. These, and other, Thredbo papers stress the importance of CT as a fall-back mechanism in the event that service providers operating under NPBCs do not measure up adequately against their key performance indicators. Using a transaction costs framework, Yvrande-Billon (2007) outlines some of the difficulties facing CT that have helped foster an interest in NPBCs and also points to some French experiences of operator opportunism. A further important rationale seen by some proponents of NPBCs is the belief that this contract form is most likely to support a trusting partnership between purchaser and provider and that, given scarce skills on both sides, such a relationship is more likely to maximise goal achievement through service provision than an awarding mechanism based on CT (Stanley, Betts, & Lucas, 2007). Case studies are needed to explore this belief. This paper examines the evolution of debate at the Thredbo Conference Series about trusting partnerships for the development and delivery of public transport services and describes how the approach has been pursued in Melbourne bus system/service planning and contracting. In Section 2 it summarises some details of the Tactical system planning for Melbourne bus services and the subsequent route bus service contracts which have been implemented, both specifically framed from this trusting partnership perspective. Section 3 places this issue within the contextual framework provided by Williamson’s (1985) discussion on contracting forms. Section 4 outlines patronage growth experience on Melbourne’s buses, arguing that there is a link between accelerated patronage growth and the strong trusting relationship between purchaser and provider. Section 5 presents some suggestions for ways to enhance the relationship while maintaining performance pressure, accountability and transparency.
نتیجه گیری انگلیسی
If patronage is any test, the dramatic change in growth trends being achieved in Melbourne is evidence that something is going right. The Victorian Auditor General, in his recent review of the contracting process, recognised that the outcome will improve value for money but was critical of the Department of Transport for delays in implementing the KPI process. Surprisingly, that report did not dwell on the patronage outcome achievement but focused mainly on whether due process was followed in contracting (Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, 2009). The contention of this paper is that the Melbourne outcome is strongly dependent on the trusting relationship that has developed between the Victorian Government and the Melbourne route bus industry, with the associated agreements about the purposes to which services are directed, Tactical level system development directions and contractual content. On-going formal and informal meetings continue, at which issues are flagged, problems dealt with, ideas discussed, demonstration studies agreed and research proposals debated and implemented. Further work remains to be completed to implement some of the contract KPIs, but delays are fundamentally due to matters beyond the control of the contracting partners (being due to delays in implementing the smartcard ticketing system, as noted above). Both parties remain committed to implementation as soon as possible. One area where further effort is likely is in the development of a charter of obligations, which could provide an umbrella for all important matters concerning the relationship between purchaser and providers. At present, Tactical level matters are discussed between bus operators and one area within the State Department of Transport. Contracts are negotiated with a separate section. While there is internal departmental discussion to ensure that a single departmental view covers the relationship with the bus industry, more formal documentation of such matters may help to ensure the relationship survives beyond the participation of those who have committed such time to its establishment. This charter could include, for example, how to handle Tactical level matters, common provisions that operators must meet to be able to hold a contract, governance arrangements (including mutual obligations) and the role of the contract and supporting documentation, such as Practice Notes (which set out the interpretation the parties intend to apply to the working through of certain contractual matters, such as selective tendering for non-orbital SmartBus services). Contract simplification would be expected under the umbrella of such a charter, focusing mainly on price, specific KPIs and special circumstances.